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PHILIP PANETH

TURKEY—DECADENCE AND REBIRTH

Türk, ogün, çalis, güven

(Turk, be proud, work, be confident)

Kemal Atatürk's message to the
Turkish people, engraved on a
monument in Ankara.

TURKEY—

DECADENCE AND REBIRTH

By

PHILIP PANETH



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TURKEY—DECADENCE AND REBIRTH

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BOOK ONE

CHAPTER I.

RISE AND FALL

AMONG THE NATIONS THAT HAVE FLOURISHED and decayed, ruled and been conquered, the Turkish nation stands out by reason of its formative and recuperative power. Founders, rulers, heirs and losers of one of the great empires, a power mighty in three continents, the Turks have experienced all the vicissitudes a people can undergo. Theirs was the power and glory of conquest in the days when half of Europe was their tributary; theirs was the shame of the conquered as the invaders tramped the streets of their capital. They knew the blessings of wise laws and a model administration, but also the ravages of corruption, ignorance and a justice bought, sold, denied and delayed. From the rulers of half the known world they had become the servants of foreigners, and the name of their state had become a by-word for sloth, corruption, inefficiency and decay.

And then occurred what has been called the miracle of modern Turkey—the resurrection, by his own efforts, of the “Sick Man” who was already believed dead. It was a regeneration which, however drastic and sometimes brutal the methods employed to achieve it, commanded the admiration of the world.

Only the first stage of this regeneration is completed at the present juncture, a period which closes with the death of Kemal Ataturk and the outbreak of the present war. It is the revolutionary period of the Turkish Reformation, comparable to the first period of the Bolshevik régime up to the death of Lenin. Like Russia then, Turkey is now faced with the problem of her external relations. Her house has been put in order during a period of almost complete isolation from Europe and its politics. The time has come for Turkey, like Soviet Russia, to decide whether her part is to be that of a European power or whether her face will be turned towards Asia.

* * *

Legend and tradition has it that the Turks are descended from Ismael, the rebellious son of Abraham the Patriarch. It was as rebels and conquerors that they first entered the arena of history.

They did so at one of the eternal cross-roads of human traffic and intercourse, at the point where a narrow sheet of water divides Europe and Asia. There the Greeks founded the city of Byzantium. Through the ages Byzantium—Constantinople—was the place where two worlds

met, in peaceful trade and amid the clash of arms. It was here that the hordes of Darius and Xerxes set out on their ill-fated attempt to subjugate Europe; it was here that Alexander's Macedonian phalanxes formed their ranks for the conquest of Asia.

Byzantium grew rich. Here camped the caravans bringing spices and silks from Persia and India, China and Baghdad. Here anchored the grain ships bringing their cargoes from the Pontus, the region now known as the Crimea; hides and skins from the Scythians living at the mouths of Russia's great rivers. Each ship must sail through the narrow straits to reach the Mediterranean, and paid dues to those who held the narrows.

Some three hundred years after the beginning of the Christian era the Roman empire had progressed far on the road to decadence. While Christianity was sapping the strength of the realm, opposing emperors struggled for power. The empire was finally split into two parts, a western half whose capital was Rome, and the eastern part whose emperor resided in Byzantium, now named Constantinopolis. When Rome finally fell to the German barbarians (476 A.D.) the Eastern Empire was all that remained of a thousand years of Greek and Roman civilisation.

* * *

Those were the days when economic and other causes—the reasons are not yet fully known—began to set in motion a vast migration of tribes, peoples and what was later to become nations. With the slow but irresistible impetus of a stream of lava, these barbarian tribes flowed towards that eternal melting pot of nations, the Mediterranean. Some tribes had pushed far eastward, into Asia; but their progress had been stopped by the Chinese emperors of the Huan dynasty, who built the Chinese Wall which forced them back. They were the ancestors of the Huns, Avars, Magyars—all of them belonging to the Turcoman tribe which is believed to have originated somewhere in the Central Asian Steppe.¹ While the Goths, Vandals, Teutons and other Germanic tribes assailed the decaying Roman Empire from the North and West, the Vandals even occupying what is now Tunis in North Africa, the waves of invasion from the East broke on the firm rock of Constantinople.

The city was beautiful and resplendent beyond description. It was the last stronghold of European civilisation, defended by the best armies, the foremost generals of the age. Belizarius, one of the greatest military leaders of all times, fought her battles; Justinian codified Roman Law in the stupendous work of the Pandects which to this day form the basis of most of our law; and beside this magnificent structure of the mind he erected (in 537 A.D.) the majestic building of the Cathedral of Hagia Sophia, the temple of 'holy wisdom' which for a thousand years remained the shrine of Eastern Christianity.¹ No wonder that during the centuries it has remained the goal of longing for Greeks and Russians; to raise the cross on the dome of Hagia Sophia remained the sacred injunction given by Peter the Great to his successors on the throne of the Czars.

¹ Since 1543 the church has been a mosque; it has lately been converted into a museum.

Byzantium the Beautiful stood on the threshold of the Orient, barring the gates of the Occident, forbidding and inviting; and many conquerors tried to possess her. Nine times the Bulgars and Avars tried in vain; but Byzantium held out. The Crusaders finally occupied the town, and it was only Enrico Dandolo, the great Doge who laid the foundations of Venice's naval power, who in 1204 succeeded in driving out the invaders and establishing the Latin Empire. But while Christian fought Christian, a graver danger was arising under the walls of the City.

The Osmanli tribe set out to conquer Anatolia, and thereby for the first time entered the limelight of History. They had been tributaries to the Seldjuks whose empire began under the walls of Constantinople—a remainder of the giant Mongol empire that had comprised all Asia, including China, and cast its threatening shadow over Europe.

In the thirteenth century the Mongol empire began to disintegrate, and during the ensuing period of chaotic warfare, when each tribe endeavoured to extend its possessions, the Turks began to rise into prominence. Their leader was Ertogrul, who led his tribe from Armenia into north-western Asia Minor; they settled on territory which was nominally Greek but could no longer be effectively controlled by the dwindling power of Byzantium. Osman, Ertogrul's son (1288-1326) extended the frontiers of his small state and made Brussa its capital.

Brussa lies in a fruitful plain, overshadowed by the *Ulu Dag*, once Mount Olympus. It became the centre of a well-administered state. Osman was a capable leader both in peace and war. He adopted Islam but remained tolerant—a trait that remained characteristic of Turkey before decadence set in.

Osman's territories grew, together with the number of his followers, who were called *Osmanli*, 'Men of Osman,' also 'Ottomans.' The chaotic situation in Anatolia favoured the rapid development of the Turkish kingdom. Constantinople, decadent, torn by internal factions and involved in constant wars with Slav intruders, was in no position to halt Turkish expansion. That expansion did not exclusively consist of the barbarous subjugation and spoliation of subject peoples but also of cultural penetration and assimilation. Anybody who adopted Islam could join the Turkish nation with equal rights. Osman's outlook was by no means narrow; he is even said to have travelled abroad and to have visited France.

His son, Orkhan, reaches the Dardanelles—a day's journey from Constantinople. Orkhan was no longer young when he succeeded his father. He led his troops to the aid of the Emperor of Constantinople against Christian adversaries, and was rewarded with the hand of one of the less attractive Imperial Princesses. But Orkhan disliked the enervating and luxurious life of the imperial court and returned to his own realm. Here he created one of the most powerful instruments for subsequent military expansion, in the Janissars (*Yeni chari* = new soldiers), the sons of former Christians who became the élite of the Turkish army.

Aggressive expansion began under Orkhan's son, Murad I (1359-

1389). He conquered Adrianople which now became his capital, and Serbia, a conquest which for centuries was to shift the balance of Turkish influence from Asia to Europe. Murad exacted tribute from the Emperor of Byzantium who vainly demanded help from the Pope and the rulers of Venice.

Turkey's fourth Sultan, Bajazid (1389-1403), conquers Macedonia, Thessalia and Macedonia; but his army is defeated by Timur (Tamerlane), the last great ruler of the Mongols. Yet Turkey recovered quickly, and when the Mongol Empire broke up, the Turks were uncontested masters of Serbia, Rumelia, Hungary, Transylvania—in fact, the whole of the Balkans. The formerly unknown Osmanli tribe subsequently extended its dominion to the gates of Moscow and Poland in the North, Styria in the West, the whole of North Africa and Egypt.

Constantinople was doomed. Fighting bravely to the last, Constantine Palæologus, the last emperor of Byzantium, the heir of the Greeks and the Romans, falls on the threshold of his palace. May 29th, 1453, sees the end of the Roman Empire. Sultan Mohammed II makes Constantinople his capital.

* * *

With the occupation of Constantinople, Turkey became a Mediterranean power. Trade and piracy—terms often synonymous in those days—brought the Turks into contact with the West. The conquest of Constantinople taught them the meaning of luxury; the taking over of an empire carried with it the task of imperial expansion.

Carried forward with irresistible impetus by their faith, for the second time since the Moors had invaded Europe the followers of Islam swept on. Christendom trembled. Those who could not, like Francis, Most Christian King of France, come to terms with the Turks had to fight. The power of Venice and Genoa was shaken; the remaining Balkan States fell one after the other.

Under Suleiman II (1520-1556), called The Magnificent by the West, The Lawgiver by the Turks, Turkey's golden age saw her at the height of her power. The '*Grand Seigneur*' conquered Tunis and Algiers, Mosul and Baghdad. Serbia fell, Hungary was enslaved, Persia defeated. The Turkish flood rolled up to the walls of Vienna. Here they suffered their first reverse, followed by another: their failure to take Malta, stubbornly defended by those most dissolute but most courageous of Christian knights, the Templars.

Yet these reverses did not yet affect the power of the Turkish empire. It flourished under Suleiman's wise rule. He showed moderation in victory and tolerance towards the subject peoples. Islam was, of course, the dominant creed, and those who adopted it could aspire to the highest dignities; but bigotry and zealotism were as yet unknown in the Turkish Empire. While Christian murdered Christian in internecine religious wars, while the Inquisition saved souls and burned bodies, while the Jews were persecuted with impartial fervour by all the sects of Christianity, Suleiman "cared for none of these things." When Spain in an access of bigoted fury expelled her Jews, Turkey gave generous asylum to the

refugees. That gifted race soon proved their gratitude by the valuable services they rendered to Turkey—services so useful and devoted that the Sultan exclaimed:

“Allah must have afflicted the King of Spain, that he should destroy his wealth and increase mine!” It was indeed a fact that Spain from that time onward declined while the countries who had given asylum to the Spanish Jews, Holland and Turkey, prospered.

Suleiman was a wise and mild ruler. In Europe the peasants were downtrodden serfs. In Germany they had attempted a revolt. It was stifled in a sea of blood by the feudal gentry (the first to bear the name of ‘Junker’) with the active and enthusiastic concurrence of Martin Luther, the reformator who in many respects can be considered Hitler’s spiritual precursor. Under Turkish rule the lot of the peasant, Moslem or Christian, was far better. Many Christian travellers of that age, brought up on tales of the “barbarous and bloodthirsty Turk,” naïvely expressed their astonishment when they observed the spirit of tolerance and enlightenment that reigned in the realm of the Turks.

Art and science flourished. The Turks showed respect and understanding for science and literature, different in this respect from their Moslem brothers, the Arabs. When they conquered Egypt, they burned the famous library of Alexandria, destroying invaluable treasures of ancient literature. Their leader coolly remarked that if the contents of those books disagreed with the Koran they deserved to be destroyed, while if they agreed with it they were superfluous.

This hatred of culture, so characteristic of the nomad Arab whose spirit is as arid as his desert, has never been a trait of the Turk. Where the Arab turned flourishing countries such as Palestine or North Africa, into deserts, cutting down trees and forests, the Turk has always been a lover of trees and running water. Suleiman executed public works on a large scale, improving his countries. His reign was one of enlightened absolutism; in the breadth of his conceptions no less than in his military achievements the ‘Grand Turk’ dwarfed his contemporaries on the thrones of Europe, not excluding Charles V. A contemporary traveller and diplomat in the service of the King of Hungary, the Flemish nobleman Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq, has left us a glowing description of Suleiman’s reign. Even if we discount the implication of moralising, of the mirror held up to the writer’s own time—a pitfall for travellers and explorers, from Tacitus who extolled the virtues of the Germans to Rousseau and his noble savages—we are left with the impression of well-ordered splendour and creative wisdom.

This is what Busbecq has to say of Turkish administration at the acme of her Golden Age:—

“Among all these high officials there is not one who has attained his position otherwise than by his own merits or courage. The advantages of birth or family do not count; everyone receives the honour due to the office he fills; there is no rivalry for precedence, as rank depends on office. The Sultan personally distributes office without considering either wealth or noble descent, or the favour and opinion of the people, but

judges each one according to his merits, character, manner of thought and talents, and each official is distinguished according to his deserts.

"Thus only capable men are promoted to official positions, and each holds his fate in his own hands. Among these immediately surrounding the Sultan are the sons of shepherds and peasants; they are not ashamed of their origin; on the contrary, they glory in it and esteem themselves the more for owing nothing to their ancestry or the accident of birth. Ability, according to their belief, is neither innate nor hereditary, but is partly a divine gift, partly due to strict discipline, hard work and great exertion, and just like art and learning, it does not pass from father to son. The soul does not take birth from the paternal seed, but flows, as it were, from Heaven.

"Hence among these people honours, dignity and high office are the rewards of ability; and dishonesty, indolence and incapacity are not esteemed, but despised. This has caused the Turks to dominate and flourish; they are the masters, and every day their empire increases in extent. We live after another fashion, with us there is no room for merit, everything depends on birth; the higher a man's birth the greater the honour he is given."

And Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq continues:—

"The burden of Turkish domination over Christians is not heavier than our own load of vice, debauchery, drunkenness, sensuality, arrogance, envy, hate, greed and jealousy, which bears us down so that we have neither thought for Heaven nor capacity for great deeds. We only exert our every effort to cross the limitless seas to India and the Antipodes to plunder the simple-minded people there, using as our pretext religion and the diffusion of our Christian faith while we plot to get their gold."

* * *

The decadence of an empire does not begin with a single fact that could be dated, one single event that stands out in the annals of the contemporary chronologer. Integrating and disintegrating forces are at work all the time, and the gradual preponderance of the latter is a slow process. The force of inertia carries on existing forms and an outward show of strength for a considerable time, despite the fact that the foundations may already be undermined. It is easier for the historian of a later age to discern motives and driving forces, and to discover the real causes of decay.

The epoch of Sultan Suleiman represented Turkey at the height of her power. Yet the Turkish historian Kochi Bey, writing two generations after Suleiman's death, is convinced that his reign marked the beginning of the decadence of Turkey. Confidence in his own judgment—and it must be admitted that he committed very few mistakes—induced the Sultan to cease consultation of the Council of State, thereby greatly reducing the prestige of that body which might be said to have been a relic of the democracy of the steppes. The fatally easy step from enlightened autocracy to tyrannical despotism had been taken.

Suleiman gave high office to inexperienced men; he closed his eyes when he saw his Grand Viziers selling appointments to the highest bidder:

corruption, the bedfellow of despotism, began to assail the State. Turkish sources relate that one of Suleiman's Viziers left 800 farms, 1,700 slaves and a fortune of two million ducats.

He also created a fatal precedent by allowing the imperial harem to meddle in affairs of State. Luxury, vice and indolence began to invade the empire and to weaken its military prowess. Under Suleiman, too, Turkey experienced her first decisive defeats, before Vienna, and against Malta. Suleiman himself fell during an attack on the Hungarian fortress Sziget Var whose valiant defender, John Zrinyi, is one of Hungary's national heroes.

As we have seen, the reversal of an empire's fortunes is rarely so sudden as not to allow for short periods of seeming recovery. After the catastrophe of Lepanto (1571) the eminent Turkish Statesman, Vizier Sokolli, succeeded for a time in keeping Spain and Venice in check, and he even conquered Cyprus.

But then a rapid decay set in. The 'Lawgiver's' wise and tolerant laws were rejected by his zealous successors. Bribery and the sale of public office spread throughout the administration, corrupted the army and the navy and undermined their striking power and discipline. There is a report, sent to London in 1622 by Sir Thomas Roe, the English Ambassador, in which he describes the position in Turkey as one of constant change. Soldiers were usurping the throne, only to be ousted by a new claimant. In sixteen months, Sir Thomas relates, he saw three Sultans, seven Grand Vizirs, two Captains of the Army and five Agas of the Janissars, and a corresponding number of changes in provincial government. Each official, the Ambassador relates, had only one aim: to squeeze as much as possible out of his job during his tenure, and then to sell it to the highest bidder.

This state of affairs remained characteristic of Turkish administration for three hundred years. Despite the heavy taxes the State was in a permanent state of virtual bankruptcy, reaching its peak under Abdul Hamid. The splendour of the Sultans and the greed of their high dignitaries sucked the country dry. It was in the reign of Abdul Hamid that a Turkish admiral sold some of his ships in order to pay his men.

* * *

Under Suleiman's successors Turkey's decline becomes visible. Campaign follows campaign, always resulting in the loss of territory. Checked under the walls of Vienna by John Sobieski, the Polish commander of the Christian army, Turkey loses Hungary in 1699. This year also marks the beginning of friction with Russia. In a series of wars with Russians and Cossacks, the Turks are ousted from the northern shore of the Black Sea.

Russian policy towards Turkey was determined by the famous Testament of Peter the Great. It is immaterial whether the document was actually written by the hand of Peter the Great or whether it is a later summing-up of the tendencies which have avowedly formed Russian policy for two centuries. All historians, including Russians, agree that

the so-called "Testament" of Peter is in complete accordance with the Pan-Slavist policy followed by Peter and his successors.

Russian aspirations to the throne of Constantinople date as far back as the end of the fifteenth century, when the first Tsar, Ivan Vassilevitch, married a niece of the Emperor Michael Palæologus. This marriage furnished the basis for subsequent Russian claims to be regarded as the protectors of Christianity in the Orient. Peter, who organised his people and gave them their first taste of expansion, assumed this rôle. In 1709 his emissaries in Valachia and Moldavia asked the population to rise against the Turkish yoke, and assured them of the protection of the Tsar.

An orthodox bishop conveniently discovered a prophecy allegedly hidden in the grave of the Emperor Constantine predicting that the Russians would free the Balkans from the yoke of the Turks.

But Peter's claims had a more realistic background than purely religious fervour. He realised that Turkey was the key to India. He who held Constantinople possessed the gate that could bar or open the overland route to the East. This conception of Peter's was the reason for Anglo-Russian antagonism during two centuries, and one of the factors that determined England to support Turkey when threatened with dismemberment.

It is interesting to note the relevant passages in the "Testament" of Peter the Great.¹ Point five reads:—

"We must interest Austria in driving the Turk out of Europe and under this pretext we must maintain a standing army and erect shipyards on the Black Sea while advancing all the time in the direction of Constantinople."

Point eight says:—

"Let my successors recognise this truth—that the trade of India is the trade of the world and that he who possesses it is the real master of Europe. Therefore we must miss no opportunity of fomenting wars in Persia, hasten her decay, penetrate to the Persian Gulf, and try to re-establish the ancient trade of the East."

Point eleven of the fourteen points of the "Testament" states:—

"We must use the power of religion over the disunited or schismatic Greeks who are to be found in Hungary, Turkey and the southern parts of Poland, in order to attach them to us by means of intrigues, so that we become their protectors and religious leaders. These Greeks must furnish the pretext and the means for the subjugation of Turkey . . ."

Peter's project was kept in sight by his successors, and Catherine II of Russia formulated one of the many projects of partitioning Turkey.

In 1769 the Russian Armies had decisively beaten the Turks on land and sea. They occupied Rumania and were prevented only by the intervention of Austria from annexing the territory. As it was, the Peace Treaty of 1774 obliged Russia to return Bessarabia, Moldavia and Valachia to Turkey. This Treaty put an end to plans for the partitioning of Turkey, negotiated for many years between Austria and Russia.

¹ Based on *Le Testament de Pierre-le-Grand* published by M. Sokolnicki in the *Revue des Sciences Politiques*.

Following the partition of Poland the appetite of the Great Powers had become not satiated but more acute, and Catherine of Russia tried, although in vain, to come to an agreement concerning Turkey with Vienna. But these plans miscarried; they did so for a reason that prevented all previous and subsequent plans of a similar nature from becoming a reality.

Emperor Joseph II of Austria expressed it in a letter to M. Ségur, "Constantinople will always be an object of jealousy and discord which will make it impossible for the Great Powers to agree on the partitioning of Turkey." Despite this proof of his political realism, Joseph finally fell in with the Russian suggestions and in 1780 a secret Treaty envisaged an attack on Turkey with a view to her subsequent dismemberment, but afterwards difficulties with France intervened and the project was dropped.

Turkey during her history has been the subject of no fewer than 100 projects for her partition. There was not a single European country that did not at one time or another cast covetous eyes at some Turkish territory; there is even a Polish project, published in 1833 by Bronikowski, who, curiously enough, proposed that Russia and the other Powers should be recompensed for the reconstitution of the Polish State with pieces of Turkey. One would have expected that the Poles would have been the last to suggest the dismemberment of another country as the foundation of their independence! ¹

During the nineteenth century the States and Principalities of the Balkans regained their independence, either ousting Turkish power completely or reducing it to a shadowy suzerainty. The liberation of Greece in the early Twenties with which the name of Byron is bound up in immortal glory, caused a curious conflict between English public opinion and the settled policy of the Government not dissimilar to the events accompanying the Spanish Civil War in 1936. Then, as now, popular opinion was on the side of those fighting for freedom, while the policy of the Government consisted of non-intervention. The only difference was the outcome . . .

CHAPTER II.

THE FOREIGNER

TURKEY HAD CEASED TO BE A THREAT TO EUROPE : it had become her prey. It may have been the innate discipline of the Turk that prevented the complete crumbling of the Empire as some Turkish historians assert; but it was undoubtedly the jealousy among the Great Powers that enabled her to continue in existence. Count Benedetti summed it up when he wrote in 1897: "The Cabinets will never be able to agree on this (the partition of Turkey); on the contrary, there is reason to believe that the military occupation of Turkey

¹ For an interesting summary of partition plans up to 1914, see *Cent Projets de Partage de La Turquie*, by T. G. Djuvara, Paris, 1914.

would be the prelude to a world war." It is this alone that explained why all the prophets of Turkey's speedy demise were proved wrong. In 1784 the Prussian Ambassador in Constantinople, Dietz, had reported to his master, Frederick the Great, that Turkey would be occupied by the Russians within ten years. A similar prediction was made by the Chevalier de Gentz in 1807, who went so far as to calculate that an expenditure of 200,000 lives would enable Russia to occupy Constantinople.

The reasons, or rather pretexts, adduced by the many actual and would-be interventionists in the affairs of Turkey were extremely threadbare. More often than not, religion had to serve as the cloak for sheer greed. Up to the period of her lowest decadence in the latter half of the nineteenth century the lot of the Christian populace under Turkish rule had been no worse and in some instances considerably better than in many European countries. If Moslems and Christians were able to live side by side for hundreds of years with a greater degree of tranquillity than the Christian nations of the West with their innumerable religious squabbles and persecutions were able to achieve, this must be attributed to the religious tolerance which has always characterized the Turks and other Turanian tribes, such as the Mongols. The privileges of the Orthodox Church were respected: when a Sultan in the sixteenth century had the idea of ordering the destruction of all churches in Constantinople built after 1453, the highest Moslem religious court intervened and pointed out that this measure would not only be detrimental to Turkish interests but in direct contradiction to the teachings of the Koran.

The Holy Book is definite in its injunctions of religious tolerance; the often-held belief that Islam enjoins its followers to exterminate all "unbelievers" with the sword is without foundation in the unadulterated tradition of Islam. Where such views were held they were the outcome of the bloodthirsty fanaticism characteristic of some Arab tribes, or the product of an Islam that shared the general decadence of latter-day Turkey. The Koran says (Chapter II, 186): "Combat in the Service of God those who wage war against you but commit no injustice by attacking first; for God likes not injustice," and also (257): "No violence in religious matters; truth is sufficiently distinct from error."

While the Turks practised this doctrine, it often happened that Christian persecuted Christian with greater violence than the Turks had done. A French author writes: "In 1687 Athens changed its masters but not its luck. Venice plundered what Constantinople had left; the lion of Venice proved more savage than the crescent of Mohammed. Morosini's bombs blew up the Parthenon which the Turks had merely abandoned to the ravages of time."

Turkey, like many other countries of the Near and Far East, was facing the onslaught of a modern age with which she was ill-equipped to contend. The impact of modernism presents an oriental country that is backward from the point of view of what we fondly call "civilisation" with the choice among three courses.

The country can either close itself hermetically against our so-called "progress"—a civilization whose main achievements can be summed up



SULTAN ABDUL HAMID II

in the production of the water closet, the machine gun and the night bomber. The only country that succeeded in doing so is Tibet. Japan, attempting the same isolation, was forcibly drawn into the orbit of our "civilization" and the chicks hatched in 1854 have now come home to roost.

The second choice is to assimilate as quickly as possible all the technical achievements of the West, trying to beat it at its own game. This is what modern Japan did—and she lost her soul in the process.

The third possibility is that of gradually adopting what is good and advantageous in Western technocracy, but to base it firmly on national culture and provide for organic development. This is what China has been doing for the past thirty years, and it is also the path of modern Turkey.

But the rulers of old Turkey, notably Abdul Hamid, chose none of these ways: instead they drifted along passively and indolently, with the result that their country became a quaint relic and the object of foreign avarice and exploitation.

* * *

England's attitude towards Turkey has always been one of friendly support. More than once in the history of Turkey, England has stood between her and dismemberment. The reasons for this attitude are partly psychological and partly political.

England has never been directly threatened by Turkey even at the height of Turkish expansion. Peoples whose national history is one of oppression by the Turks, of cruelty and bloodshed on both sides; nations that gained their independence in a sanguinary struggle against Turkish domination, are naturally burdened by a mass of *ressentiment*, of hereditary antagonism, fear and hatred. The Turk had become a by-word in their languages for tyranny and cruelty; their religion had, during centuries of Turkish rule, assumed the character, not only of a faith but also of a political and national credo. Their tongue, their customs, the very buildings in their towns and villages constantly reminded them of Turkish influence: it is only natural that reaction was violent, and hostility lingered on even after national independence was achieved.

None of these factors applied in the case of England. Wherever the Englishman came into contact with the Turk he learned to respect and like him. The Turks were good fighters. The life of their leisured classes had much in common with that of the English gentleman of the old style: a love of sport, an appreciation of the comforts of life, a tolerant if slightly cynical sense of humour.

Religious fanaticism was absent in the Englishman's mental make-up. Islam at its best displays a quality of broadmindedness and realism that appealed to the island race that had fought and conquered the Inquisition. England and Turkey were the lands that had often given refuge to the victims of bigotry and religious intolerance.

In addition there were powerful objective factors that made for Anglo-Turkish co-operation. Turkey in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had ceased to be a strong maritime power. After the disasters

of Lepanto and Navarino, the Turks were convinced that if Allah had given power on land to the Turks, sea power was for the *Franks*. But the Dardanelles remained a factor of paramount importance in the silent but perpetual struggle for mastery in the Mediterranean. It was Russia's aim, dictated by her geographical position, to become a Mediterranean power; and consequently her policy aimed at advancing towards the Straits by way of the Balkans as well as along the Asiatic shore.

In the Balkans she clashed with the aspirations of Austria who, as the ruler of Hungary and the heir of Venice, and as the dominant factor in an Italy not yet unified, strove to extend her sphere of influence in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia and other Balkan regions. Austria was possessed of considerable naval power and her trade with Turkey as well as the former Turkish dominions gave her an important position in the concert of the Powers. Austrian expansionism, it is true, was hampered by the many difficulties caused by internal friction within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; on the other hand Austria, towards the end of the nineteenth century, came more and more into the German orbit.

German interest in Turkey dates from the days when Moltke, the great strategist, reorganised the Turkish army. In 1826 the Sultan had disbanded and, after a bloody massacre in the streets of Constantinople, exterminated the Janissaries who had become a veritable pretorian guard, threatening to assume power in the State. The Turkish army was reorganised by German instructors, and the well-known German technique was employed ever since. German instructors in Turkey, Turkish officers schooled in German military academies, Krupp guns supplied to the Turkish army, more German instructors and technicians—in short, all the paraphernalia of “peaceful” penetration which took the typically German form of guns and armaments.

French penetration, on the other hand, was cultural. The French language was the tongue of trade and commerce, but also the medium of diplomacy, of polite society, of all those who laid claim to education. Students from Turkey, Greece and all Balkan States flocked to Paris; French was the language of missions and schools in Turkey which did much to improve hygienic and educational conditions. Paris was, and still remains, the city that symbolizes civilization to the Levantine: when a Greek says, “I’m going to Europe,” he means a journey to Paris.

To the French, on the other hand, Turkey symbolised the glamour of the Orient. Writers like Claude Farrère and Pierre Loti did Turkey the same service—or disservice—as Lafcadio Hearn had done in the case of Japan: they drew a picture of glamour, charm and mystery that tended to create an erroneous impression. Europe was in a *fin de siècle* mood; French literature, fond of an atmosphere of decadence in which flourished the *fleurs du mal*, found a condign field in the elegant decay that was Constantinople.

Prussia beat France in the war of 1870 and established her domination over a unified Germany. Germany now had an emperor, soon to be followed by another whose imperial ambitions knew no bounds. Bismarck's brutality of “Blood and Iron” had been tempered by caution;

he had counselled against colonial expansion and against naval ambitions. Both, he realised, must lead to conflict with England. But Wilhelm II threw all restraint to the winds. With all the zest of the *nouveau riche* he threw himself into the task of imperial expansion; and Turkey was one of the many fields selected as *lebensraum* for Germany's surplus population.

Since the eighteen-forties, many German writers had claimed the Sick Man's heritage for Germany. Palestine and Mesopotamia were to be occupied by German settlers, while the whole of Asia Minor was to become a German protectorate. It was no accident that German "archæologists" multiplied in these areas, collecting data and information no less interesting to the German General Staff than to the scientific bodies by which they were ostensibly employed. Under the influence of the *All-Deutsche*, the Pan-Germanists whom Bismarck had always resisted, the conception grew in the Fatherland that Germany must rule the entire space between Berlin and Baghdad; and when the Kaiser in 1890 had "dropped the pilot" he became the willing instrument of the Pan-Germans, the spiritual precursors of the Nazis.

A railway was to be the means of securing German domination of the Near and Middle East: the famous Baghdad Railway (*Bagdad Bahn*)¹

The Germans began by collecting seemingly unimportant railway concessions, beginning with the Haidarpasha-Ismid line. Starting in the immediate vicinity of Constantinople, it was the head of any proposed line to Baghdad which would naturally follow one of the great trade routes of antiquity. The line had been leased to a British group, but the Turkish government seized it and handed it over to the Germans who in 1889 formed the Anatolian Railway Company for taking over this railhead of the future Baghdad line. In the same year the Kaiser visited Constantinople and obtained the first of many concessions, extending the line, first to Angora and subsequently to Konia, Adana and Alexandrette.

These concessions were, of course, monopolies. The Germans had the audacity to invite French and British participation in supplying the capital—with the proviso, of course, that the Germans would always be able to outvote all others on the board of directors. Britain recognised the economic value to Turkey of the proposed railway but was in time to discover the cloven hoof. An instance of German methods had been furnished by the case of the Mersina-Adana line, an enterprise of which 55% were in British hands, while the remaining 45% were held by French subjects. The Germans secretly bought up the French shares and such British-owned stocks as were obtainable in the open market, and one fine day the entire line was under German management. It was but one of many instances proving that Germany was firmly resolved to exclude all others from Turkish railway development.

The scramble for railway concessions gave rise to an incident that

¹ The following facts are based on Chapter 10 of Sir Edwin Pear's *Life of Abdul Hamid*, Constable, 1917. See also *Pan-German Aspirations in the Near East*, by R. W. Seton-Watson in the *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, March, 1916.

very nearly led to war with Russia. Alarmed by German expansion, Russia demanded that railway concessions in north-eastern Turkey be granted exclusively to Russian subjects approved by the Russian government. The demand was a blatant infringement of whatever fictitious sovereignty remained to Turkey, and for once Abdul Hamid took up a firm stand, demanding the withdrawal of the Russian demand. He was, however, not supported by any of the powers, not even Germany, and was finally constrained to accept this humiliating request.

This happened in 1896, at a time when the Armenian outrages led many observers to think that the best solution would be to allow those provinces in which large Armenian populations were domiciled to fall under foreign rule. Sir Edwin Pears hints at a sort of understanding to this effect between Russia, Germany and England; the belief was held that Germany's considerable investments in Asia Minor would induce her to prevent Constantinople falling into Russian hands.


The Baghdad project received a further impetus when on November 7, 1898, the Kaiser while on a visit to Damascus, had the theatrical impudence of proclaiming himself the "Protector of Islam." He was at that moment in the territory of the nominal Khalif of all the Faithful; of the three hundred million moslems in the world at the most a few hundred were living under the flag of imperial Germany; yet Wilhelm demonstratively assumed the protection of Islam "for ever." If this was a counter-claim to Russia's self-styled protectorate over the Christians of the East, it was also an open announcement of a plan of world-wide conquest.

Islam was not threatened by anyone—if not by self-appointed "protectors." Exactly forty years later Mussolini assumed the same rôle: one that brings no luck to its actor, it would appear.

The Young Turkish revolution of 1909 and the World War five years later wrote finis to the Baghdad Railway. Germany's dream of a chain of German settlements along its trajectory with eventual access to the oil fields of Mosul, was ended—though not forgotten by Nazi Germany which began anew where the Pan-Germans had left off . . .

The ascendancy of German influence in Turkey was facilitated by the fact that Wilhelm and Abdul Hamid had much in common. Both cared for a show of external pomp, a display of military splendour, and both were extremely susceptible to flattery. When Wilhelm's Court Physician diagnosed "a slight cold," the Emperor exclaimed indignantly: "Nothing that pertains to me is slight." Abdul Hamid tried to foster the impression, held by the more ignorant among his subjects, that his title of King of Kings was a reality: that the sum total of Turkish statesmanship consisted in making the other nations do the Padishah's bidding.

Abdul Hamid was extremely flattered by the two visits paid to him by Wilhelm, who knew on occasion how to be a boon companion and displayed a genial, if Teuton, sense of humour. The first visit took place in 1889, one year after Wilhelm's accession to the throne. On his way back from Athens, where he had attended the nuptials of his sister Sophie to the Crown Prince, Constantin, the Emperor's yacht *Hohenzollern* anchored off Constantinople. The Kaiser, accompanied by a brilliant



OLD PLAN OF

CONSTANTINOPLE

suite including Count Herbert von Bismarck, the great Chancellor's son, and his brother, Prince Henry, transhipped to the German cruiser *Kaiser* in order to achieve an impressive entry into the harbour. The cruiser was followed by the resplendent yacht of the Emperor, and a gunboat, the *Danzig*. Wilhelm, his young bride by his side, was welcomed by Abdul Hamid who had sent his Grand Vizier, Edhem Pasha, with numerous dignitaries, in the Turkish cruiser *Izeddin* to meet the German flotilla.

Abdul Hamid stood waiting on the shore, leaning on the Sword of the Prophet that was nearly as tall as he, a figure looking far from impressive. The two sovereigns embraced ceremoniously, and then the Sultan bowed deeply over the hand of the Empress Augusta Victoria. Seeing the grotesque and unprepossessing figure confronting her and feeling her hand unpleasantly scratched by the Sultan's dyed beard, she could not overcome a slight gesture of recoil.

The respective suites were then presented by each monarch. Abdul Hamid introduced his nephew and heir-elect, Prince Yussuf Izeddin. Prince Selim, the Sultan's eldest son, was absent: he was in disgrace and close confinement. The reason had been a scandal that had kept tongues wagging in Turkey and abroad.

The tutors of the young prince had seen fit to round off his education by introducing him to a subject in which only experience and not theoretical instruction can lead to accomplishment. To this end they enlisted the help of a French dancing girl who acquitted herself of her duties with ardour and devotion. Unfortunately the Prince's tutors had not been sufficiently careful in their choice of an instructress, and the prince, in addition to the memory of some pleasant and instructive hours, retained a souvenir of a less pleasant though more lasting character. Before the inexperienced young man could discern the nature of this unpleasant memento he had made a successful attempt to continue studies that had captivated his ardent interest: this time with an odalisque in his father's harem.

The inevitable happened: the girl shared the prince's misfortune. Before further harm was done the affair became known. The Sultan's rage was boundless; he was firmly convinced that here was a plot aimed at his life, or at least at his health. The unfortunate girl was strangled and committed to the waters of the Bosphorus in the customary manner; the Prince was banished and imprisoned. No intercession in his behalf availed; the Sultan remained adamant.

In this manner it came about that Yussuf Izeddin welcomed the Kaiser as the Sultan's prospective successor. Abdul Hamid and Wilhelm took their seats in the State Coach together with Yussuf and the German Empress. The usual cheering crowd lined the streets through which they drove; Wilhelm acknowledged their cheers with gracious bows while the Sultan, as host, sat stiffly upright. During the drive they exchanged memories of their first meeting in Koblenz twenty-one years earlier.

On arrival at the kiosk specially built for them, the imperial couple retired to their apartment. The Empress remarked how ugly and uncared-

for that man had looked, whereupon the Kaiser remarked that he had changed a great deal since his youth and he had hardly recognised him. "He looks awfully worried," said the Empress, whereupon Wilhelm said drily, "Well, Gussy, our profession is no joking matter." And indeed, Wilhelm's reign turned out to be far from a joking matter, either for his own people or for the rest of the world . . .

Two days later the Kaiser had a long and intimate talk with Yussuf Izeddin. The Prince, boldened by his guest's seeming geniality, asked him to intercede with the Sultan for Prince Selim. Wilhelm's jovial manner dropped from him like a cloak: he brusquely changed the subject and walked away from the prince who stood mute and confused. Wilhelm had no intention of spoiling his own good relations with Abdul Hamid. But this incident did not prevent him later on from including both Izeddin and Selim in the many projects of marriages by which he planned to strengthen German influence among all the reigning dynasties of Europe.

One of these projects found the concurrence of Abdul Hamid, who planned to marry Selim to some European princess, in accordance with the Prophet's saying: "Take ye wives from among other tribes so that ye have sound progeny." In this instance Wilhelm proposed a princess of the house of Wittelsbach as Selim's bride.

The Wittelsbachs are Bavarians of ancient and noble lineage. In 1180 Dukes, in 1623 Electors, in 1806 Kings of Bavaria, they also gave to Emperors to the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (Louis of Bavaria, 1314-1347, and Charles VII, 1742-1745). They were renowned for their beauty, poverty and extravagance that sometimes culminated in insanity. Otto, for a time King of Greece, died insane, and Louis II, the megalomaniac friend and protector of Richard Wagner, drowned himself and the alienist who was looking after him. Their womenfolk, poor but handsome, were married off to the minor nobility of Italy and France; Prince Selim was to marry another Wittelsbach princess, and was pardoned by the Sultan with this end in view.

But when the political situation of Turkey deteriorated, the Kaiser dropped the plan, and Selim married a Caucasian royal princess. Wilhelm's influence in Turkey continued, however; it survived even the downfall of Abdul Hamid and resulted in Turkey's entry in the first World War.

CHAPTER III.

BLACK MAGIC

DISTORTED BY THE PARTIES' HATE AND FAVOUR, Uncertain is on him the annals' verdict. This word of the poet hardly applies to Abdul Hamid. His reign began in blood, was steeped in blood throughout, and although the despot himself died peacefully in his bed, he is remembered as the "Red Sultan," or as "Abdul the Damned."

There have been sporadic attempts at whitewashing him, and perhaps his precarious position, coupled with a power as immense in details as

it was futile in the realm of politics, may excuse or at least explain some of his enormities. But he committed two unforgivable faults that are the reason why to this day his name stinks in the nostrils of mankind: he had no notion of propaganda, and he failed.

Abdul Hamid's régime anticipated many of the features of the Nazi Gestapo system; but as an absolute ruler of the old style he overlooked the necessity of popular backing. Consequently he failed to employ the pen of some Goebbels who could easily have drawn a more attractive picture of the "Servant of the Praiseworthy."

In addition he failed; he lost the battle, and it is the victor who writes history. Defects and irregularities of a man's private life are easily overlooked when the hero, like Mustapha Kemal Pasha, succeeds; his vices remain his own, while his achievements benefit the State and are remembered. But when a man fails, his vices take on an added significance: not only may they explain his failure, but they may also have led to the destruction of the State.

Kant evolved that least German of ethical maxims: Let each and every one of your actions be fit to form the basis of general legislation. Abdul Hamid's conduct represented the opposite; not only was his life one long catalogue of misdeeds, but he also endeavoured to rule his country on the basis of those 'principles.' And yet, from a loftier point of view it might be said that the Sultan, too, was part of "that power which works for evil and yet results in good." His reign produced the violent revulsion of feeling which turned the easy-going Turk of old, first into the progressive Young Turk, and in the end into the level-headed revolutionary who was able to build the New Turkey.

The son of Abdul Medjid, the "Well-Beloved," and a Circassian lady of the Harem, Abdul Hamid was born in 1842. His mother soon died, and another lady who was childless looked after him. She was, as one of the few sources friendly to Abdul Hamid assures us, a loving foster-mother.¹ Although not in the direct line of succession, he was given a good education. His first tutor was the Court *mullah*, Mustapha Effendi, followed by Kemal Effendi, a man of European culture. Mustapha and Kemal—a curious coincidence . . .

Abdul thus received an education that was a good mixture of Oriental and Western elements; he learned Arabic and Persian and studied geography and history with special interest. As a child he was weakly and timid, as a young man shy and retiring, avoiding court functions and entertainments; yet he is described as of acute perception, and quick, sound judgment. He was also a good manager; extremely parsimonious, he had accumulated savings to the amount of £T60,000 when he succeeded to the throne.

In 1868 his uncle, the reigning Sultan Abdul Aziz, took him on a journey to Europe. They visited Paris, London, Vienna, and Koblenz, in the Rhineland. Abdul Hamid took a great liking and admiration for

¹ Under the title *The Sovereigns and Courts of Europe* a book published in 1891 by *Polytikos* endeavours to whitewash Abdul Hamid who is described as "one of the best Turkish sovereigns."

German efficiency: it was two years before the Franco-Prussian war in which Bismarck demonstrated the seeming effectiveness of his aggressive and reactionary policy of "blood and iron." Abdul Hamid continued to be impressed by Germany for the rest of his life, a fact that did not, however, prevent him from opposing German influence in Turkey when it suited his purpose. It was in Koblenz, too, that he met the Hohenzollern family—Wilhelm, King of Prussia; his son, Crown Prince Frederick, and a charming boy of nine who twenty years afterwards was to become German Emperor—Kaiser Wilhelm II. Abdul Hamid struck up a friendship with the Crown Prince, an enlightened man of liberal tendencies and a decided opponent of Bismarck. Frederick, unfortunately for Germany and the world, died after only a month's reign.

Sultan Abdul Aziz was not a great success with the Hohenzollerns nor they with him. He was a man of unprepossessing exterior and owing to his lack of languages and the rigours of old Turkish court etiquette, had to converse with the aid of an interpreter. Abdul Hamid kept silent for another reason. It would have been unhealthy for a prince not in the direct line of succession to show too much interest in politics and external contacts. The murder of younger sons who might become claimants to the throne was a recognised practice. One Sultan, on his accession to the throne, had ordered eighteen royal princes to be bowstrung. Infanticide was a regular practice in the imperial harem. A Sultan had only four legitimate wives, but any children he had with a slave girl were considered legitimate and of equal rank. The simple slave girl on whom the Sultan's eyes fell received the title of *geuzde*; when their union was consummated she received the proud title of *ikbal* (glorified), and if she bore a child she was elevated to the rank of *kadine* (favourite), with numerous attendants of her own, and only one step lower than the *Valide-Sultan*, the absolute ruler of the Harem.

The women of superior rank used to watch jealously for signs of approaching maternity in a slave, and had the child killed soon after birth—if they did not resort to even viler practices before it saw the light.

In consequence, to survive and reach maturity was an achievement in itself. But a childhood where betrayal lurked behind friendship, murder behind the ties of blood, was not conducive to the development of character and independence of spirit; and this may explain much of Abdul Hamid's mental make-up.

All reports depict him timid and uncommunicative as a child, retiring, morose, suspicious and already greedy for money and power as a young man. Meanness was his dominant trait from childhood; it is related how, having incurred a debt, he prostrated himself before his uncle in an abject and cringing manner. For his financial operations he used the services of an unsavoury individual whose presence at Court was much resented by foreign ambassadors.

What was probably only a mischievous invention cast a shadow over his youth and indeed his whole life: the story that his mother had been an Armenian slave. The story was lent a semblance of credence

by Abdul's features which were indeed of an Armenian cast. To this "accusation" Abdul Hamid reacted much as Goebbels to allegations of Jewish descent, and this may explain the vicious and personal virulence with which he later persecuted the unfortunate Armenians. As late as 1906 some young students were overheard referring to the Sultan as *Bedros* (the Armenian form of Peter) and were at once imprisoned and deported.

A small and mean spirit, incapable of true religion, often resorts to the dubious esoteric substitutes of mysticism and magic. Abdul fell under the spell of an old woman of the Harem who introduced him to astrology and necromancy, spells and incantations and all the mumbo-jumbo of the sham-occult that has so often bolstered up the intuition of despots throughout the ages. What grotesque rites were practised under the light of the moon of Hecate, what pins were stuck into wax effigies of enemies in default of living bodies to practise upon. . .

Throughout his reign superstition rode Abdul Hamid. Like Hitler, he had his private astrologer; and the man's predictions were often surprisingly correct—especially as he took the precaution of bribing the telegraph clerk of the Palace so that he read all incoming telegrams before his Royal Master.

Abdul Hamid's superstition and greed was matched by another trait common in dictators—a boundless vanity. He realised that ridicule kills more surely than the assassin's bomb; and the Turks have always possessed a lively sense of humour. When he was still a prince, a Turkish translation of Molière's *l'Avare* was put on the stage in Constantinople. Abdul Hamid, believing that a lampoon on him was intended, particularly as the title of the translation was *Pinti-Hamid* (=catch-penny, a popular Turkish expression) stormed and raved, demanding the withdrawal of the offending play. He succeeded only in appearing even more ridiculous.

As Abdul grew up, he realised that only one life stood between him and the throne—a glorious prospect intensified by the prediction of an old gipsy woman that he would ascend the throne of the sultans and enjoy a long reign. At the same time the oracle warned him that a sickness coming from abroad would cause his downfall. This prophecy explains his valetudinarian habits, of which more later; it has the authentic ambiguous obscurity of all Sibyllinian utterances. For it was indeed the germs of Liberalism, coming from abroad carried by exiles and conspirators, that turned out to be the illness fatal to Abdul Hamid.

His behaviour became concentrated on making a good impression on his uncle, the Sultan. Displaying all the small and parsimonious virtues—as mean as his vices—he never fell into the more flamboyant forms of debauchery that are capable of clothing evil with a certain glamour. His early love affairs were puny and obscure contacts; he never knew the passion of love, or even of sensuality. Much has been written about Abdul's alleged moral depravity: the secrets of his harem have formed a subject of joyful story-telling by prurient minds that love to hint at unspeakable excesses, deriving a vicarious pleasure from such tales. The truth is that Abdul Hamid was extremely abstemious in every

respect, conscious of his weakly constitution that made wine and women dangerous indulgences.

Beware of the abstemious autocrat, the water-drinking dictator. Like Adolf Hitler, the teetotaller and vegetarian who does not love women, that kind of ruler sublimates his unassuaged thirst for wine into lust for blood, his unsatisfied craving for a woman's tender embrace into a craze for massacre and mutilation.

The Sultans of the past had drunk deeply and loved profusely; they had gloried in the gifts dispensed to man by Allah, they had been swordsmen, hunters, horsemen, fighters. Abdul Hamid had never practised any sport with the exception of horseriding, soon to be given up; his sole hobby was carpentering. Louis XVI of France, we are told, was a good locksmith, but he could not prevent the unlocking of the gates of the Bastille. Abdul Hamid was equally good at his hobby, but the only thing he achieved was making a coffin for his country . . .

From a pale, thin face, disfigured by the nose of a vulture, two crafty, cruel eyes watched and observed, biding their time, noting down for future punishment those that had slighted him. He watched his brother Murad, his exact opposite in almost everything. Murad was gay and charming, leaving an excellent impression with all who met him. But Abdul noted how his brother kept digging his own grave by indulging in excesses of wine and women that were already inducing signs of the fatal illnesses overshadowing the royal family—the gaunt spectre of tuberculosis, and the dark cloud of insanity.

CHAPTER IV.

STORM AT DAWN

THE YEAR 1876 WAS A FATEFUL ONE FOR TURKEY and her royal house. Sultan Abdul Aziz showed signs of insanity, and was deposed in conformity with the law of Islam as enounced in a *ferva* (response) of the *Sheik-ul-Islam*, the President of the highest court of the Moslem world.

A few days later Abdul Aziz, left alone and unguarded in his apartments, committed suicide by cutting his veins with a pair of scissors which he had secured under the pretext of wishing to trim his beard. Women of his harem were almost eye-witnesses of the occurrence; they watched through a keyhole, seeing the Sultan sitting alone in an armchair and then suddenly falling forward, already lifeless. In addition, a number of doctors, both Turks and foreigners, examined the body and reported the complete absence of any signs pointing to external violence. It was a clear case of suicide.

But, as always when a royal personage quits this Vale of Tears suddenly, the usual crop of bazaar rumours began to circulate in Constantinople, that city of gossip and intrigue *par excellence*. A few years later these rumours were to furnish Abdul Hamid with the pretext for one

of his greatest infamies, a deed that alone would condemn him to eternal shame.

Meanwhile Mahmud succeeded to the throne. But his tenure was to be numbered by days. His two illnesses had made such progress that it became evident that he was unfit to rule. It is certain that Abdul Hamid had followed his brother's decline with more than brotherly interest; there is talk of an effigy made in Mahmud's likeness that Abdul cursed with magic incantations, transfixing with pins and left to rot in a dark, dank cellar; of a specially made coat, a gala garment, that he gave to his brother after imbuing it with the venom of black magic. Whether, as some writers assert, Abdul Hamid resorted to methods more direct and less innocuous than this modern Shirt of Nessus in order to ruin his brother's health must remain a matter for conjecture.

What is certain is that Mahmud was deposed, again with the sanction of the ecclesiastical Court and the Ministers; and now Abdul Hamid's hour had struck. He rejected suggestions of a regency; for him it was all or nothing. In order to attain this goal he was prepared to promise anything—even the liberal constitution urged by the Cabinet under the leadership of the able and progressive Grand Vizier, Midhat Pasha. Abdul gave Midhat another promise in writing: he undertook to give up the throne, should his brother regain his health. Midhat did not realise that in this declaration he carried his own death warrant . . .

On the strength of this promise, Midhat overcame the last doubts of some of the ministers and the clergy. At 10 o'clock on the morning of August 31st, 1876, a salute of one hundred guns announced to the population the proclamation of the solemn edict which deposed Murad and elevated to the Throne of the Caliphs His Imperial Majesty Abdul Hamid II.

* * *

It was a year of danger and unrest. Abdul Hamid succeeded to a heritage of trouble not of his own making; it was a state of affairs that called for energetic statesmanship. The Slavs of the Balkans were in full revolt, aided and abetted by Russia, who declared war in support of the Serbs. At home, the demand for reforms, for a more liberal régime grew with irresistible force.

Yet it was characteristic of Abdul Hamid that his first acts were directed solely at securing his power and position. All the members of the ex-Sultan's entourage were immediately arrested and exiled or imprisoned. Murad's son, Prince Selaheddin, was removed from the military academy he was attending and subjected to close supervision. Innumerable spies swarmed through Tcheragan Palace, the dethroned Sultan's residence, which was completely cut off from all contact with the outside world. It was then that Abdul Hamid evolved the system of spies and informers that was to be the most prominent feature of his reign.

He forgot his customary parsimony when rewarding his informers whose reports, the so-called *djournals*, began to fill his palace. These reports were for the most part valueless, composed of empty gossip and malicious accusations by people of extreme ignorance; and as the Sultan's



ABDUL HAMID IN 1876

largesse in exchange for information became known the informers frequently concocted imaginary plots.

Turkey became a hotbed of intrigue and police spying: here was born the furtive look over the shoulder, the fearful glance at a strange face, the whispered conversation in public and in private, the uncertainty whether even the intimate family circle might hold an informer—in short all the features of the Gestapo State. It became a current saying in Constantinople that out of any three men gathering at a street corner or in a café one was a spy . . .

But as yet the people were indifferent. They did not know their new ruler. While they had cheered Mahmud when he became Sultan, they had no picture of the pallid and secretive young man who had never been in the public eye. Brilliant illumination and lavish display of fireworks with which Abdul Hamid's accession was celebrated did not impress a populace that could almost see and hear flashes and thunder drawing ever closer from the North where the Russian guns were spewing death and destruction.

The empire Abdul Hamid had just acquired threatened to fall to pieces. The prevalent disorder and insecurity furnished a welcome pretext to foreign interventionist powers, notably Russia in her self-proclaimed rôle of Protector of Eastern Christianity and upholder of the peace. It was therefore in Abdul Hamid's own interest as well as that of his country to grant the constitution advocated by Midhat and all the progressive and patriotic elements in Turkey. The Constitution would effectively block foreign pretensions, enable Turkey to put her house in order, and, incidentally, enormously enhance the prestige of the Sultan.

Yet here again the smallness of Abdul Hamid's mind showed. A constitution to him meant a restriction on his powers; while realising that it was inevitable he at the same time firmly resolved that the new Constitution should remain a dead letter. And his hatred of Midhat was given added fuel.

But he must tread warily. His first speech from the Throne was very nearly a model; we are entitled to suppose that the voice heard in it was that of Midhat and not that of the man who later violated every single one of the promises made therein. What would have been an admirable testimonial to an honest monarch's statesmanship appears a piece of impudent hypocrisy in the light of later events. The message is worth quoting *in extenso*; for it enhances the guilt of the physician who did not merely err in his diagnosis, but who diagnosed correctly and then proceeded to murder the patient.

Abdul Hamid's lips spoke these words:—

" . . . It is true that there are numerous reasons for the crisis which our Empire is at present undergoing; but they can all be traced to a single point of departure: lack of application of the Sacred Law, fundamental basis of Our Empire's strength, which should equally regulate each individual's conduct.

"That for some time past irregularities in the administrative and

financial conduct of Our Country have increased until they have come to their present pass;
 "that public opinion distrusts our credit;
 "that the courts have not as yet secured the rights of the individual;
 "that it has as yet not been possible to exploit our country's well-known rich resources in industry, commerce and agriculture, fruitful sources of general well-being and prosperity;
 "that finally all measures taken hitherto in order to assure to the whole of the country and all Our Subjects without exception, the blessings of civil liberty, have remained unsuccessful despite the sincere intentions that prompted such measures: all this must be attributed to one single cause: the lack of observance of the Law."

The law to which Abdul Hamid referred was the ancient code of *sheri'a*—the ecclesiastical law of Islam, not perhaps the best suited to modern conditions. However, almost any system of law can be made to work if it is applied with equity and impartiality, and in the spirit under which it was conceived.

The Sultan's *hatt* went on to charge the Cabinet with the task of studying conditions and proposing administrative and financial reforms, and then, with remarkable frankness, proceeded to uncover another running sore of Turkish administration:—

"Another obstacle to the efficient carrying-out of laws and regulations is the facility with which public office is often entrusted to inexperienced hands, and the fact that civil servants are exposed to frequent changes not always justified by legitimate grounds; this seriously inconveniences the State and its affairs. In future each public appointment will require special qualification; it must be our rule to employ in the service of the State capable and competent persons, not to be demoted or transferred without good and sufficient reason, and to establish the responsibility of every official in the sphere of his duties. . ."

Abdul Hamid must have uttered these words with his tongue in his cheek. Did he consider himself a Servant of the State, responsible or accountable to anyone? While he was reading out these lines, his cunning brain must already have toyed with schemes to remove the irksome restraint imposed on him by the existence of a Cabinet daring sometimes to oppose his wishes.

But the address is not yet complete. Progress, that god of the West, must receive a tribute. We can hardly suspect Abdul Hamid of a sense of humour; it must have been unconscious irony when he wrote:—

"The material and moral progress which all the world agrees is to be found among the European nations springs from the spread of science and enlightenment."

The Turks being no less adaptable to progress by reason of their natural gifts and intelligence, the Sultan continued, special attention must be paid to popular instruction, and special allocations made in the budget for that purpose. Finally, a thorough administrative, financial and

judicial reform must be carried out in all the provinces; and this remarkable document closes with an invocation of the aid of the Almighty.

The prudent and modest wording of the Proclamation created a good impression everywhere. It was increased when barely three months later (December 10th, 1876) the Constitution was proclaimed. Without too much resistance the Sultan fell in with the wishes of Midhat and the group of reformers that backed him; anticipating the reforms for which the Powers were pressing must take the wind out of their sails and enhance the Sultan's prestige.

There were scenes of great rejoicing in Constantinople. Few of the populace can have had a very clear idea as to what kind of animal a "constitution" was; there was nothing corresponding to it in Turkish history.

For one thing, it provided for a Parliament. Public clamour compelled Abdul Hamid to convene it and, considering that Turkey had no parliamentary tradition whatsoever, no trained public speakers, an ignorant and illiterate electorate, and only the barest knowledge of parliamentary debate and procedure,¹ the Chamber gave fair promise of evolving into a responsible legislative assembly.

This was bound to displease the Sultan; neither could it be desirable from his point of view to have deputies from far-distant provinces meet and exchange notes on local conditions and grievances. The corruption which each member had thought prevailed only in his constituency, under his own particular Pasha or Bey, was found to be widespread and universal, and the Sultan was clever enough to realise that there was a goodly percentage of honest and able men in a Chamber which he had not succeeded in packing with ignorant and reactionary clergy. To-day these men were criticising and already attacking—with the vehemence ever characteristic of the Turkish Parliament—his administrators and ministers; to-morrow the Padishah himself might well be the target of these assaults. Therefore he struck.

He had already exiled Midhat Pasha and a number of his friends. He now adroitly played upon the fears and misgivings of his ministers who saw themselves threatened by the violent attacks made on them in the Chamber, and allowed them to 'persuade' him to dissolve the Assembly and proclaim a state of siege. The ostensible pretext for this measure was the prevention of a possible Christian uprising in view of the Russian advance.

Barely two months after its inception the Diet was dissolved and its members ignominiously bundled home to their provinces; parliamentary government in Turkey was ended for the rest of Abdul Hamid's reign—a whole generation.

* * *

In the meantime a grave and deadly danger overshadowed the

¹ It is related that on one occasion the Speaker interrupted and effectively silenced a tedious and long-winded deputy by shouting: "Shut up, you ass!"

northern horizon. Separatist agitation in Bulgaria had led to outbreaks of violence by the population followed by cruel oppression on the part of the Turkish authorities. It was the period of Turkish decadence when her rulers had forgotten the precepts that had made the Empire stable, and retaliated against disaffected populations with the sole method of massacre.

The world has since learned to contemplate greater massacres with equanimity; but in the summer of 1876 Mr. Gladstone's disclosures in letters to the Press and shortly afterwards in a pamphlet entitled "Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East," created a political storm of the first magnitude. Pro-Turkish sentiment still lingering on from the Crimean War began to dwindle, and the Turkish issue became a dangerous weapon in the hands of Mr. Gladstone and the active and vocal opposition which he led against Mr. Disraeli's administration.

It should be remarked in fairness to Abdul Hamid that he cannot be held responsible for the massacres occurring in 1876, before his accession to the throne, nor for those perpetrated during the first months of his reign: communications were then so slow and uncertain that even the most enlightened ruler could not have stopped the authorities on the spot in time.

Serbia and Bulgaria rose in arms and the Tsar of Russia declared war, followed shortly afterwards by Rumania.

It is not our task to tell the story of the Russian-Turkish war in detail. Suffice it to say that it showed up what was rotten and displayed what was still sound in the state of Turkey.

The Turkish soldier fought with tenacity and bravery, but he was badly and inefficiently led. The battles of Plevna and the Shipka Pass will forever be glorious, both in the annals of the victorious Russian and the defeated Turkish armies.

The Russians attacked Turkey by a "pincer movement"; while two of their armies drove down the Balkans another strong force attacked Turkey's eastern provinces and swept up to the very walls of Erzerum. The two jaws of the pincers were to meet in Constantinople and crack the fruit that seemed to be ripe for the appetite of the Russian bear.

The Christian populace of the Balkans rose *en masse* and the victorious Russian armies swept across the Balkans, captured Adrianople and advanced up to the last barrier defending Constantinople—the Tchataldja line, less than twenty miles from Constantinople. The Eastern army, less successful, was held by the Turks at Erzerum.

In the month of January, 1878, Constantinople seemed lost. A Russian army of 150,000 was facing the Capital, assured of unlimited supplies and reinforcements by way of the Black Sea route which now lay open. Abdul Hamid, taken with the cowardly fright that constituted one of his chief traits, packed his bags, including the pots and pans of the Imperial kitchens, ready to fly from Constantinople. It needed very energetic remonstrances on the part of the English Ambassador, Sir

Henry Layard, who pointed out to the Sultan that if he were to quit his Capital now, his throne would be irrevocably lost.¹

On the 31st January at the intervention of the Powers, an armistice and subsequently the Treaty of San Stefano were concluded.

Once more the jealousy of the Great Powers had arrested the march of the victorious Russians. A secret treaty between Austria and Russia had given the latter a free hand against Turkey, provided the Russian conquest did not continue south of the Balkan range. When Russia advanced beyond that Line Austria quietly started mobilising and the Russians deemed it wiser to halt. The Treaty of San Stefano was drafted while an English naval squadron lay in the Bosphorus, protecting and threatening both Russians and Turks. The Sultan hastened to give the formal permission which under the Treaty of Paris was necessary to allow warships to enter the Straits.

The Treaty of San Stefano, a Russian *diktat*, was harsh in the extreme. Almost the whole of European Turkey was removed from her sovereignty and was to become either independent, semi-independent, or a district under special supervision by the Powers, notably Russia. A war indemnity to the enormous amount of 141 million pounds sterling was to be paid to Russia—31 millions in cash (there was not that amount in the whole of Turkey) and the rest by the cession of vast territories in Asia Minor.

The Treaty of San Stefano, had it been allowed to become a reality, would have meant the same for Turkey as the Munich Agreement for Czechoslovakia sixty years later: mutilation beyond the chance of

¹ In this connection it is amusing to read the description of the same incident given in a remarkable book entitled "*The 12 Years Reign of H.I.M. Abdul Hamid II*," by The Princess Annie De Lusignan. The Princess indulges in one long panegyric of Abdul Hamid, whom she describes as one of the wisest, most successful, cleverest and kindest rulers of Turkey and, indeed, of the world. According to Princess Lusignan the Sultan was determined to fight to the last ditch and His Majesty scornfully rejected suggestions by his ministers that he should leave the Capital "with contemptuous dignity." "He preferred," writes the Princess, "to rely on his own brave heart."

This book is full of violent anti-Russian, anti-Slav, anti-Disraeli and anti-everything prejudice: the exalted authoress confesses that her only hero is Abdul Hamid, who treated her very kindly when she was in Turkey. The political and mental maturity of the authoress can be gauged from two instances out of many: she claims that the Armenians were not only treated with the greatest fairness, but as it were, the Sultan's favourite subjects, ardently grateful. "Proof" of this is the fact that the Patriarch of the Catholic Armenians closed an official service held in Constantinople with prayers for the preservation of the Sultan's life!

The second instance of Princess Lusignan's mature judgment is to be found in her evaluation of the Suez Canal. She says, (page 241), "Really, of course, all this pother about the 'security' of the Canal is altogether unnecessary and absurd. The ditch dug by M. de Lesseps is by no means essential to England's communications with her Eastern Empire. In peace no question of its free navigation can possibly arise, and in war we should not dare to trust to it as a means of reaching India. No number of troops on land or of fleets on the ocean could prevent treachery sinking a barge in one of its narrower parts and as effectually blocking the road as though its banks were in possession of a hostile power; and even now, what with the heavy charges and the continual and prolonged delays which occur in course of transit, it is questionable whether the Canal is such an immense benefit to the world's commerce as is generally supposed."

recovery, a hardly deferred sentence of death. Russia did not have to claim Constantinople and the Straits: they would have fallen to her in the natural course of events.

But there was a revulsion of feeling in Europe, prompted perhaps less by love of Turkey than by distrust of Russia. Under considerable pressure the Tsar discovered that the Treaty of San Stefano had been, after all, a "preliminary arrangement" and the famous Congress of Berlin was convened in the month of June, 1878.

Again it is unnecessary to go into the well-known details of this Congress; it suffices to say that the wise and benevolent statesmanship of Disraeli effectively blocked Russian and German pretensions, enabled Turkey to survive, though not without territorial loss, and exacted from the Sultan definite promises of according religious and civil liberty to all his subjects, including Christians and Armenians.

When Disraeli and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, returned to London, they were justified in telling the cheering crowds that welcomed them that they had brought "Peace with Honour."

Sixty years later a British Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary were to return from another Continental mission. To draw the obvious comparison between their respective achievements would be an injury to the memory of their great predecessors . . .

CHAPTER V.

MURDER TO ORDER

ABDUL HAMID DID NOT, OF COURSE, SHOW THE slightest inclination of implementing any of his promises concerning the reforms. The fact that many of his subjects agreed with the demands raised by the foreigners did not, to his twisted mind, prove that these demands must have some justification, but merely the necessity for tightening up his system of spies and informers.

A complete censorship of the Press was instituted—a censorship outstripping even that of contemporary Russia. This censorship often reached sublime heights of the ludicrous. There was a long list of names and subjects that must never be mentioned: Armenia or Macedonia, for instance, simply did not exist. "Somewhere in Turkey" became a customary date-line for dispatches from such places. In these dispatches such things as massacres, uprisings, revolts must not be mentioned: the reports invariably stated that "bands of brigands had been put down firmly" by the gendarmery.

A particularly strict taboo was imposed on news of the attempted or successful assassination of royal personages, since this obviously might have given ideas to the Padishah's subjects. Reports of this character had always to be confined to mention of a "sudden illness." When Empress Elizabeth of Austria was stabbed and killed by the anarchist Luccheni, the Turkish papers carried the following notice: "The demise,

owing to a sudden illness, of the Empress of Austria is reported from Geneva. All Europe is burning with indignation."

The Turkish papers were therefore not organs of public opinion nor even a source of news, but the exclusive vehicles of nauseous adulation for the Padishah, his wisdom and his power. Byzantinism, the slavish lip-service paid to the Monarch, had a long period of revival on its ancient soil.

Among the many amusing stories told of a censorship that combined repression and ignorance, one related by Sir Edwin Pears¹ is worth telling.

A young Greek printer in Constantinople was imprisoned under the following circumstances. The Greek printers in Constantinople had formed a Mutual Benefit Society and published their rules and bye-laws—in Greek, naturally. On the back of the pamphlet there was printed, in Greek, "While there is time let us do good unto all men but especially to those of the household," a quotation from St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, indicated on the pamphlet by the Greek letters, *Paulos ep. e. t. Galat.* The young man had been setting up these words when he was asked to state where was the residence of this Paulos. He declared that he did not know, adding that to the best of his knowledge Paulos died some 1,800 years ago.

He was arrested by the indignant police who declared that they could read enough Greek to see that he was a resident of Galata (the suburb of Constantinople where European publications were printed).

When prominent residents informed the police that Paul was a Christian apostle, dead for eighteen hundred years, they remained doubtful, especially when it was affirmed that the epistle was not addressed to the inhabitants of Galata, but to the Galatians, a people who lived in Asia Minor centuries before the Turks. The young printer was released only when leaders of the community were sworn as witnesses and gave a solemn affirmation that the Paul mentioned in the pamphlet was indeed long since dead . . .

It was one of the functions of Turkish envoys abroad to influence the foreign Press by means of cajolery and bribes, and to enlist mercenary pens in the service of the Sultan's greater glory.

At home, the threat and use of force could be employed in addition to bribery when dealing with Turkish subjects. Foreign visitors of importance were received by the Sultan with lavish hospitality, entertained and flattered; even ordinary tourists were honoured with invitations to public functions, and returned with stories of an amiable and much-maligned ruler. The same technique with which the gangsters of Germany bamboozled the credulous British visitor to Party Congresses and Olympic Games was anticipated by Abdul Hamid.

And while illustrious and less illustrious visitors were swallowing the bait, the dungeons were out of sight. The strangler did his work discreetly and quietly; the walls of Yildiz were soundproof.

For with his own subjects the Padishah had a free hand. He did

¹ *Life of Abdul Hamid*, Constable, 1917.

not like men of independence and freedom of spirit, and a well-trying technique was applied in order to make them either more pliable or to draw their teeth for good.

A man who kept aloof and who might be suspected of liberal tendencies was honoured with an invitation to the Palace, impossible to refuse. In the ante-chamber a Secretary would overwhelm him with flatteries, relate to him the high opinion His Majesty had of his merits, and in turn sing the praises of the Sultan. How hurt was Abdul Hamid that his talented subject did not love him; in what way had the Padishah offended the gifted person who would not reciprocate his Monarch's affection? He would willingly make amends, elevate him to some high dignity, give him a lucrative position.

Let the guest only give the Sultan a proof of his loyalty. Surely he must be able to furnish a list of disaffected persons, give names, details. Everything would be treated with the utmost discretion—that went without saying: just a little list, just a small proof of loyalty in confirming what the Sultan knew already, anyway; just a report on what this Bey, that Pasha, had uttered by way of treasonable sentiments, and there might be a new ambassador, a new minister . . .

And when this cajolery failed, the Padishah was not offended. Oh no—it was in sorrow and not in anger that he expressed the pious hope that his stiff-necked subject might see the light.

This was the time, if the person in question valued his continued health, to take a quick trip abroad. One of indefinite duration.

For the Sultan was liable to honour him with a second invitation. Equally pleasant, of course: the Padishah would chat graciously with his guest, compliment him on his talents, his achievements . . . and he would offer him a cigarette, a sweetmeat, or a cup of that aromatic Turkish coffee which in order to be perfect must be as black as Night, as hot as Hell, and as sweet as Love . . . And it was the last cigarette or cup of coffee tasted by the unlucky guest; for the Sultan had not forgotten his youthful skill in concocting poisons.

And if the guest was bold or desperate enough to decline the proffered refreshment, again the Padishah was by no means offended. Outside the door his black eunuchs were waiting, experts in the wielding of the curved scimitar that severs head from body with one stroke, the silken cord that strangles with silent efficiency . . .

The interrogation of suspects often took place in the Sultan's presence. Abdul Hamid derived particular satisfaction from watching the application of torture. He would himself question the victim, usually a woman of his harem or some Palace servant suspected of conspiracy.

Now the time was ripe to wreak vengeance on his old enemy, Midhat Pasha. Midhat, a true patriot, could not live in exile: he had demanded and received permission to return to Turkey and was living in quiet retirement. Suddenly Turkey, and indeed the whole of Europe, was startled to learn that Midhat had been arraigned for the crime of murder. He was accused of having instigated the murder of ex-Sultan Abdul Aziz five years ago.

Abdul Hamid's case was cunningly construed. According to the official version, an accidental examination of the Sultan's private accounts revealed the presence on the payroll of several persons, classified as gardeners, to whom no actual duties were given. Closer investigation revealed that these men, according to their own "confession," had been given these sinecures as their reward for the assassination of Abdul Aziz. One of them was a wrestler, another a gardener; they unanimously named Midhat as the instigator of the alleged crime.

A travesty of a trial took place in public. Midhat defended himself with dignity, but was not even permitted to cross-examine creatures who "confessed" to a capital crime with a facility not to be encountered until a similar technique was employed in certain notorious show "trials" many years later.

Their story was that the wrestler had held the Sultan while the other man stabbed him with a stiletto, piercing the heart. This story must look ridiculous in the face of the thorough examination of the body conducted immediately after death by no fewer than nineteen eminent physicians, both Turks and foreigners, and in addition by Dr. Dickson, the Medical Officer of the British Embassy, and Dr. van Milligen, a prominent physician. All these medical men signed declarations according to which no trace of external violence was to be found on the body, apart from the self-inflicted wound caused by the scissors.¹

The trial resulted in the pre-arranged verdict. Midhat was sentenced to death, while the other accused were not only pardoned but rewarded with generous pensions. All Europe was indignant and condemned what Sir Henry Elliot rightly described as an indelible blot upon Abdul Hamid's reign. The Ambassadors of the Powers exerted all their influence and finally succeeded in getting the sentence commuted to one of banishment for life. Midhat was deported to Arabia; but he did not escape Abdul Hamid's murderous fury. Midhat was strangled by the Sultan's orders, and his head was dispatched to Abdul Hamid in a box labelled "Japanese Ivories—with care. To His Majesty the Sultan."

In this manner Abdul Hamid eliminated not only the sponsor of Turkish reform, but also a man of integrity who might have become a rallying point for an opposition. The lesson was not lost on the Sultan's ministers. Abdul Hamid had already reduced them to a bunch of obedient "yes-men"; he took further care, by appointing to the various offices men who were known to be on bad terms with each other, to prevent any solidarity within the Cabinet. Its importance was still further reduced when the Sultan gradually diminished the influence of the Sublime Porte by concentrating the reins of government completely within the precincts of Yildiz Palace.

Abdul Hamid had made himself a prisoner in the tasteless con-

¹ A detailed report on the trial was given in an article by Sir Henry Elliot in the *Nineteenth Century* for 1888 (p. 288), where he flays the "disgraceful mockery of the whole proceedings."

The only author to believe in Midhat's guilt is, of course, the Princess Annie de Lusignan (see p. 38) who bursts into violent vituperation at Sir Henry for attempting "to cast odium" on His Imperial Majesty.

glomeration of heterogeneous buildings known as Yildiz Palace. After a severe earthquake he had built a new Pavilion for himself, based on an enormous block of concrete embedded in the ground; but he rightly felt that his rule was based on foundations that no architect could make secure.

Constant fear of assassination haunted him—a fear that, curiously enough, was almost completely devoid of grounds. The Padishah was held in wellnigh superstitious reverence; even the Young Turks did not threaten his life. It can be said that no serious attempt on Abdul Hamid's life was ever made during the whole of his reign—apart from the usual conspiracies “discovered” by spies and informers. It is quite customary for secret police to invent “plots” in order to prove their zeal and justify their rewards; or even to play the *agent-provocateur* and instigate some conspiracy.

In his palace girt by a triple wall and guarded by five thousand soldiers, Abdul Hamid lived alone, without friends or companions. The insipid creatures of his harem, the illiterate palace servants, the cowed and abject courtiers of Yildiz were his only contact with humanity, and served to increase his contempt for it.

He tried to find relaxation in the tedious buffooneries of the Court Jester, or in the vast and gloomy private theatre where foreign theatrical companies sometimes gave performances, depressed and dispirited by, the emptiness of the house.

His rare appearances outside the palace were made on the occasion of the weekly *Selamlik*, the ceremonial service in the Hamidié Mosque. The route was lined by police and troops; all the houses on the way were searched, all windows had to be shut; then the Sultan would flash past in his carriage at undignified speed, surrounded by a living wall of guards.

Back at the palace his fears were never at rest. Abdul Hamid's food was plain and simple, partly because his health was always weak, and partly because the egg and milk dishes he preferred are more difficult to poison. His food was sent up from the kitchen in sealed containers; detectives had supervised its preparation, and a chamberlain had the task of tasting each dish before it was presented to the Padishah.

Abdul Hamid was an inveterate valetudinarian. All documents reaching him were first placed in a sterilising oven whose heat was to destroy the germs. This fear of illness—inspired by the gipsy's warning—impelled Abdul Hamid to one of the few praiseworthy reforms he introduced, though it was not prompted by concern for the common welfare but only for his own: a modern and up-to-date hospital and, bacteriological service which did much to reduce cholera and typhus, diseases formerly endemic in Constantinople.

His fear of modern inventions went to ridiculous lengths. Although he permitted the installation of electric lighting in his own palace he rigorously banned it from Anatolia and the rest of Constantinople. He had heard that dynamos are used to generate electricity, and suspected a dangerous connection between dynamo and dynamite, the tool of

regicides. From similar motives he refused to allow the installation of the telephone; it is said that one of his ministers, afraid of being summoned to the Imperial Presence with even greater speed and facility by means of the new invention, convinced him that it would be possible to fire a revolver into the telephone at one end of the line and hit the Sultan at the other!

He was particularly incensed against the lightning conductor; here he did not suspect—he knew! He had allowed himself to be persuaded to permit the erection of this wicked contraption on an isolated tower in which gunpowder was stored. The Turkish workmen who put up the newfangled apparatus omitted to affix the earth lead, and when the first thunderstorm occurred the tower promptly blew up. Since that time lightning conductors were strictly *verboten*.

A ludicrous episode—but somehow symbolic of a régime that was bound to attract violent storms and, isolated from contact with the people, was destined to blow up in explosions of violence, cruelty and massacre; an object lesson, too, for all self-styled isolationists.

CHAPTER VI.

NOCTURNO . . .

THE NIGHT LAY OVER CONSTANTINOPLE. THE darkness was broken by a few gas lights throwing a pale glamour on the squalid elegance of the European quarter of the town, Pera. The rest of the vast and straggling city lay in utter obscurity. The wild dogs roamed the narrow streets and alleys, fulfilling their time-honoured job as scavengers. They barely moved aside, growling and baring their fangs, as the night watchman approached, banging his wooden club on the uneven cobblestones to warn thieves of his approach. The only people out at this unsafe hour were furtive little men, the police spies who, like the rats emerging from the ruins of burnt down houses, preferred the cover of darkness for their operations. Constantinople was beautiful only in daylight, and seen from a distance. At night the squalor of centuries and the odour of decay pervaded the twisted alleys of the ancient city.

Behind the triple walls of the Yildiz Palace, amid a jumble of pavilions and kiosks in a wild mixture of all styles, a small and wizened old man was muttering in fitful slumber. It was a nightmare-ridden sleep; if anybody had been permitted to watch the repose of Abdul Hamid, King of Kings, the Arbiter of Princes, Master of the World and Shadow of Allah on Earth, he would have seen that ghosts were tormenting the mean and fearful spirit that inhabited the repulsive shape lying in that large and stately bed.

What had it helped the Sultan to kill thousands of those that hated him, and whom he hated and feared, if their ghosts came back to haunt his dreams? He had given orders to exterminate the Armenians, and at

the time he had believed that this measure conformed with the highest wisdom of princes. Had not the Tsar of Russia successfully diverted public clamour for reforms and improvements by throwing the Jews to the fury of the ignorant masses? Fanatic priests had excited the passions, paid agitators of the *chorna sotnya*, the Black Hundred, the cupidity of the populace. The Jews were about to attack the Little Father, and every true son of Russia who slew them was at liberty to reward himself with the Jews' money and womenfolk. It had worked in Russia—why should it not work in Turkey?

So the Sultan's men had gone out into the Eastern provinces, where the peaceful Armenian peasants, paying taxes to the Turkish officials and tribute to the Kurd brigands, were tilling their stony fields. The Faithful had been gathered in the mosques and the mullahs told them that the accursed Christians were about to cut each Mussulman's throat. It was the Padishah's will that the true believers rise and kill the infidels.

And under the green banner of the Prophet the mob had gone out on a very satisfactory orgy of looting, raping, and throat-cutting. Fifty thousand Armenians, unarmed and unprotected, were butchered. At Sivas, eight thousand men, women and children had sought refuge in their cathedral. The populace, assisted by the military and the gendarmes, killed all the men, drove the women and children into the wooden galleries, and then set fire to the building. Order was maintained throughout. In the morning, after prayers in the mosque, a bugle gave the signal for the massacres, and at night the same bugle sounded the "Cease Fire."

At Erzerum, two hundred young Armenians were laid in the market place on their backs, bound hand and foot. An appreciative crowd watched the mullah cut each man's throat, like those of the sheep sacrificed after the sacred month of fast.

It had been easy to keep the knowledge of what was happening in his Eastern provinces from the rest of the world; it was not so easy in Constantinople when the mob, armed with cudgels, surged through the streets braining with impartial fervour Armenians, Greeks, and other non-Moslems. The Powers had had the insufferable impudence of threatening intervention—interference in the Sultan's domestic affairs. They had not yet learned that indifference towards purely domestic butchery that was to characterize their actions, or rather their inaction, forty years later.

The venerable patriarch of the Armenian Church had fallen on his knees before the Sultan and implored him to stop the slaughter. He was imprudent enough to hint that the continuance of the massacres might not be in the best interests of Turkey. This had been an opportunity for Abdul Hamid to shed for once the cringing servility that he was forced to assume in his dealings with foreign powers. His voice had been thunderous, and he had felt the true successor of Suleiman the Terrible when he had screamed at the frightened priest:—

"You seem to expect the warships of the foreigners. Before they can reach Constantinople the water of the Bosphorus will be red with your blood and that of your accursed race."

It had been a truly royal occasion; and now it was most unfair that the waters of the Bosphorus, that had served the Sultan so well, that had engulfed many a sack containing the struggling bodies of his enemies—or the discarded women of his harem—should rise up against him in a threatening red flood. The floods were drawing nearer, and the Sultan was bound and helpless. He struggled wildly to break his bonds . . .

With a strangled cry he sat up and looked wildly around the richly-furnished room. It lay in semi-darkness, full of menacing shadows in which assassins might lurk. Murderers were waiting everywhere, ready to pounce on him the moment darkness, full of guilt and the memory of dark deeds, was allowed to reign.

"Lights!" Abdul Hamid clapped his hands, and a black eunuch sidled into the room. His hands were folded on his chest; ever since a minister's sudden movement when he wanted to take a document from his breastpocket had frightened the Sultan out of his wits, it had been a strict order that nobody must approach the Padishah unawares and with hands not fully visible. The ministers had to carry all documents openly: who knew what might be hidden in the depths of a despatch case.

The eunuch moved a switch, and the room was flooded with a blaze of light. But that was not enough.

"More light, everywhere!" Servants were scuttling through the corridors, through the alleys and paths of the garden, and soon the buildings all around were lit up. The peacocks in the aviary, dazzled by the unwonted illumination, set up a harsh screaming; the other birds joined the chorus; monkeys chattered excitedly, bears growled, gentle-eyed gazelles tried to hide in their rockery.

The electric light threw harsh shadows over the old man's face. The deep-set eyes spoke of fear and cunning; the pinched mouth under the grotesque nose betrayed cruelty and meanness. The Sultan scanned every corner of the room. No one was there.

One advantage of that accursed innovation, electricity, which the Padishah had admitted only into his own palace while prohibiting it in Constantinople: it worked more swiftly than the old-fashioned kind of lighting. But it had banished sleep for the night.

The Padishah clapped his hands and summoned one of his aides-de-camp. The officer came hastily, closing up the buttons of his tunic as he ran. But he pulled up sharply outside the door and entered with deliberate slowness while bowing three times in the regulation manner. He remembered only too well what had happened to the War Minister a short time ago. When admitted to the Padishah's presence, the minister's legs had become entangled with his sword, and in an effort to regain his balance he had stumbled forward. The Sultan, afraid as usual of an attempt on his life, had drawn a revolver and fired at the unfortunate minister. Luckily the shot only grazed him—a very narrow escape, seeing that the Sultan's one accomplishment in the field of sport was his ability to draw quickly and shoot straight. He would often amuse

himself by writing his name on a wall with bullets, or by puncturing with infallible aim oranges thrown up into the air.

He always carried two or three small revolvers secreted on his person, and constant fear had made him as dead as a frightened snake. All Turkey knew of the misfortune of a gardener who was at work one day in the park of Yildiz Palace, squatting half-hidden under twigs and leaves. Seeing the Sultan approaching, the unfortunate man sprang to attention, whereupon the monarch shot him dead. A subsequent investigation showed that the gardener had been completely unarmed; he did not even carry a pair of garden shears such as might have evoked unpleasant associations in the nephew of Abdul Aziz.

All this the officer knew as he stood beside the Sultan's bed. The Padishah answered the man's salute with a slight inclination of his head, and took a cigarette from a gold box standing on a bedside table. The officer produced a match—very slowly, so as not to alarm the despot—and approached it to the cigarette.

But when his hand drew near the Sultan's face, panic seized the old man. They were going to strangle him! He seized the officer's hand in an iron grip, squealing for help and trying to get at the revolver hidden under his pillow.

The man paled and trembled. Was this a trap? Would the black eunuchs pounce on him and do him to death, as had happened to so many others summoned to the imperial presence? He tried to stammer excuses, prayers for mercy, while Albanians with drawn scimitars rushed into the room. But the Sultan had recovered his composure and waved the guard away. He had just been reading a *djournal* on that officer: he knew what crimes—non-political and therefore venial, since they were only directed against the people and not against the Padishah—made the man dependent on his sovereign's favour and, indeed, long life.

He offered the trembling man a cigarette and invited him to read to him. This was a signal favour, and the frightened officer gradually recovered from his terror and held out some books for his master's selection.

The Padishah's private library was not impressive from a western point of view. It consisted of Turkish translations—Abdul knew no other language—of lascivious French novels, cheap detective stories and thrillers of the "blood and thunder" type. The one exception was a much-read translation of Machiavelli's "Prince," that manual and vademecum of tyrants through the ages. And although Abdul Hamid had none of the makings of a renaissance ruler, none of the abundant vitality and zest of living that characterized a bloody but great epoch, he loved to read the cynical maxims of the Florentine.

But to-night he preferred another story . . . one drenched in blood, and which told the world how would-be assassins of a king should be treated. It was the story of Damiens that the officer was reading in a slow and monotonous voice—Damiens, a poor, half-witted creature who had made an abortive attempt to stab Louis XV of France.

The Sultan smacked his lips and nodded with approval as the story

of the regicide's public execution unfolded—wound by wound, scream by scream, from the first bite of the red-hot irons to the last gasp of the wretch as the executioner tore the still beating heart out of the armless, legless, screaming lump of raw flesh that had been a man . . .

Abdul Hamid's eyes shone with a strange brilliance. This was how a king should rule; this was the fitting punishment for the unspeakable, abominable crime of attempting the life of a king.

As he listened to the story of torture and suffering, peace came to his troubled mind. He lay back on his pillows and fell asleep. With infinite precaution the officer closed the book and tiptoed out of the door, not forgetting to make the three deep obeisances prescribed by ceremonial. The lights in the palace gradually paled into yellow smudges as another day dawned over the Golden Horn—another day of the inglorious reign of Abdul Hamid, Destroyer of Turkey . . .

CHAPTER VII.

COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL

IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ABDUL HAMID ever conducted his policy on the basis of any principle other than that of safeguarding his personal rule. There were a number of issues on which he might have had a united nation behind him; for Turkey was kept in a state of submission to the foreigner that must irk national feeling.

Foreigners were exempt from Turkish jurisdiction; they were protected by their consular courts. Foreign powers had their own postal services on Turkish soil. A reform of Turkish legislation, justice, administration would have deprived the foreigner of valid grounds for the maintenance of these humiliating "capitulations," and all patriots would have supported the Sultan in his fight against them.

But only free men can be patriots; the oppressed become serfs or plotters. And Abdul Hamid's system of repression took care that no concerted public opinion could arise, let alone coalesce into parties and movements. The ubiquitous spies discouraged the expression of opinion; all meetings and gatherings were forbidden. A consequence of this ban was that what meetings were held had to take place under the protection of some foreign flag. This was the reason why the first groups of the Young Turkish Movement were affiliated to a lodge of Italian freemasons in Salonika.

Travelling inside Turkey became more and more difficult for the native. He needed a *teskere*, a domestic passport, while for journeys abroad an exit permit was necessary. This permit was refused to people suspected by the police. Consequently Europe for the first time saw the spectacle of refugees without papers. But it was a Europe that had not yet learned to treat the passportless victims of tyranny with bureaucratic hardness of heart: veritable colonies of Turkish exiles were formed

in many European capitals where they worked under the watchword of the Young Turks, Union and Progress.

Those less fortunate who had to stay behind under a régime of oppression and espionage became disgusted and cynical. The Sultan, not the people, ruled in Turkey; the Sultan, not the people, was humiliated when once again the guns of foreign warships, the bayonets of foreign armies extorted a concession.

Abdul Hamid's conception of rulership was entirely personal. *L'état c'est moi* was his motto as much as that of Louis XIV, the Sun King. But as different as the waning crescent from the brightness of the sun, was the state and the personality of the mean and shabby old man with the henna-dyed beard from the genial and inspired reign of the French king. Splendour turned to slatternly disorder, crumbling palaces in a disintegrating state—such was the Turkey of Abdul Hamid.

If he possessed no statesmanlike gifts he was not entirely devoid of cunning. Cunning, if practised on the grand scale, can serve as a temporary expedient, though not as a permanent substitute for statesmanship: a case in point was that of Ferdinand, the crafty German princeling who ruled Bulgaria for many years. But Abdul Hamid's gifts in that direction were put to the narrowest of uses. He did not possess the knack of seizing the right moment for action, the appropriate period for inaction. Blustering and blundering, he would get himself into a position from which retreat with dignity was impossible, and then had to climb down to the detriment of his prestige. Where, on the other hand, he should have taken action—as in the case of Egypt, when Britain invited him to send an army and thereby perpetuate his overlordship—he hesitated, and was lost.

The one conception which seems to have underlain his actions apart from his personal interest seems to have been a vague notion comprised under the name of Pan-Islamism. His title of Caliph made him the nominal head of Islam, although this assertion was by no means accepted throughout the Moslem world. The wealthier and more educated Moslems from abroad who visited Constantinople returned with considerably diminished enthusiasm. Attempts made by Abdul Hamid to stir up agitation among the Indian Moslems proved abortive, and the Pan-Islamic conception failed even more signally than its Pan-Slavist antitype. Through embracing many races—Turks, Arabs, Indians, Malays, negroid tribes and Mongols—Islam had lost forever the unifying force of a political conception; nationalist instincts had superseded religious fervour exactly as in the case of Catholicism. But it would appear that Abdul Hamid's only preoccupation was his own financial advantage. He became one of the wealthiest men in the world. Prudently, he lodged his enormous accounts, running into millions of pounds, with the Constantinople branches of foreign banks, and also abroad. He employed numerous agents to play the stock exchange for him and increased his fortune further, despite the vast amounts he had to spend on his system of spies. Numerous peasant smallholdings were expropriated under a

variety of pretexts, though the crushing taxes were usually sufficient to achieve this; and these lands were then added to the Sultan's ever-growing estates.

Like a malignant growth, Abdul Hamid sucked the riches from his State and people, forever swelling his private fortune. In addition, there was an almost official system of bribes—*baksheesh*—exactd from everyone who wanted to do business in Turkey or obtain some concession. The scale was graduated, but at the end was always to be found the Sultan who, through his agents, bagged the lion's share.

Numerous scandals illustrating the Sultan's dishonesty were public property—mean dishonesty despite the grand scale on which it was practised. Thus, a large sum of money collected for wounded soldiers after the war of 1897 was never accounted for: it disappeared into the Sultan's private coffers.

Another instance was the Hedjaz Railway project, a popular undertaking destined to facilitate Moslem pilgrimage to Mekka. It was to be an all-Moslem enterprise, and followers of the Prophet all over the world subscribed large amounts to this deserving project. Later it was discovered that a sum of £700,000 had been stolen by Abdul Hamid. And all this in addition to an official Civil List of £882,000 a year—twice the amount paid to King Edward VII or King George V.

The severest of censorships, the tightest net of espionage could not prevent these and many other instances of corruption, mismanagement and depravity becoming widely known. The Young Turk groups abroad as well as their secret lodges within the Turkish empire, notably in Salonika and other provincial centres, made it their business to enlighten their countrymen and the rest of the world on Abdul Hamid's mismanagement, greed and tyranny.

The Young Turks were bringing the spirit of modernism into Turkey. In their ranks were found, not only Turks but also Christians and Jews, all animated by the desire to establish amity among the many creeds and races of the Empire. There were among them Turkish free-thinkers, men who felt that Islam in its contemporary debased form was hampering enlightenment and progress; in their conceptions Pan-Islamism found no place.

The strength of Islam during its aggressive phase, when it subjugated the Balkans, had been that it was a creed that united its followers, whereas Christianity actually divided the Christians of the Balkans. At times, the antagonism between Roman and Greek Catholics had been greater than that between Christianity and Islam: Serbian kings had fought with the Turks because they felt threatened by Roman Catholicism, encroaching on them from the North. As late as 1875, the creation by the Turks of a separate "exarchate" in the form of a Bulgarian Church became a source of friction; this was no surprise to the Turks who realised that the Balkan Churches were intensely nationalist instead of universalist. A united Islam watched these Christian squabbles with satisfaction and contempt, since they prevented united action against the Turkish Empire. It is within living memory how more than once the Turkish custodians

of the Holy Places in Palestine had to intervene in order to prevent free fights among devoted Christian pilgrims of conflicting sects.

But Islam was no longer a factor of progress or even an element of political stability. Realising this, the Young Turks for a time tried to replace the myth of Pan-Islamism with the equally nebulous legend of Pan-Turanism. Going back to the almost legendary period when some sort of racial and political union was believed to have existed among Turks, Mongols, Finns, Magyars, Bulgars and other tribes, the re-establishment of a "Turanian" empire was the vague aim of Pan-Turanism.

Such conceptions are dangerous. There is hardly a single square mile of territory in the world not held at some time or other by different powers. Basing territorial claims on the vastest extent of his predecessors' realm—an extent often attained for only one fleeting moment in history has become the practice of dictators. If Mussolini claims the inheritance of the Roman Empire it would mean that England and France, Spain and Western Germany, Turkey and Persia must form part of it; Hitler demands Holland and Switzerland, Poland and the Baltic States, because at some moment many centuries ago German aggression may have established a momentary foothold there.

Such universalist movements, complete with their own "blood and soil" myth, are conducive to war, and essentially reactionary. It was therefore no accident that Pan-Turanism soon ceased to play a part in Young Turkish activities, and it is greatly to the credit of Kemal Atatürk who at the height of his power might well have revived these ambitious plans, that he rejected them completely in the political field.

What has remained of Pan-Turanism is legitimate pride and interest in the culture, language and poetry of the early Turks and their fore-runners or co-racialists, Uighurs, Turcomans, Mongols, Hittites. Western science is indebted to recent Turkish archaeologists, ethnologists, philologists and writers whose researches have shed new light on this complex.

But under Abdul Hamid the Young Turks had no time to indulge in research and speculation. Students, intellectuals, young officers joined them in ever-increasing numbers. It may not always have been patriotic ardour or democratic enthusiasm that brought recruits to their ranks. Business men, Turks and foreigners, realised that where corruption exceeds a certain measure, it ceases to fulfil its time-honoured function of oiling the wheels of autocracy and becomes increasingly an impediment to their very movement. The Young Turks aimed at establishing a sound financial system; aiding them became a prudent investment. To the ambitious, adherence to the proscribed movement was a dangerous but alluring prospect of high office and honours. And finally, foreign powers were not averse to supporting a movement which they hoped to remain able to control.

"Union and Progress." Under this slogan publications appeared abroad and were smuggled into Turkey; revolutionary posters appeared on the very walls of Yildiz Kiosk. Abdul Hamid retaliated with prison and exile, the bullet and the noose. Constantinople became a furtive

city of whisper and intrigue, plot and counter-plot, rumour and violence, secret assassination and seething rebellion.

But Constantinople was also the City of Promise and Fulfilment for all those who had found the soil of their home too barren—or too hot. Adventurers and *entrepreneurs* thronged Pera and Galata whose air seemed to be that of a permanent “South Sea Bubble.” Usually staid bankers indulged in bold coups, adventurous projects; foreign industrialists gathered concessions and enabled hordes of corrupt officials to earn a golden harvest.

The Turk had never had much aptitude for business; his military valour had always been matched by his indolence in commerce and industry. The decay of the Empire must to a great extent be ascribed to the Turk’s utter inability to comprehend the principles of sound administration and colonisation. Squeezing the last piastre from subject populations and overcoming their understandable reluctance by means of massacre had been the only method understood by countless Pashas in charge of Turkish or foreign provinces.

Now Turkey herself had become the object of foreign exploitation and the Miser on the Throne had no objection so long as a sizable stream of the golden life-blood drawn from his realm flowed into his own basin. He took good care to be a “silent partner” in any enterprise that promised profit, be it a railway or the opium trade.

The law, the whole authority of the State had become a farce. A farce that was not funny, for it was stained in blood and mud; a travesty as grotesque as the small and skinny figure of the little old man, disappearing in the folds of an enormous bullet-proof overcoat, and in his hand, taller than he, the ancient sword of Osman.

CHAPTER VIII.

REVOLT

YILDIZ KIOSK WAS CELEBRATING ANOTHER VICTORY over the rebels. A number of suspected Young Turk leaders had been captured—a great success for Izzet Pasha, the “Syrian fox” who was the head of the secret police. He could count on a generous reward: had he not dug out this whole gang of revolutionaries who wanted to overthrow the Padishah?

The prison of Constantinople was crowded; outside waited the friends and relatives of the prisoners. They had pulled all possible strings, bribed influential court officials and induced them to implore the Padishah’s mercy.

They waited for many hours until the deputation returned. Its report was depressing: the Sultan had declared that he must await the complete result of the preliminary investigation before declaring his intentions. This meant two things—a long period of uncertainty, and meanwhile police “examination” of the suspects. What that signified

was clear. Afterwards the most to be hoped for by way of mercy was banishment to the solitude of some miserable far-away garrison.

The Sultan's consternation was great when he learned that high-ranking army officers were among the arrested. He had felt certain of the loyalty of the army, and now he saw its leaders in the ranks of his enemies. His first impulse was to have them shot out of hand; but the Commander-in-Chief intervened.

It would be disastrous to deprive the army of its most capable officers who, misled by their youthful credulity, had been ensnared by the revolutionaries. Let the Padishah shame them with his magnanimity and give them a chance to atone for their error by zealous service under the Sultan's banner; these young men might become useful one day.

"Here are their names, Commander of the Faithful," said the General. "Here is a young officer just gazetted Staff Captain, one of the best ever to pass through the Salonika Military Academy. His name is Kemal—Mustapha Kemal. May I humbly suggest that a short term of imprisonment in the Red Tower, followed by a spell of garrison duty in Syria, may knock the nonsense out of the young man's system?"

Abdul Hamid, although he never tolerated opposition, was thoughtful. Perhaps the General was right. He needed capable soldiers, efficient officers. What a pity that his predecessor Mohammed sixty years ago had disbanded the Janissars and modernised the army. This was the reward of modernism: a rebellious spirit, officers who dared to think! How much simpler to have a devoted guard, well-paid and contented, who could be given the goods of subject populations as their private pasture grounds.

The Sultan sighed deeply. Gone were the good old days when there were no ministers who dared contradict their Master, no foreign powers whose insolent interference prevented the King of Kings from having his own way, no foreign Press and public opinion that must be bribed or placated.

But it would never do to weaken the army still further. So an Imperial *Yrade* was signed—the Sultan's edict without which no pin was allowed to drop in his realm—and the young officers, among them Captain Kemal, were given short terms of detention and then assigned to the remotest and dullest of garrison towns.

But there were others, intellectuals, students, lawyers, with whom the Sultan dealt differently. He hated those meddling lawyers, educated in the heretical conceptions of the West, who fomented the movement of discontent and unrest. Let them talk their way out now in court—but this time in the dock.

It was, of course, no ordinary court: there were no judges, juries, advocates or members of the public or the Press. It was the Sultan's own tribunal, held in secret behind the walls of Yildiz by Court officials who were accuser, judge and jury, all in one.

Abdul Hamid liked to be present; he liked to face his enemies—when they were securely handcuffed and under guard. Frequently he took a hand in the examination, asking the victims blandly, almost affably, for details of their lives, their families, their activities. Deliberately

he fostered the impression that the trial was not the last word; that at the worst a sentence of banishment would result.

But then came the death sentence, executed then and there. We possess secret reports, culled from the archives of a European power, that give horrible details. The park of Yildiz was occupied by strong detachments of troops and the condemned men were hanged from the trees—sometimes inexpertly or with deliberate slowness—and left hanging till sundown. The bodies were then sold by Court officials to the Anatomical Department of the University which was, consequently, one of the best supplied with dissecting “subjects.” The Court officials never failed to send a covering letter together with a fresh supply of “goods,” stating that the bodies were those of suicides or victims of traffic accidents.

Abdul Hamid delighted in watching the executions, until one day some of the condemned men assailed him with a flood of curses and oaths, of which the Turkish language is particularly rich. Abdul Hamid had his victims’ tongues cut out and their execution prolonged. But since he was superstitious, and also afraid of the effect such scenes might have on the soldiers, he witnessed executions after that from behind the curtains of a window in a nearby kiosk.

These atrocious details may sound sensational, but they are based on reliable official sources; and when some of Abdul Hamid’s relatives later threatened libel suits against various newspapers, they hastily withdrew their suits when shown this material.

Murder engenders murder. A short time afterwards the mutilated body of a notorious informer was found lying under the walls of Yildiz on the wall was found a poster calling on the Sultan to abdicate if he valued his life.

This occurrence created a sensation. A huge crowd gathered around the spot and discussed the poster; it was only with considerable delay that the police appeared on the scene, dispersed the mob, removed the body and took the placard inside.

Within a few hours the whole of the Capital was seething with rumours, and finally the police, realising that it was impossible to hush up the incident, was constrained to issue a communiqué. It stated that unknown persons, probably disaffected individuals, had affixed an offensive poster to the walls of the Palace and, in order to make their threats more impressive, had left a dead body on the spot, probably the victim of a traffic accident. The police were already following certain clues, and several arrests were imminent, etc.

This incident, combined with the singularly stupid official communiqué, for the first time drew the attention of the public at large to the now admitted existence of an active opposition. The actual identity of the members and leaders of the Committee remained of course unknown; but through a network of supporters—often in unexpected places—they received information and aid. Invisible and ubiquitous, their actual numbers and power enhanced by rumour, their influence had the Sultan on the defensive.

Abdul Hamid was not without astuteness. Despots have always

endeavoured—sometimes successfully—to stigmatise progressive movements as anti-national, anti-religious, and inspired by sinister forces from abroad. Throughout the ages minority groups—Catholics, Jews, Freemasons—have furnished the safety valve which the tyrants opened to avert an impending explosion.

The Sultan gave out that atheists and Christians were the leaders of the Young Turks—enemies of Islam who had made common cause with the accursed Armenians with the aim of razing all mosques, killing all Moslems, and enslaving Turkey to the foreigner. And his propaganda had a certain measure of success. A grasping and ignorant clergy played on the fanaticism of a still more ignorant populace; orthodox elements resisted the Young Turks' influence, not from any love they may have felt for the Padishah, but because they believed their faith in danger. The ignorant and downtrodden peasant, illiterate and dumb, could not be interested in political questions; words like Constitution, Progress, Liberalism, Civic Rights had no meaning for him. Nor did the Sultan's misdeeds arouse his particular abhorrence. The ways of the Great were inscrutable, and taxes must be paid in any case. But what the peasant did understand was the pretended threat to his mosque, his way of life. He also understood that his *mullah* preached something both honourable and profitable when he incited him to wipe out the infidels, notably the Armenians whom he could see waxing wealthy by dint of hard work and owing to their particular aptitude for business.

In May, 1895, Abdul Hamid decided to solve the Armenian Question. He did it in a way that set the example for all mass-murderers after him.

CHAPTER IX.

MASSACRE

TO-DAY ARMENIA NO LONGER EXISTS AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE; the western part of the district lying between the Black and the Caspian Seas comprised under this name is a Turkish province while its eastern part is a federated Soviet Republic within the framework of the U.S.S.R. Armenia's political existence ceased already in the Middle Ages, during the Crusades, and was only fleetingly revived for a few years after 1918. It was Armenia's fate to be dominated by many powers in succession—Persians, Romans, Turks, Russians—and to be partitioned time and again. The fate of the Armenians presents many striking parallels with that of the Jews to whom they bear a pronounced racial resemblance, though the Armenians are Christians and of "Aryan" origin.

Around Erzerum, Kars and Trapezunt the Armenians lived the life of small agriculturists. Impoverished and oppressed by the Turkish authorities, their lot was further embittered by the exactions of Kurd brigands who levied heavy tribute without interference on the part of the Turkish gendarmery. This constant pressure led to large-scale

emigration from Armenia proper to Constantinople and the countries of the Levant, to France, to Russia, and also to America where considerable Armenian communities came into existence in New York and in California.

From all these centres teachers, missionaries and educationists returned to Armenia, trying to improve the lot of their brethren. If one of the many racial groups then under the Sultan's sway deserved the appellation of model citizens it was the Armenians. Thrifty, industrious and peaceable, they showed considerable business acumen; their appetite for education enabled them to make rapid progress amid an indolent and illiterate population. Their knowledge of foreign languages, their adaptability and quickness of perception was the secret of their successes in business.

Political ambitions they had none. They had no reason, as Abdul Hamid later alleged, to desire annexation by Russia. The Russian régime at that time was as reactionary, rapacious and intolerant as that of Abdul Hamid, and the Tsar himself showed no desire to have more Armenians within his borders. Later, when the massacres were at their height, some Armenian leaders finding themselves in a situation that nothing could make worse asked for active support by their brothers across the Russian frontier, but without result. Their horrible treatment would have relieved them of all allegiance to Turkey in the eyes of God and man; and if a quarter of a century later, following another series of massacres, they proclaimed their independence and fought, though unsuccessfully, against the Turks their struggle deserves the fullest sympathy.

In 1895 the biblical story of Haman and Mordecai was re-enacted not far from its original scene. "There lives a nation within your empire whose faith and customs are different from ours . . . May it please the King to order their destruction." And this time no Esther interceded with the cruel despot who calmly ordered the extinction of a people.

Sir Edwin Pears gives the following description of the methods employed by the Sultan's emissaries:—

"The Moslem population were collected in the largest mosque of the town where of course no Christians were present. Abdul's agent declared that the Sultan had evidence that the Armenians generally were in revolt and that their principal aim was to strike at Islam. They were called upon as good Moslems to defend the faith and to give a lesson to intending rebels. He declared that according to the Sacred Law the property of rebels might be taken by Believers, and he invited his congregation on the morrow to loot their neighbours' possessions, informing them at the same time that if resistance were made they would be justified in killing those who opposed."

The result of this infamous appeal to greed in the name of religion had the results that were to be expected wherever mob rule is given a free hand. There are reported a few isolated cases in which some honest and courageous Moslems opposed the mob and protected Armenians at

great risk to themselves; but the percentage of such cases was probably equal to that of "decent Germans" under Hitler.

A population of peaceful peasants and small shopkeepers, totally unarmed and surrounded by enemies, had no chance to defend itself. In some places self-defence units were hastily formed and many episodes of heroic fighting against overwhelming odds are reported; but on the whole it was large-scale butchery, with no greater risk to the murderers than the butcher's trade entails.

An orgy of killing, rape and pillage swept the eastern provinces; and when the Armenians of Constantinople, in understandable terror, organised demonstrations in order to attract the attention of the European powers, similar massacres started in Haskeuy, the Armenian quarter of Constantinople.

The leader of an Armenian delegation sent to present a petition to the Grand Vizier is cut down by the sabre of a high police officer; an Armenian student thereupon draws his revolver and shoots the officer. At once the Armenian crowd is surrounded by troops, police and a savage mob who open fire and mow down hundreds of people. The remainder throw themselves into their Cathedral which they fortify, resolved to defend themselves to the last.

And now, driven to despair, the Armenians rise. Once more Armenia's hymn of freedom resounds from the mountains. At Trebizond a small band seizes public buildings and holds out for three days against regular troops until, miraculously, a French warship rescues the few survivors. In Constantinople the ambassadors of the Great Powers—with the significant exception of Germany—present a joint note of protest, demanding the immediate cessation of the massacres, and guarantees against their recurrence. Seen in retrospect, it was one of the last manifestations of Europe's conscience; forty years later the thought of interfering with Germany's massacre of the Jews would have evoked the scorn of correct diplomats who did not admit of interference in the "internal affairs" of a sovereign State . . .

The organised massacres ceased, at least in the Capital. In the provinces, sporadic pogroms continued for another two years. Mr. Gladstone, speaking at the time of these outrages, declared that "the powers of language hardly suffice to describe what has been done and is being done in Armenia, and that exaggeration is almost beyond power."

The persecution of the Armenians, lasting for five years and followed by petty molestation, innumerable restrictions and oppressive measures, wiped out a large percentage of the Armenians, but did even greater harm to Turkey itself. Unless criminally insane a ruler can be assumed to have three main objects: to preserve his territory, to retain the loyalty and affection of his subjects, and to enhance his own prestige. By doing everything in his power to offend against all three of these principles Abdul Hamid showed himself devoid of all qualifications for government, even if the moral aspect were to be left aside.

It was not the last persecution the unhappy Armenians had to suffer. During the first World War proof was given of the deplorable fact that some of the victorious Young Turks were after all the old kind of Turk wearing Prussian boots. Enver Pasha instigated an infamous mass-deportation of the Armenians under the pretext that they were Russian sympathisers; a deportation whose goal, according to an actual instruction issued by Enver, was—nothingness. Between six hundred and eight hundred thousand men, women and children were massacred. The whole process was watched with benevolent interest by Germany who, indeed, instigated this mass-murder through Ambassador von Wangenheim. Mr. Henry Morgenthau, the then Ambassador of the United States in Constantinople, sums up this fact on which all impartial observers agreed, in the following passage of an article published in the issue for March, 1918, of the American *Red Cross Magazine*¹:—

“To what extent is the German Government responsible for the deportation and the massacres of the Armenians? Let me state categorically that the German Government could have prevented them.”

Mr. Morgenthau describes how his repeated intervention with the German Ambassador in Constantinople (the U.S. were still neutral) did not evoke the slightest response, while diplomatic steps in Berlin finally resulted in a weak and ineffectual note of “protest,” simply in order to establish an alibi for German guilt.

This horrible crime was never brought home to the Germans when they were defeated. Is it too fantastic to believe that having noted how the greatest of crimes escape punishment, they filed away their records of the Armenian massacres—as the blue-prints, to be used with improvements, twenty-five years later for their atrocities against the Jews of Europe? . . .²

Abdul Hamid could have pacified the West and gained the confidence of his subjects, Turks and Christians, by the introduction of a few rudimentary reforms—if even from the point of view of his own convenience and popularity. But as he never travelled through his provinces or had any contacts in his capital apart from a few foreign diplomats, he did not even become aware of the existence of public opinion, let alone of the necessity of placating it. The infamies instigated by him, the brazen shamelessness with which he persisted in shielding and rewarding the perpetrators of the most revolting outrages, earned him the names of opprobrium under which, despite occasional attempts at whitewashing, he will forever be remembered in history—Abdul the Assassin . . . Abdul the Damned.

¹ Re-translated here from its French version, *Les faits les plus horribles de l'histoire*, Paris, 1918.

² See Franz Werfel, *The Forty Days of the Musa Dagh*.

CHAPTER X.

REVOLT

IT IS A CURIOUS PHENOMENON OF HISTORY THAT THE least normal and orderly of events, revolutions, seem to follow a definite pattern. Their causes are so patently obvious that the observer cannot comprehend the blindness of rulers; they devolve in several sharply defined stages, in a sequence of events almost normal in their predictable regularity.

There are the plotters and terrorists who sow the seed; there are the bold leading spirits who unchain the flood. The first stage of a revolution is often effected with little bloodshed; a feeling of general elation reigns, fraternisation occurs between classes, creeds and races that were hitherto implacable enemies. French aristocrats voluntarily resign their privileges, well-intentioned Kerenskys, benevolent and liberal Milyukoffs assume office. All is harmony and fraternity.

But then a "morning-after" feeling arises. An opposition arrived in power begins to discover that criticism is easier than government; conspirators are discovered to be less successful when in office. The spirit of rebellion will not curb itself under the discipline of re-established law and order; the more radical accuse their moderate comrades of having betrayed the spirit of the revolution.

So Mirabeau and Danton are overthrown and succeeded by the Jacobin terror of Marat and Robespierre; Kerensky is ousted by Lenin and Trotzky. The spirit of universal brotherhood evaporates, for a harsher wind now blows.

Then comes the third stage. In internecine struggle, amid murder and violence, the order of the strongest is established. There emerges Napoleon who with "a whiff of grapeshot" disperses the last of the Jacobins; there comes Stalin who proscribes and exterminates his former collaborators.

And then the victor creates his own myth, since it is the victor who writes history. In retrospect, the official version of events presents them as one long preparation for the ultimate victor's emergence. The Press, literature, the cinema, the radio noisily and incessantly proclaim the myth. Trotzky never existed, or if he did, he was resolved to betray Russia to the Germans even while he was creating the Red Army. The Victor, he who stayed alive and in power because he was the strongest, is now discovered to have been the author of all that was good and permanent, to have been right throughout where others fell into error—which is treason—and to have achieved what he did by reason of superhuman prescience.

Propaganda, however, is not history; and no service is done to a great man by lapsing into blind adulation and renouncing independent judgment in favour of the myth created by the Dictator and his grateful people.

These considerations should be borne in mind when dealing with

the Young Turkish revolution and the part played in it by Mustafa Kemal. The present tendency, especially of official sources, is to exaggerate the importance of his rôle in those events, and to write history in terms of retrospective prophecy.

In fact, the Turkish revolution followed the pattern decreed by history. All the elements, all the successive stages are there, and it bears a striking resemblance to the French Revolution of 1789 in more than one aspect.

Like the French, the Turkish revolution covered a period of fifteen years, streaked with war and upheaval, and ending in the establishment of a firm and lasting régime. And, like Napoleon's, Mustafa Kemal's part in the political side of the revolution was at first insignificant and his rôle a purely military one.

Contemporary reports on the Young Turkish revolution hardly mention Kemal. He was a useful but minor and unpopular member of the Central Committee of the Salonika lodge, and during the early years of the régime he was completely overshadowed by the dashing and impressive personality of Enver Pasha.

The upheaval started, appropriately enough, in the ancient cockpit of the nations, Macedonia. Since the day Macedonia entered the arena of history, led by Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, some three hundred years before the Christian era, it has almost without interruption remained the scene of war and battle, insurrection and repression, murder and massacre. Rome and Byzantium, Greek, Turks, Serbs and Bulgars ruled, coveted, attacked and defended its mountains and valleys until such a hodge-podge of races and tongues resulted that a clear delineation of racial and linguistic frontiers has remained impossible to this day.

Macedonia forms part of the overland highway to the East; the ancient Via Egnatia of the Romans led to Thessalonike (Salonika). The Macedonian coast with its harbours formed the conflicting terminus of Serb, Bulgar, and Greek expansion—vitally important to each, though always open to attack and hard to defend. Macedonia formed the object of Italian interest ever since Venice penetrated southward along the Dalmatian coastline, and it was particularly coveted by Austria-Hungary in its "Drang nach Süden," resulting in the enslavement and forcible Germanisation or Magyarisation of the Slavs. Germany, Austria's ever more dominant partner, favoured such expansion, for she expected to become the heir to Austria's vast but unwieldy and decaying power. Bismarck's cynical doctrine, "Slavs are slaves," was faithfully copied by Austria; she had applied to the Bosnians and Herzegovinians, Slav populations partly moslemised, the same treatment as to the Poles, Czechs, Croats and other Slav subjects. Serbia and Macedonia were the next objects; Salonika was to be Austria's outlet to the Mediterranean in addition to Trieste, tucked away into the innermost fold of the Adriatic Sea.

Germany, in turn, was actively pursuing her Baghdad project. She had a valuable stepping-stone in Bulgaria, ruled by a crafty German

princeling, always willing to betray the solidarity of the peoples of the Balkan in favour of his German master.

In 1908 an Austrian expansion into Macedonia seemed imminent. Widespread brigandage, fomented by Austria or caused by deliberate provocation on her part, was to furnish the pretext for an intervention that would have spelt finis to the independence of Serbia too. Six years later, in the fateful year 1914, that attempt was indeed made.

But in 1908 the Committee for Union and Progress came to the conclusion that the Turkish patriots must take action; they must introduce reforms in order to prevent the continued existence of anarchy and thereby a pretext for Austrian intervention. The Paris lodge instructed the Salonika group that they must act. The powers had shortly before declined to take official cognisance of a memorandum submitted to them by the most influential groups of the Young Turk movement; insurrection was the last resort.

The success of an insurrection undertaken with weak forces, consisting chiefly of officers and civilians without the initial active support of the rank and file, was in itself proof of the advanced decay of the central government's power; indeed, the insurgents were astonished by the facility with which their almost bloodless revolt achieved success.

Niazi Bey, a bold conspirator and soldier of almost Garibaldian stature, the hero of a hundred plots and escapes, struck the first blow. With a handful of adherents, Niazi marched from the town of Resna into the mountains and issued an appeal to the army and the empire, demanding reforms and the restoration of the Constitution. Enver, also with a small following, joined him, and at once rebellion spread like wildfire throughout the whole of Macedonia. This was during the first half of July, 1908.

Abdul Hamid, on learning of the insurrection, took a step typical of his cunning but narrow outlook. He immediately promoted over 2,000 officers in the Anatolian and Syrian army corps in order to bribe them into loyalty, and promised the rebels complete amnesty and promotion to the rank of general if they would surrender. But at the same time he sent troops against them.

The General in command of Uskub received the order to subdue the insurgents; how small their forces were is evident from the fact that two battalions of regulars were deemed sufficient for that purpose. But the troops shot their commander and joined forces with the rebels. The same thing happened in Serres, and soon the whole of the army in Macedonia had joined the revolt. Their decision was hastened by another stupid step taken by Abdul Hamid: the dispatch to Macedonia of large numbers of spies. They were promptly captured and suitably dealt with; the system of espionage was deeply abhorrent to the Turkish soldier, as it must be to all soldiers. Political "commissars" do not strengthen but weaken the morale of the professional soldier.

When troops were sent to Macedonia from Asia Minor, agents of the Committee were smuggled on board and spread their propaganda

so successfully that these contingents on landing refused to fire on their comrades and immediately joined the rebel forces.

And now Abdul Hamid began to feel the crumbling of the block of concrete on which he had hoped to build his power. The crowning blow came when, faced with the prospect of civil war, he consulted the religious Court of the *Sheik ul-Islam* and was informed in a *fatwa* that it was not permissible to set Moslem against Moslem, since the grievances of the rebels were justified.

Abdul Hamid must give in or abdicate. This was even the advice of a *divan* of ministers and high dignitaries who, afraid of facing their sovereign's fury, entrusted the Court Astrologer with their message.

It was a bitter blow for the crafty schemer who saw the work of thirty years undone. He had murdered and bribed, plotted and intrigued in order to establish his absolute and autocratic power; he had cut off Midhat's head—but only to see a thousand new heads sprouting on the Hydra of Revolution.

In this situation Abdul Hamid for the first time showed something akin to cleverness. His own skin was dear to him—he had been greatly frightened by a message sent from Salonika by some astute psychologist in which “something very unpleasant for the Sultan's person” was threatened—and he clung to the throne with all the wiles he could muster. It was better to give in gracefully, if possible to take the wind out of the rebels' sails by appearing as the real sponsor of reform, and meanwhile to lie low. He would appear passive and pliable in order to gain time for the forming of a reactionary opposition; Abdul felt sure that political friction would occur among the many heterogeneous forces and personalities now united in opposition, and it seemed politic to bide his time.

For the nine remaining months of his reign he fostered the impression, shared by several contemporary observers duped by his guile, that he was content to drift along passively. In reality, the cunning fox of Yildiz employed all his powers of intrigue and came near to success.

For the time being he gave in; on July 23rd, 1908, the Constitution was proclaimed in Salonika and the following day in Constantinople. It was universally taken to refer to Midhat's constitution, abrogated and in abeyance since 1877, but Abdul Hamid did not commit himself. With superb impudence he had it announced that “despite all opposition His Majesty has proclaimed the Constitution and ordered new elections.”

The effect was electric. Constantinople witnessed scenes of public rejoicing unequalled in its long and varied history. A jubilant crowd thronged the streets, utter strangers embraced, mullahs fraternised with orthodox priests and rabbis. The British and American embassies were besieged by cheering crowds paying homage to the two leading democracies. “Long live the Sultan,” “long live the Constitution” was the public cry, intermingled with shouts of “Down with the spies.”

The spies and informers scuttled underground; the censors were uncivilly ejected from newspaper offices. Armenians were slapped on the back by Turks, Turkish women shook hands in public with their

barefaced Christian sisters—it seemed that the millennium had arrived.

For a brief moment the Sultan's popularity stood higher than ever before. Flags spontaneously appeared on all houses when it was announced that the Sultan would for once show himself to his people in the Hagia Sophia. He was cheered to the echo; it was announced that he had sworn on the Koran to honour the Constitution, and that henceforth there would be no religious or racial discrimination in his realm.

The crowd—short-sighted or magnanimous, it does not matter—was prepared to forget that the Constitution had been extracted from the Sultan's clutch by force; they were content to honour their Padishah as the fount of wisdom, benevolence and liberalism. A wiser or better monarch would have read the signs aright: he would have tried to capitalise the people's enthusiasm for reform and draw to himself the glory of peace and progress.

But Abdul Hamid could see only one thing: the humiliation of being no longer an absolute ruler, of having to accept a Constitution and the interference of the people's voice in the sacrosanct realm of government. And during the ensuing nine months he chose to ally himself, not with the forces of progress but with those of black and ignorant reaction; and thereby he hastened his own downfall.

CHAPTER XI.

THE TYRANT FALLS

IN SOME RESPECTS ABDUL HAMID'S EXPECTATIONS were fulfilled. The universal honeymoon feeling soon gave way to disenchantment. While the members of the Committee did not trust the Sultan and rightly expected to be treated as rebels, should he ever regain his absolute power, there was also growing mutual suspicion in their own ranks. The newspapers used their regained independence to indulge in violent abuse, the public witnessed, instead of the anticipated millennium, the rule of a new bureaucracy which was in some respects hardly less tyrannical than the old régime.

A split occurred in the Committee, which broke up into parties, Liberals and Nationalists. While the Liberals wished to implement their promises of reform, the Nationalists interpreted them in a narrow and chauvinistic sense. They applied equality to Turks only; minorities and their languages were persecuted with fanatic ardour. A fresh massacre of the Armenians occurred at Adana; the Arabic language was banned in the Arab parts of the Empire, a stupid measure which led to risings in the Hedjaz where wild tribesmen annihilated the Turkish troops sent against them. Greeks and Albanians were similarly molested and persecuted—a step particularly imbecile in the case of the Albanians who, as a Moslem island among Christian populations, had always been the surest support of Turkish rule.

The Nationalist deputies finally brought about the dismissal of

Kiamil Pasha, the progressive Grand Vizier confirmed in office after the *coup d'état*. But they were unable to retain popular support. Discipline in the army and the navy became lax, and the public was greatly concerned to hear that the *Sheik ul-Islam* whose attitude had facilitated the success of the Young Turk rising and prevented the horrors of civil war, had resigned because he could no longer collaborate with the Committee.

In addition to all this, the state of the finances remained chaotic: an initial revival of trade was followed by a serious slump. In these circumstances the forces of reaction gathered around the newly-formed Mahometan Association.

It was founded by the Chief Eunuch, and consisted of disgruntled officials dismissed by the new régime, spies out of work, a few honest men of the old school sincerely afraid of modernism and atheism, and members of the minor clergy. At least one of Abdul Hamid's sons was a leading member, and funds were secretly conveyed to the organisation by the Sultan.

The newspapers set up by the Mahometan Association played on the masses' fear of Westernisation. The Committee was denounced as a gang of Atheists, Jews and Freemasons, and the re-establishment of the Sacred Law of *sheri'a* was demanded in lieu of an impious and un-Turkish Constitution.

Reaction spread in Constantinople, where a more literate populace was easily swayed by the printed word. Some *ulemas* and *hodjas* saw to it that this propaganda spread also to the illiterate, and particularly among the soldiers.

As a result, a counter-revolution broke out in April, 1909, to the complete surprise of the Committee. A journalist, the editor of a reactionary paper, had been assassinated in the street. The Sultan, adroitly seizing this occurrence, had the man interred in the Turkish equivalent of Westminster Abbey, and the funeral became the occasion of demonstrations against the Committee. Soon rioting broke out in the Capital; the garrison and the marines guarding the arsenal mutinied. If the Salonica insurrection had been one of officers without regiments, the soldiers of Constantinople now rose without, or against their officers.

The Sultan's agents, disguised as *mullahs*, rushed through the streets, raising cries of "Down with the Constitution," "Down with the Committee." Progressive newspapers were wrecked, the leaders of the Committee hastily went into hiding. The rioting soldiers, without opposition and without leadership, contented themselves with firing wildly into the air, causing a number of casualties. Abdul Hamid now showed his hand almost openly. Hordes of soldiers, better designated as a mob than as troops, were attacking the War Office; when the officer in command of the loyalist troops defended the building with initial success, he was ordered to cease resistance by the Sultan.

This was the moment for Abdul Hamid to come into the open, suspend the constitution and re-establish his absolute power. He could count on the support of the army both in Constantinople and Asia Minor and also on the navy which, in conjunction with the Tchataldja

defences, could have held and possibly defeated the Committee's forces should they attempt an invasion from the European side. But here Abdul Hamid gave a final proof of his irresolution and cowardice. He allowed four decisive days to pass without taking any action.

Meanwhile the revolt, deprived of fuel, fizzled out. The soldiers, left with no leaders and no object for their patriotic ardour, returned to their barracks, and there was next to no opposition when the Salonika Committee, having recovered from their initial consternation, marched on the Capital. At San Stefano the "Army of Liberation" was welcomed by a convention of deputies, and on April 22nd, 1909, the troops, led by Shevket Pasha, entered Constantinople, encountering hardly any resistance. Yildiz was surrounded and the palace guards marched off. The counter-revolution was over.

And now Abdul Hamid, alone and friendless in his palace, had good reason to tremble for his life. Many spies and the leading eunuchs were publicly lynched; the cruelty of their executions matched some of the atrocities these guilty men had practised themselves. A considerable faction in the Committee asked for Abdul Hamid's head; they were afraid that mere deposition and expulsion would give him a chance of further plotting. Suggestions varied between a public trial and immediate assassination.

But finally the more lenient majority view prevailed. Abdul Hamid was to be deposed—without the "option" of abdication—and held prisoner; Reshad Effendi, his younger brother, was to be proclaimed Sultan in his stead. Abdul Hamid's person was in the eyes of the people still glorified by "the divinity that doth hedge a king," and his execution might have led to risings and, perhaps, to foreign intervention.

A commission was despatched to the Sultan to inform him of this decision; it was backed by the legality of a *fetva* issued by the new *Sheikh-ul-Islam's* Court, according to which a Caliph who had proved himself unworthy of his office could be deposed.

It was a dramatic interview; but the scene left a disgusting impression with all those who witnessed it. There stood the King of Kings, the Shadow of Allah on Earth, the Blood Drinker, the Sole Arbiter of the World's Destiny—a skinny, scrubby little old man, the dye gone from his grey beard, who trembled and whined and pleaded for his life. He did not believe the solemn assurance that his life would be spared, and was reassured only when, accompanied by three of his wives and a retinue of twenty-seven servants, he was taken to the station and put on board the train that was to take him to Salonika.

There he was permitted to live under guard but in comfortable circumstances in the Villa Allatini, a handsome mansion surrounded by a large garden. Some years later he was taken back to Turkey and died, forgotten and broken, but of natural causes. No human judge made him expiate his crimes . . .

When Yildiz Kiosk was searched the sum of £500,000 was found in notes, gold and silver, and securities to the value of £1,600,000. His account with the Ottoman Bank in Constantinople was impounded: it

amounted to only £45,000, whereas the extent of his deposits abroad was never ascertained. Abdul Hamid himself stated that they amounted "only" to £1,000,000. His private properties, most of them acquired illegally, were transferred to the State; their extent was enormous, the mines alone producing a yearly income of £300,000.

The Commission charged with these investigations also discovered 300 cases of *djournals*, reports from spies. Most of them were still unread, and what there was showed such a mixture of lies and futility that they were completely without value even from the police point of view. As Abdul Hamid, devoid of all external contacts with the people and the state of public opinion, based his decisions on the information contained in these reports, it is not surprising that he committed so many blunders—as distinct from his crimes.

Thus ended the reign of Abdul Hamid. It left a heritage of disorder and demoralisation. Vast territories had been lost, the substance of the empire wasted, its prestige brought to the lowest level. It seemed as if all vitality had left the Turkish colossus: of its virtues only the innate discipline of the Turkish soldier remained.

And this, too, was to be tested to breaking point in a series of disastrous wars. The evil heritage of Abdul Hamid proved too much even for his immediate successors. Turkey had to suffer still more before, through war and invasion, misery and devastation, she was to find a leader, and her soul.

END OF BOOK ONE.

BOOK TWO

CHAPTER I.

BALKAN WARS

THE VICTORIOUS YOUNG TURKS DID NOT EVEN contemplate the abolition of the Sultanate. In Mohammed Reshad they had the perfect figure-head; the man of sixty-three whom they put on the throne had spent most of his life in what was virtual captivity. He knew no foreign languages, had been jealously guarded from any contact with the outside world, and his mental powers, never above the average, had become atrophied to the point of imbecility. No initiative, no independent action was to be expected of him. The real rulers of Turkey were the Committee whose nationalist wing dominated both the party and the Diet.

The new men preferred to govern without bearing official responsibility. A veil of secrecy still shrouded the composition of the Committee; it was only later that some of its members, among them Javid and Talaat, assumed the functions of Ministers of Finance and the Interior. Elder statesmen who were not members of the Committee were appointed Grand Vizier: Hilmi Pasha, who had replaced Kiamil, was in turn followed by Hakki Pasha.

This practice—incompatible with the principles of parliamentary government they themselves had so ardently advocated—enabled the Committee to remain in opposition while actually exerting control: they would be the first to claim successes for themselves while blaming others for their failures. The Diet was completely ruled by the Young Turks. Its activities soon reflected the growing spirit of chauvinism and intolerance which stultified the spirit of the revolution.

“Union and Progress” had been the slogan of the Young Turks, and Union had stood for the conception of Pan-Ottomanism. The word *vatan*, fatherland, forbidden under Abdul Hamid, was the title of one of their publications: it symbolised the idea of equal citizenship for all the races and creeds of the Empire. The Nationalists replaced this with the reactionary slogan of Pan-Turkism, demanding the complete assimilation of all other ethnic, racial and linguistic groups to Turkish customs, the Turkish language, and Turkish administration. It is essentially the programme as realised later by Kemal Ataturk.

But whereas this conception is defensible in a racially homogeneous State such as Turkey became after 1923, it was the worst possible idea for the preservation of the empire. It was bound to increase the centrifugal forces which a system of federation might have placated; it even alienated

such staunch supporters of Islam as the Arabs in the East and the Albanians in the West. To combine a programme of intolerance with the slogan of "Turkey One and Indivisible" was obviously most unwise—especially as a disorganised army and an almost non-existent navy were in no position to back up this policy.

The army had been grossly neglected under Abdul Hamid. Apart from a few regiments of the Constantinople garrison, well-equipped in order to impress the foreigners, the army was in complete disorder. To cite only one instance: Abdul Hamid had never allowed the holding of manœuvres. He asserted that theoretical instruction must be sufficient to produce good generals. Similarly, the navy consisted of rotting hulks; the guns of warships in harbour were removed, the machinery of modern torpedo boats, bought chiefly in order to impress the powers, was allowed to rust.

The effect of the Young Turkish revolution had been to turn the officers into politicians. Many of them were given civilian office after the *coup d'état*. Realising the necessity of reorganising the army, the rulers of Turkey were faced with a dilemma. Growing national pride had led to sharp attacks in the Turkish Press against foreign influence, foreign missions in Turkey; on the other hand it was realised that no reorganisation of the army as well as of other branches of the administration was possible without the active concurrence of foreigners. Indeed, when some of the powers offered to recall their missions, the Young Turks invited them to remain.

Already under Abdul Hamid foreign officers had successfully reorganised the corps of gendarmes (*zaptieh*) in Macedonia. A compromise was now made by making foreign experts and instructors organs of the Turkish administration, so that national pride was not injured. A German mission, headed by Marshal von der Goltz, was invited to reorganise the Army, a British admiral had the task of building up the Navy, French and American advisers were employed in the Departments of Finance, Public Works, and others. French, Italian, British and German officers donned Turkish uniform and were put in charge of the gendarmery in the six great *vilayets* (provinces). But the well-meaning efforts of all these foreign experts and advisers were much hampered by the inefficiency, laziness and corruptness widespread among the civil service.

Meanwhile Macedonia, the jumping-off point of the Young Turkish revolution, continued to be a centre of unrest. Paid and equipped by Bulgaria, bands of murderous cut-throats, the so-called *comitadji*, established a reign of terror, attacking not only the Turks but also the Serb and Greek populations. Bulgaria, proud of her title "The Prussia of the Balkans," sought to justify this epitheton by a policy of expansion. She claimed the whole of Macedonia, not excluding the southern and western districts which were, and are, preponderantly Serbian or Greek.

The bands of brigands instigated and supported by Bulgaria at that time formed the notorious IMRO, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, a terrorist body which among many other crimes became responsible for the murder of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in



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1934. Bulgaria, ever rapacious and aggressive, then as now was the willing tool of Imperialism and Fascism—of the Tsar, of the Kaiser, of Mussolini and of Hitler. Those populations that came under the brutal rule of Bulgaria had reason to regret the passing of the Turkish régime—even that of Abdul Hamid. The German on the throne of Bulgaria, King Ferdinand, “The Fox,” dreamed of conquering Constantinople, true to the Bulgarian anthem which claims *Tsarygrad ye nashe*, “Constantinople is ours.”

In view of the growing Bulgarian threat the Turkish government acted unwisely in suppressing with great harshness tendencies among the Moslem Albanians aiming at autonomy. In 1908 and again in 1910 disorders broke out in the region of Kossovo which resulted in punitive expeditions and the total suppression of the Albanian language.

Similar harshness was shown to the Arabs. In Syria and Mesopotamia the use of Arabic was actually banned in the courts and the administration; the Turkish Diet rejected a bill demanding the promulgation of all laws in the languages spoken in various parts of the empire in addition to Turkish. In this, the “democratic” Young Turks showed themselves even more intolerant than the Austrian-Hungarian absolutism where that practice prevailed.

If this was the Committee’s attitude towards Moslem populations it can be imagined that other non-Turkish groups were treated even more severely. All political bodies and societies based on a foreign nationality or bearing their names were prohibited; thus, many “Constitutional Clubs” formed by Christian and Jewish groups, organisations that had actively supported the Committee while it was still “underground” and might have formed a useful support for the new régime, were driven into opposition.

In 1911, another Albanian rising, supported by Montenegro, was pacified by Austrian and Russian mediation; but it flared up again in 1912, this time supported by parts of the garrison of Kossovo. These disorders facilitated the war long contemplated by the Balkan States, especially as Turkey was now involved in another war—this time with Italy.

That the outbreak of hostilities in Africa took Constantinople completely by surprise is a sorry testimonial to the efficiency of a régime that had proclaimed the maintenance of the empire’s integrity as one of its chief aims. Eight years before, France, England and Italy had made a treaty giving each other a free hand in Morocco, Egypt and Tripolis respectively. It is certain that the Turkish Government was as aware of this threat, as it must have been of an agreement between Russia and Italy, concluded as recently as 1909, in which they assured each other of a benevolent attitude in regard to their respective designs on the Dardanelles and Tripolitania. Yet nothing had been done either to take diplomatic counter-measures or at least to strengthen the defences of Tripolitania. A single infantry division, and that much depleted, was stationed in Tripolis; it had no contact by sea with Turkey and had to be supplied and reinforced via the long overland route on which British-dominated Egypt formed an effective barrier to the sending of troops.

Italy presented an ultimatum, followed immediately by a declaration of war. She was aware of the sorry state of the Tripolitanian defences, and expected a walk-over, a "military promenade."

But this is a form of exercise which it seems is denied to the Italians for ever. True, Tripolis was bombarded and subsequently occupied; but native levies conducted a bitter resistance and inflicted heavy losses on the Italians. Enver, the hero of the revolution, had hurried to Cyrenaica from his post as Military Attaché in Berlin and organised resistance; he was joined by Major Mustapha Kemal whose military valour here for the first time attracted the attention of a wider public. He had come by the overland route, disguised as an Arab, and outwitted British attempts to stop him at the Egyptian frontier. Enver and Kemal conducted a successful guerilla warfare against the Italians; it is here that Kemal learned much of the tactics that stood him in such good stead in the Anatolian campaign.

The Italians, as always in search of a spectacular but less risky success, occupied something much more valuable than the sterile deserts of Tripolis: Rhodes and the Dodecanese. This occupation met with little opposition, as the preponderantly Greek populations of these islands had no reason to prefer Turkish rule.

In Cyrenaica, neither side was strong enough to strike a decisive blow, and fighting might have dragged on much longer, had not an ever greater danger overshadowed the Turkish sky—an imminent threat of destruction so grave that a hasty peace was concluded with Italy. The Turkish troops were to evacuate Cyrenaica, and Italian *de facto* possession was recognised. Enver and Kemal hurried home—by devious routes and with great delay. When they arrived they were to find the Turkish armies driven out of Europe, the Bulgars hammering at the gates of Constantinople, and the empire in danger of immediate collapse. Such were the results of three months' fighting in the First Balkan War.

* * *

The ineptness of Turkish administration in Macedonia had given fuel to Bulgarian agitation and the expansionist desires of Serbia, Greece and Montenegro. The oppressed populations—not only Christians but also Moslem Albanians—were forced by the intransigent policy of the Turkish Nationalist Party to seek salvation in sedition.

In order to prevent the growth of the Liberal Party, which advocated an understanding and federation with all non-Turkish populations of the empire, the Nationalists had precipitated new elections (January, 1912). These gave a smashing majority to the Chauvinists: 275 out of 290 deputies supported them. In consequence repression grew even harsher in Macedonia. The Turkish authorities now began to interfere in ecclesiastical and scholastic questions, and to restrict the cultural autonomy the non-Turkish populations had enjoyed even under Abdul Hamid. Under the pretext of disarming the population, detachments of ill-disciplined Turkish soldiers, raw Anatolian levies, were sent against the villages, with violence and pillage as the inevitable result. The attempt to settle *mohadjirs*, Moslem refugees from Bulgaria, in parts of Macedonia

was feared by the Christian population to presage their complete dispossession.

This policy of the Young Turks had a disastrous result—one that they should have foreseen, because it was the one threat that must mean the end of Turkish rule in the Balkans: it brought about a temporary understanding between Bulgars and Serbs.

To maintain the antagonism between these two peoples, both of Slav language but of different racial origin and adhering to different churches, has been the aim of all powers before or since wishing to dominate the Balkan scene. Even Abdul Hamid had recognised at least the negative wisdom of the maxim *divide et impera*; it was left to the men of the Committee to complete the downfall of the Turkish Empire by employing the very worst of all policies: harassing and irritating an opponent one is unable to destroy.

The Balkan States—with the exception of Rumania—concluded a secret alliance. Characteristically, Bulgaria started the ball rolling, not by overt action but by having a series of bomb outrages perpetrated in Salonika, Uskub and elsewhere. A bank was blown up, an infernal machine destroyed a ship, a grenade was thrown into a mosque, and numbers of completely innocent people were killed. Not unnaturally the Turkish authorities as well as the Turkish populace retaliated, and these disorders furnished the pretext for declaring war on Turkey (October, 1912).

The Turkish army was numerically stronger than that of the allies and had indeed been the object of a number of reforms; but the short period of three years had not been sufficient to remove the effect of thirty years' neglect. The fact that the officers preferred meddling in politics to their proper job was not conducive to discipline, be it in the ranks or among the officers.¹ In addition, the Anatolian peasant, ever the reservoir of Turkey's military strength, was war-weary after many years' drain on man power to fight insurrections in distant parts of the country.

The armies of the Allies, on the other hand, were in a high state of efficiency and buoyed up by their consciousness of fighting their hereditary enemy. Apart from national sentiment they were backed up by the moral and also material support of most of the European powers. Russia, Austria, Germany and Italy each saw a good opportunity of extending their own spheres of influence, for they foresaw that this new unity of the Balkans could not last long. England alone remained friendly; its government—if not public opinion—realised clearly what lay behind Russia's and Austria's desire for "reforms" and the "protection of the Christians."

Within a few weeks the Bulgarians, Serbs and Montenegrins had beaten the Turks on all fronts, while the Greek Navy embarrassed Turkey's maritime lines of communication. The Serbs occupied Monastir, the Greeks entered Salonika, the Bulgars swept through the whole of

¹ A French author (Colonel Lamouche, in *Quinze ans d'histoire balkanique*, Paris, 1928) relates that at the height of the fighting numbers of officers simply left the front and took up residence in Constantinople, where the newspapers had to print official notices ordering them back!

Eastern Thrace, by-passing and investing Adrianople, and were halted only at the defences of the Tchataldja line, where they suffered heavy losses.

In Constantinople, the Cabinet of Achmed Mukhtar, the renowned Marshal of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, fell. He was replaced as Grand Vizier by Kiamil Pasha who, despite his advanced age, once more assumed office—chiefly in view of his well-known British sympathies. It was he who not only did not object to, but actually invited the sending of a naval squadron consisting of warships of all European powers, including Holland, Spain and Rumania. The ostensible function of this flotilla was to protect the foreigners in Constantinople in the event of mob risings; actually they served to warn off Ferdinand of Bulgaria, should he consider entering Constantinople and thereby crowning his dream of a Greater Bulgaria.

This situation was an obvious parallel to the events of 1877, when the Russians, as now the Bulgarians, stood before Tchataldja, and subsequent events continued this parallel.

The last Turkish strongholds on European soil fell. Yanina was taken by the Greeks, Scutari by the Serbs and Montenegrins, Adrianople by the Bulgars. These, on the other hand, suffered a severe rebuff when they tried to take the Tchataldja line by assault, and in addition cholera and typhus began to decimate their army.

Under these circumstances an armistice was concluded among all the belligerents on December 3rd, 1912. The troops were to remain on their present lines, and a Peace Conference began in London. The venue chosen indicated which power it was that prevented the complete dismemberment of Turkey.

While the Turkish delegates were temporising not without adroitness, serious events happened in Constantinople. Kiamil's Cabinet, from which the Young Turks were excluded, was willing to make peace at any price; and it seemed indeed that there was no choice. But this was an opportunity for the flamboyant Enver to seize power. Not having been in office, it was easy for the Committee of Union and Progress to accuse its opponents of having lost the war. Enver, at the head of a group of officers, broke into a Cabinet meeting. Nazim Pasha, the *Seraskier* (War Minister) was shot on the spot; Enver forcibly ejected the other ministers. Now Enver was in power. He had Mahmud Shevket Pasha—the Commander of the "Army of Liberation" in 1909—appointed Grand Vizier. The new Cabinet included Talaat and Jemal; it was the first government openly to proclaim both the power and the responsibility of the Committee of Union and Progress.

At that time Mustapha Kemal was in command of a division charged with the defence of the Gallipoli peninsula—a fateful appointment in view of the use to which Kemal was to put his local knowledge a short time afterwards. Following Enver's *putsch* Kemal was recalled to the Capital; for the war flared up again.

Enver had rejected the peace terms proposed in London. He had evolved one of his grandiose plans for a vast "pincer" movement—plans

later to be attempted by him with equally disastrous consequences—without taking into account details of transportation, supply, and the quality and capabilities of his troops. His military training in Germany had accustomed him to planning on the grand scale, and he forgot that the Turkish army was not then the beautiful precision instrument of tempered steel he had admired in Potsdam.

Kemal and Enver clashed—not for the first time—when Kemal voiced his doubts. Even then Kemal demonstrated one of the less pleasant aspects of his nature. Intolerant of criticism himself, he never hesitated in criticising others, even his military superiors; and he would utter his criticism with so much unnecessary arrogance and aggressiveness, in so bitter and offensive a manner, that he never failed to antagonise even those who might have agreed with his arguments. Throughout his brilliant career, Kemal has inspired antagonism, fear, respect, unwilling admiration even—but never liking; he has been right more consistently than any other man in Turkey, but he never gave his opponents or even his friends an opportunity of admitting it with good grace.

This was particularly unusual among the Turks who were renowned for their natural courtesy. From centuries of domination over Continents, from the inheritance of proud and cultured Byzantium, they had not maintained many material possessions; but what they had retained, apart from their military valour, was a beautiful code of perfect manners and dignified gravity of bearing. To these qualities even their enemies had always paid tribute; the Turk was hated and feared, but never despised.¹ For this reason, the Turks disliked the loud-mouthed arrogance of the Prussian, and this is equally the reason why Kemal throughout his life encountered, and aroused, much opposition and enmity.

Enver overrode Kemal's arguments, and an attack was simultaneously launched on the Bulgarian positions from Bulair and Shahkeuy. It was an arrant failure; the Turks were thrown back with enormous losses. This was on February 8th, 1913; the following day the Turkish Ambassador in London had to ask the Powers for their mediation. Enver and the Nationalists were in the humiliating position of having to accept the same conditions as the Cabinet they had overthrown.

And they were harsh conditions. Again the parallel with San Stefano becomes visible. Turkey was to be excluded from Europe almost completely; Adrianople was to fall to Bulgaria, and a line running from Enos, on the Sea of Marmora, to Midia, on the Black Sea, was to form Turkey's boundary.

This meant reducing Turkey's last foothold in Europe to a strip of

¹ In his book, *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches* (Vienna, 1928), Lt.-General Pomiankowski, who was in command of the Austrian troops stationed in Turkey during the World War, gives the following description:—

"The Turk is the finest soldier in the world and a real gentleman . . . Always unassuming, sparing of speech, polite and dignified . . . the Turk considers civility and good manners the first duty of a cultured man. He avoids hasty or unpleasant gestures and words, and prefers to couch even a denial in terms resembling an acceptance . . ."

territory in which the Tchataldja Line, as close to Constantinople as St. Albans is to London, would be the first, and last, line of defence. In addition, Albania's fate and form of Government was to be determined by the Great Powers. Crete was ceded to Greece, while the other formerly Turkish islands off the Asiatic coast were committed to the Great Powers.

But then intervened what was perhaps inevitable although nevertheless surprising: a violent quarrel broke out among the former Allies, and Bulgaria, dissatisfied with the considerable loot she had reaped, attacked the Greek and Serbian forces. It is generally agreed that Bulgaria relied on some sort of assurance by Russia; but this time the aggressor was let down. Not only were the Bulgarians defeated by Serbia and Greece but Rumania now used this opportunity for occupying a large slice of territory and invading Bulgaria without encountering much resistance. Sofia was threatened, and Bulgaria, the biter bit, had to make peace.

The Turks, naturally, were jubilant and did not hesitate to profit from the remaining anarchy in the Balkans. In the meantime a virtual military dictatorship had been established by Enver following the assassination by opponents of the Committee of the Grand Vizier, Mahmud Shevket Pasha.

It seems that coming events had indeed cast a shadow; the assassination took place on June 28th, 1913—exactly a year before the Sarajevo *attentat* which was to set the world aflame. Here, too, the victim was murdered while travelling in an open automobile.

This act of terrorism did not, however, have the desired result of overthrowing the Young Turkish régime. On the contrary, a Young Turk cabinet headed by Prince Said Halim, with Talaat as Minister of the Interior and Izzet Pasha as War Minister, proceeded to bloody reprisals. A dozen prominent opponents were publicly hanged, and Enver's power was now uncontested. Together with Jemal, who was Military Governor of Constantinople and Talaat, the triumvirate continued to be responsible for Turkish policy for five fateful years.

Enver marched into Adrianople, which Bulgaria was forced to relinquish. Now the Powers, weary of the Balkan squabbles, insisted on the conclusion of peace. Turkey retained Adrianople and the frontier of the Maritza, also the islands of Chios and Mytilene. The rest of her European possessions, however, was divided among the former Allies.

Bulgaria, despite extensive gains, including access to the Mediterranean by way of Dédé-Agatch, felt dissatisfied. If proof were needed that her instigation of two Balkan wars resulted, not from concern over the fate of Christianity in that area but simply from greed, it can be found in the fact that already in November, 1913, Bulgaria was ready to ally herself with the Turks against Greece—an event that was to materialise not many months later. Since that time Bulgaria, true to her designation as "The Prussia of the Balkans," has remained a factor of unrest and menace; her barbarous treatment of the Greek population, after the country was overrun by Hitler in 1941, will not be forgotten . . .

* * *

Turkey had, miraculously, survived another war aimed at annihilating

her completely. But the country was in a sorry state, exhausted by years of war. The Committee, realising that the first and most immediate necessity was reorganisation of the Army—particularly in view of the impending conflagration which they realised was bound to involve Turkey—confided that task to a German military mission. General Liman von Sanders, a brutal but able German Staff Officer, arrived in Constantinople at the head of some forty German officers. This mission was soon to grow to a strength of about fifteen thousand officers and men, who occupied all key positions and made Constantinople to all intents and purposes a German dependency. Mustapha Kemal, now a Staff Officer, opposed this German influence. Not only did he dislike the Prussian Junkers, whose overbearing arrogance clashed with his own, but already he entertained serious doubts as to the real strength of their impressive war machine. Not so Enver, who had received his military education in Germany and who, blinded by flattery and his own boundless ambition, brushed aside not only opposition at home but also Russian protests at this “invasion.” Kemal was sent to Sofia in the capacity of Military Attaché where, as his biographers relate,¹ he ate his heart out in boredom and wasted his health in riotous and loose living.

Russia’s protest at the appointment of Liman von Sanders as Commander of Constantinople was countered by the expedient of making him a Marshal of the Turkish Army and its Inspector-General. It was now necessary for Enver to be at least nominally the Commander-in-Chief of all the forces in Turkey. This was done with that lack of manners which was characteristic of some aspects of the Young Turkish Movement. Izzet Pasha, the War Minister, was forced to resign, and the Sultan, “the King of Kings and Commander of the Faithful,” had to learn of this appointment when he opened his morning paper.

In his memoirs, Liman von Sanders stresses—and perhaps over-stresses—the state of disorganisation in which he found the Turkish Army. At any rate he employed the few months remaining to the outbreak of the world war to such good effect that in the autumn of 1914 the Turkish Forces, if not first rate, were nevertheless extremely valuable while backed up by a stiffening of German troops in technical and communication services.

The spark that was to set the world aflame sprang from the Balkans. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was merely the long-awaited signal, and the ambitions of Austria and Russia now clashed over the Peninsula which had so recently been part of the Turkish Empire. That Turkey, despite the cultural and political ties that bound her to France and England, finally sided with Germany and Austria, after some months of indecision, was the natural outcome of her previous mutilations. Like Bulgaria, Turkey had been forced into the position of a revisionist power.

Kemal was among those who, from a feeling of resentment and distrust, refused to consider the war under any other aspect than that of power politics. Turkey could not feel any special urge “to make the

¹ See “*Grey Wolf*,” by H. C. Armstrong. Penguin Books, 1937.

world safe for Democracy," especially when a State like Russia appeared as one of its defenders.

From that point of view, all the European Powers alike were out for loot, preferably also the remains of the Turkish Empire and it behoved Turkey to remain neutral until such time as it seemed politic to join the winning side.

But Enver and his colleagues prevailed; thinking Germany's power irresistible, they saw a good opportunity of re-conquering their lost territories and laying the Russian danger once and for all.

The war was already several months old before Kemal, champing at the bit in his inactivity at Sofia, was recalled to Constantinople and entrusted with a command. This command later on was to comprise an area destined to become memorable in history—the rocky peninsula of Gallipoli where Winston Churchill clashed with Mustapha Kemal.

CHAPTER II.


ON THE WRONG SIDE

WHEN THE WAR BROKE OUT, TURKEY'S KEY position at the crossroads of East and West became evident once more. Constantinople became the scene of feverish diplomatic activity. For three months, while battles were raging on all fronts, an uneasy neutrality prevailed. Enver profited by the occasion to abolish the Capitulations, the hated symbol of foreign interference and Turkish inferiority.

But it was clear that Turkey must choose sides, and it was equally clear that she could not join the Allied Powers. Russia was the hereditary enemy and constant threat; Russian designs on the Straits were well-known to the Turks. Russia was willing to "guarantee" to the Turks' possession of Constantinople and its hinterland, but demanded the right of unrestricted transit through the Straits.¹ Even an alliance with the Allied Powers, and therefore with Russia, would have constituted no safeguard; so much had been demonstrated by Russia's treatment of her allies, Rumania and Bulgaria, in the Russo-Turkish and the Balkan Wars respectively. On the allied side Turkey saw Italy, England, Serbia, Rumania and, to a certain extent, Greece—all States who had recently annexed much Turkish territory and were threatening even more. Germany and Austria, on the other hand, were out for much more than slices of Turkey; yet their economic and political penetration, if much more dangerous to Turkish independence, was less evident.

Von Wangenheim, a brutal Prussian who was the German ambas-

¹ The interesting diplomatic background of the Straits question and the Russian attitude to Turkey is given in full in the collection of the secret dossiers of the former Russian Foreign Office, published by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Moscow, and edited by Prof. E. Adamov. We have used the authorised edition in German, published in 1930 under the title, *Die Europäischen Mächte und die Türkei während des Weltkrieges* (5 vols.)



sador, and Count Pallavicini, the crafty Austrian envoy, cajoled and threatened. Germany had big plans for Turkey—or rather, plans in which Turkey was to play the part of the satellite. Now the time seemed ripe to crown the Baghdad Railway project with success. It was intended to win the support of Persia, to form a strong German-Persian army, to eject Russian and British influence from Persia and thus safeguard the line. The semi-barbarous State of Afghanistan was to be recruited for this alliance, and a chain of German “Consulates”—in reality military posts and strong-points—were to garrison the road from Baghdad to Teheran and Kabul. Along this route money, arms and propaganda were to flow so as to enable the Emir of Afghanistan to attack India.¹

Turkish enthusiasm for an alliance with the Central Powers was very lukewarm. Jemal Pasha was out-and-out opposed to it, and so was Major Mustapha Kemal Bey, whose influence among the officers was beginning to grow. Enver, on the other hand, and Talaat were firmly convinced that a German victory was a foregone conclusion. A “loan” of thirty-two million pounds, paid partly in gold, partly in armaments, was von Wangenheim’s final trump card, and Turkey’s hand was further forced by a sudden bombardment of the Russian coast effected by two German battleships, the “Goeben” and the “Breslau.” These ships, evading the British Mediterranean fleet, had fled into the Bosphorus and were nominally bought by Turkey. Anti-British feeling ran high just then because the British Government, rightly doubtful of Turkish intentions, had impounded two almost completed dreadnoughts then building in Glasgow and ordered by Turkey.

So Turkey was at war. Mohammed V declared the *jehad*—a weapon which seemed effectual until actually used. The Holy War was a complete failure: it did not prevent the Arabs from placing themselves—then as now—at the disposal of the highest bidder.

The first result of Turkey’s entry into the war was the virtual occupation of the country by Germany. “All important positions on the General Staff, in the artillery and technical units, in the war industries and in the navy were given to Germans. Not only instructors, experts and executives, but even the low-ranking staff such as N.C.O.’s, foremen, inspectors, and even a large proportion of workers in the factories were sent from Germany. Similarly the entire defences of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, gun emplacements, fortifications, communications, mine-laying and anti-submarine defences, the Air Force, all the munitions and explosive factories, armaments works, naval arsenals and dockyards were taken over and occupied by the Germans.”¹

Marshal Liman von Sanders was in virtual command of the entire Turkish army—a fact which, combined with the insufferable arrogance of the German officers, produced a great deal of anti-German feeling. Yet throughout the war there was never any question of a separate peace.

¹ This fantastic plan—confirmed by many contemporary observers—was later revived by the Nazis who extended a whole chain of observation posts and short-wave transmitters along the caravan roads of Central Asia.

² J. Pomiankowski, *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reiches*, p. 53.

This loyalty sprung in part from the Turkish character which respects the pledged word, and in part from realisation of the fact that whoever allied himself with Russia thereby declared himself Turkey's enemy.

What were Germany's and Turkey's war aims in concluding this fateful alliance? This interesting question has never been the subject of any official pronouncement, apart from the usual platitudes, but in the light of subsequent information and events these aims are easily discernible.

Although the long distances involved precluded any tactical co-operation between the Germano-Austrian and the Turkish forces, and the long overland route—on which hostile Rumania cut the Danube line of communication—made the problem of supply very difficult, Turkey was allotted an important part in the German scheme of operations. The closing and holding of the Straits prevented Russia having direct contact with her allies, while strong Russian forces were tied down in the Caucasus. The proclamation of the Holy War by the Sultan and Caliph was to incite the Moslem world against England so as to facilitate an attack on India and particularly on Egypt and the Suez Canal.

Ambitious aims—to which, as to so many "kolossal" German projects, Goethe's word applies:—

*Were not your plan so clever, I would say
It is the acme of stupidity . . .*

Germany's forecasts were correct only as regards the defence of the Dardanelles. By attacking in the Caucasus, the Turkish army exposed itself to a shattering counter-blow from Russia's greatly superior forces. The Holy War fizzled out completely. No amount of sophistry could convince the simple Moslem that a war against the Infidels necessitated an alliance with three Christian States—including the recent enemy, Bulgaria. What insurrectionist movements there might have been in British and French colonial territories could not be supplied with money and arms, for the British Navy dominated the seas. The Arab rulers, whose peoples remembered Turkish oppression, were easy to bribe. The Egyptians had no reason to exchange British domination, which had brought them prosperity, for Turkish misrule and tyranny, and when weak Turkish forces reached the Suez Canal the population remained completely indifferent.

The specific war aims of the Young Turks, particularly of Enver and Talaat, were no less fantastic and even more ambitious. Under the influence of their Pan-Turanic dreams they demanded the annexation of all territories inhabited by "Turanian" tribes, i.e. large parts of Persia, the Caucasus, the Crimea and areas on the lower Volga as well as Turkestan. In addition, Pan-Islamism postulated the re-conquest of Egypt and North Africa, not to mention the positions, lost so recently, in the Balkan Peninsula.

Enver, dreaming of a victorious march on India, grossly over-estimated his own capabilities, and the actual, very modest, potentialities of Turkey. The Germans, realising that 'his ambitious programme must further weaken Turkey's military power, had no objection to Enver's grandiose plans; on the contrary, they drove him on with flattery and

promises. While Enver, who had married a Turkish princess, fancied himself as a new Gengis Khan, the Germans welcomed the prospect of a Turkey so enfeebled after the war that she could no longer form an obstacle to German domination of the Middle East. Where successful Turkish resistance was essential to Germany, as on the Dardanelles, the Germans strongly supported the Turks and did not hesitate to supersede and dominate the Turkish High Command; where this was not the case, as in the East, the Germans viewed with equanimity and even approval Turkish reverses which further increased Turkey's dependence on Germany and furnished a reason for sending more officers, more technicians, more taskmasters and future rulers.

Kemal, whom the Germans respected as an able and energetic staff officer, was aware of these things, and fuming with impotent rage. He knew the limitations of Enver, that amateur strategist in uniform; he also knew his Germans, and squirmed under the barely veiled contempt with which these Prussians looked down on the Turks, whose country they were already treating as a colony. As a politician, he recognised the mortal perils conjured up in the Young Turks' irredentist claims; as a patriot, his pride suffered under the humiliation of his country; as a soldier, he saw through the myth of German invincibility and began to fear the worst.

It was hopeless to argue with Enver; it was equally impossible to approach the Sultan whose actual power was nil and whose stupidity verged on imbecility. Kemal's only contact was with the Crown Prince, Vaheddin, who like all prospective successors to a throne did not love the dictator wielding the power that should have been his own. Vaheddin irresolute but not unintelligent, was impressed by Kemal's forthright views, and each of the two men made a mental resolve to use the other for his own purposes.

But meanwhile Enver attacked. The Russians had crossed the frontier but their advance on Erzerum had been halted at a point only forty miles inside the border. The Turkish army was in a good defensive position and could have held the Russians indefinitely. Enver, however, was anxious to add to his laurels. He superseded the General in command, evolved a grandiose plan aiming at outflanking and encircling the Russians and led an army of 100,000 men on a new march of Hannibal through the snow-clad mountains.

His march ended in another Cannæ—his own. The month of December saw his army completely annihilated by cold and hunger. In his eagerness to strike a decisive blow Enver had neglected such details as supplies, warm clothing and a knowledge of climatic conditions in the Southern Caucasus. Out of 100,000, eighty thousand perished in the snow, 7,500 were captured by the Russians who hardly fired a shot, and only 12,500 came back.

Enver returned quietly to Constantinople. The Press was forbidden to mention the campaign, but Enver's prestige had suffered a crippling blow, and for the remainder of the war's duration he assumed no other operational command. Later it became known that the Chief of Staff,

the German General Bronsart von Schellenberg, who had accompanied Enver on his ill-fated enterprise, had been the real author of the plan. Although the furious Turks demanded his recall, Germany insisted on maintaining him in office—a clear proof of Germany's intentions.

CHAPTER III.

GALLIPOLI

BUT NOW A GRAVE DANGER THREATENED THE VERY heart and core of Turkey. It was in the month of March, 1915. The fronts in the European theatres of war had become rigid; the war of movement had been followed by a deadlock, in which trenches running from the Channel to Switzerland and from the Baltic to the Black Sea kept gigantic armies in a state of virtual immobility. The air arm was still in its infancy, the tank had not yet appeared on the scene, and operations were reduced to the gaining of a few yards of shell-torn ground at an inordinate expenditure of lives and ammunition.

It was at this juncture that Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, conceived the bold plan which was to restore mobility to the war—a plan which, if it had received the support it deserved, would have shortened the war considerably, prevented the rise to power of Bolshevism in Russia, and saved millions of lives on both sides.¹ The plan consisted in forcing the Dardanelles—first through naval action alone and afterwards, as this proved unfeasible, by means of a large-scale amphibious operation. The forcing of the Dardanelles would have led to the occupation of Constantinople; Turkey would have been eliminated from the war, and a supply route opened which would have enabled Russia to turn the scales and defeat the Germans.

The struggle for the Dardanelles will forever remain memorable in military history. It was the prototype of the kind of operation which is likely to decide this war. On both sides then it brought out qualities of heroism and resourcefulness which render that episode equally glorious for the Turks and the British, particularly the Anzac contingents who showed their mettle on Gallipoli's arid hills.² The operation demonstrated the military genius of Winston Churchill, and equally that of his great antagonist, Mustapha Kemal. It was a straight fight between the Turks and the British, no German troops taking part; a struggle that was hard, but clean, and which laid the foundation for mutual respect and friendship in the years to come.

¹ The political background of the failure of the Gallipoli venture does not come within the purview of this book; the reader is referred to the numerous publications on the subject, notably Mr. Churchill's own utterances.

² Gallipoli also saw the first Jewish military unit formed in modern times, the Jewish Legion. Recruited by the great Jewish statesman, Vladimir Jabotinsky (died 1940) from Oriental Jews and Russian Jews of Whitechapel who were unwilling to join the Tsarist army, this Legion rendered valuable services both in Gallipoli and later in the conquest of Palestine under General Allenby.

The scene of this epic struggle was laid in a place famous in history. It was here that Trojan fought Greek; here was enacted the ancient and symbolic story of Hero and Leander; it was here that the armies of Xerxes crossed, bent on the conquest of Europe; that Alexander's phalanxes took the first step on the road to India.

The ancient Hellespont had its narrowest part, seven stadia (1,200 yards) across, between the towns of Abydos and Sestos. In historic times, the strong currents have altered the shape of the narrows. Forty-four miles long, they connect the Ægean with the Sea of Marmora; their narrowest part now lies between Kilid Bahr and Canak Kalé where Europe and Asia are separated by a belt of water seven-eighths of a mile wide. The Straits curve into a number of basins the largest of which, close to the Ægean, is four miles across. The eastern shore is formed by the Anatolian coast, where the observer, standing on the hill where stood the city of Troy, still sees the river Skamander (now *Menderes*) winding its swampy way to the sea through the wide plain sung by Homer, and on the horizon the Isle of Tenedos, in whose cover the Greek ships were hiding until the Trojans had accepted their pernicious gift . . .

On the west, the Straits are bounded by the rocky hills of the Gallipoli Peninsula, full of gullies, crevices and defiles, covered with scanty scrub and almost completely devoid of roads so that mule transport is essential. The Peninsula is sixteen miles wide but narrows towards its southernmost point, Cape Helles (*Eles Burnu*).

The Straits were securely guarded by lines of fortifications on either side, consisting of eight forts and seven gun emplacements on the European, and ten forts and three gun emplacements on the Asiatic side. Their heavy Krupp guns were more than a match for any ship's batteries, but shells were in short supply.* In addition to this formidable protection there were several mine belts, submarine nets, and strong searchlights. When a British naval squadron in pursuit of the German battleships appeared before the Dardanelles (August, 1914) this was a further incentive to intensify defensive preparations. The fire power of the forts was further increased by dismantling guns from units of the Turkish navy and placing them on shore; also, a number of obsolete Turkish men-of-war were placed in bays and inlets to serve as floating batteries. Two infantry divisions and six battalions of gendarmes formed the comparatively feeble defence on land; they were under the nominal command of General Jevad Pasha, but it was actually Colonel Kemal Bey who commanded on the spot and was to save the situation.

The British had occupied the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos and Samothrake; the Gulf of Mudros, in the isle of Lemnos, was the operational base for a strong allied fleet. In the month of February, 1915, this fleet consisted of sixteen British battleships and cruisers, four French battleships, one Russian cruiser and numerous smaller units.

¹ As Turkish war factories were not equal to the production of heavy-calibre shells in default of the specially-hardened steel required, ammunition had to be sent all the way from Germany. At one time it was even intended to send supplies by Zeppelin, but the project had to be dropped.

This armada began a heavy bombardment of the forts, and succeeded in silencing some of the outer defences. There followed attempts to land troops which were, however, frustrated. On March 18th the Allied fleet tried to force the passage of the Dardanelles; but it ran into mines and the devastating cross-fire of the Turkish forts. Four British and French ships of the line were sunk and many others damaged; altogether half the Allied fleet had been put out of commission.

It was a Turkish victory, and Constantinople, where the Sultan and the Germans had already packed their bags, ready to fly to Anatolia, breathed again.

But on April 25th, British troops landed at two points on Gallipoli, at Sedd ul Bahr in the South and near Ari Burnu on the West coast. Another landing was effected at Kum Kalé by the French. Owing to the disposition of the Turkish troops whose main forces were concentrated inland while only weak units were holding the likely landing places along the coast, it took some time to launch a counter-attack. When it materialised—on April 26th—it proved impossible to dislodge the allied forces that had landed on Gallipoli, although the French were forced to relinquish Kum Kalé on the Asiatic shore and to re-embark their troops.

For ten days the Turks battered at the British positions around Sedd ul Bahr and Ari Burnu. Colonel Kemal led charge after charge in person. The Australians advanced to the hills, but were stuck half-way up. Kemal held the crest, but could not throw them into the sea. His quick action, undertaken with weak forces, insufficiently supplied with ammunition, and without any artillery, had stopped the allied attack and prevented the decisive break-through towards the interior of the Peninsula and eventually to Bulair and Constantinople.

Both sides dug in, bringing up reinforcements. There ensued a period of trench warfare and savage bayonet assaults under the rays of a burning sun. Kemal seemed to be everywhere at once, heartening his tired troops, sharing their hardships, the heat, thirst, dust and glare. He did not begrudge Enver his pleasant sojourn on the cool blue waters of the Golden Horn, but grew furious when Enver tried to interfere with dispositions on the spot. Kemal demanded supreme command of all forces in Gallipoli, now numbering twelve divisions; and Marshal Liman von Sanders, recognising military genius when he saw it, overrode Enver and the War Minister, and put Kemal in charge.

Mustapha Kemal Pasha—that was his rank now—was as happy as it was in his nature to be. This was power and action, so different from the niggling game of politics fought out in stuffy conference rooms and the ante-chambers of politicians or newspaper scribblers in Constantinople. Action, as always, brought out the best in Kemal. Inaction in him produced a state of brooding and misanthropia which, in later years, was to give way to dangerously unpredictable outbursts of violence; or his pent-up energies sought an outlet in orgies of debauchery. There was no room for mysticism in his soul: the ideologies of Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism meant nothing to his rebellious and mundane spirit.

He was a Turk, nothing else,¹ proud and haughty, having no patience with internal squabbling and foreign encroachment. The soil of Turkey was threatened, albeit that alien city, the scene of many humiliations for him; to defend his country was his destiny. Let others admire the struttings and posturings of Enver, that insufferable little peacock; here, a man's job had to be done. He felt no gratitude towards the German Marshal who had secured his promotion: it was no more than his due and, indeed, long overdue.

It had, indeed, come not a moment too soon. During the months of July and August the British launched two strong offensives. A fresh landing between Ari Burnu and Suvla was followed by the drawn battle of Anafarta (July-August, 1915). Once again it was Kemal who saved the situation when, with a mere handful of men, he attacked vastly superior forces. Two British divisions, twenty-four battalions, were opposed by only two Turkish battalions but, deceived by their sustained fire, believed the position strongly held. They wasted a whole decisive day until reinforcements were brought up behind the Turkish lines. Kemal himself led the counter-attack; it was a sanguinary battle, but the Anzacs were held.

The battle of Anafarta was the costliest engagement of the campaign for either side; it settled the fate of the whole enterprise. During the ensuing months the Allied Command decided to abandon the venture, and during the months of November and December a very successful evacuation was effected. Breaking off contact with the enemy and embarking large numbers of troops and equipment right under his guns is a military feat of the first order; but, as Winston Churchill once remarked, successful evacuations do not win wars.

The successful defence of the Dardanelles was an undoubted Turkish victory, and a chapter not devoid of glory in Turkish history. The glory was, in the first place, that of the simple Turkish soldier. In inadequate uniforms, with insufficient equipment, badly fed and exposed to the rigours of a climate that ranged from prickly heat and sandstorms to icy rain squalls and even blizzards, subjected to constant bombardment by the heaviest naval artillery, these Anatolian peasants clung to their positions. Had the cause for which they fought been as noble as their courage, the Dardanelles might claim the title of another Thermopylae.

But without a leader to inspire and sustain them, without a general capable of judging a situation at a glance and acting on a split-second decision, even these enduring and tenacious soldiers would have lost the day. Kemal combined all the qualities which form the picture of the great generals who fought and won the decisive battles of history; his was not only personal bravery and fortitude among hardship and adversity, but also the gift of judging with equal perception the strategic position of armies and the tactical situation of a platoon.

The balance of the campaign showed heavy losses on both sides.

¹ Born in Salonica, the melting-pot of many races, Kemal did not possess the external racial characteristics of the Turk. Although the official point of view avoids mentioning it, it is not unlikely that Kemal may have had Albanian or Jewish blood.

Of the 500,000 men engaged in operations on either side, Anglo-French casualties numbered 160,000, while Turkish casualties amounted to the formidable total of nearly 250,000—one-half of the total. A large proportion of these casualties were due to illness.

One consequence of the British attack on the Dardenelles was to underline the great dangers lying in the exposed peripheral position of Constantinople, situated as it was in the immediate front line. For the first time the idea of transferring the Capital to another place was mooted—which proves that Kemal's subsequent decision was not without precedent. Already then Angora (Ankara) was suggested as the new administrative centre of Turkey, but at that time nothing came of the plan, particularly as the Germans for reasons of their own opposed it.

CHAPTER IV.

ENVER'S CRIME

AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE GALLIPOLI EPISODE weak forces only were left in the peninsula and Kemal, his military reputation now established beyond doubt and obloquy, returned to Constantinople. He had discovered that even command of an army could not give him the power to make changes that to him seemed necessary, and indeed, vital. But when he demanded the position of *Seraskier* (War Minister) his old enemy, Enver, succeeded in side-tracking Kemal. Instead of the coveted post he was given command of an Army Corps in Syria. Enver knew that Syria was not a climate in which laurels could grow. The Army there was badly organised and equipped; its only offensive action so far had been an abortive raid on the Suez Canal, led by Jemal Pasha.

His transfer to Syria removed Kemal from the political scene in Constantinople and thereby from responsibility for one of the most horrible crimes known to history until the advent of the Hitler régime. It was the massacre of the Armenians.

After the victory of the Young Turkish Revolution and the resulting fraternisation among all races and creeds of the Empire, reaction, as we have seen, rapidly set in. The extreme Nationalist wing of the Young Turks which, led by Enver and Talaat, finally emerged victorious, was resolved to proceed to a solution of what they called "The Armenian Question," by all means, preferably by that of extermination. In this the Young Turks were the successors of the Sultans during Turkey's decadence, who also knew no other way of dealing with subject populations. The outbreak of the War enabled Enver and Talaat to go ahead without fear of outside interference. Shortly before Turkey entered the war in July, 1914, it had seemed as if the Armenians would finally receive international protection. Internationally appointed Inspectors were to supervise the provinces which, at that time, contained the majority of the Armenian population.

When the War effectively disposed of these safeguards, the position

of the Armenians and also of the Greeks in Turkey began to deteriorate to an alarming degree. It was obvious that these groups must sympathise with France and England, since they had no improvement of their position to expect from a Turkish victory.¹ But while the Turks in their dealings with the Greeks were restrained by consideration of the political situation, they had a free hand as regards the Armenians who were not protected by any co-racial power.

Immediately after the outbreak of war Enver and Talaat, aware of the fact that the Armenians, victims of so many massacres, had no cause to love the Turks, had summoned the Armenian leaders. They warned them that any hostile act on the part of the Armenians would lead to severe reprisals. The Armenians understood what this meant.

Notwithstanding German propaganda alleging the contrary, the Armenians scrupulously refrained from hostile acts, despite ever-increasing provocations and excesses on the part of the Turkish soldiery. It is true that refugees from Armenia had joined the Russian Army, where they formed special detachments fighting side by side with the Russians for the liberation of Armenia. To have made this understandable reaction the pretext for what ensued, cannot be defended even by the best friends of Turkey. It is generally recognised that the major part of the responsibility must fall on the Germans. They suggested to the Turks the mass deportation of the Armenians to Mesopotamia; this would have facilitated Germany's plans with regard to the Baghdad Railway project in that this important district would have been inhabited by the remainder of a cowed and terrified population incapable of forming an obstacle to Germany's schemes. In his memoirs the then American Ambassador, Mr. Morgenthau, exposes the brutal and cynical attitude of the German Ambassador, von Wangenheim. This evil precursor of the Nazis declared that Turkey was in a state of legitimate self-defence; there was only one problem, that of winning the war, and every measure, however inhuman, which conduced to this was completely legitimate.

Consequently the order was given to disarm all Armenians, Greeks and other Christians then serving in the Turkish Army; they were formed into special labour and pioneer battalions. When the victory of Gallipoli had dispelled any chance of outside intervention, Enver and Talaat issued a secret order with the ostensible purpose of transferring the entire Armenian population of Asia Minor to Mesopotamia where they were to be re-settled in the Euphrates desert.

The real aim of this order, however, was the complete extermination of the Armenian people. In April, 1915, all male Armenians capable of bearing arms were killed. During the next few months all Armenians without regard to sex or age were driven out of their towns and villages and marched off under escort. On the way the men were butchered, the women and girls raped and then killed, many others died of hunger, cold and hardships, with the result that not a single person survived

¹ Consideration for the lot of the Greeks in Turkey was one of the reasons which prevented King Constantine from joining the Allied Powers during the early part of the war, and from taking part in the attack on the Dardanelles.

the march. Not a single Armenian entered Mesopotamia; according to figures admitted by the authorities, out of a total population of 1,200,000, one million were killed in this barbarous manner. At the end of 1915 Talaat rightly boasted that he had definitely solved the Armenian question in Turkey.

In two places, notably in the towns of Zeitun and Van, despair drove the Armenians to bitter resistance. The "rising" was suppressed by the Governor Jevdat Bey, a brother-in-law of Enver, whom even an Austrian author describes as "a monster in human shape."

Neither Germany nor Austria stopped the massacres, while the Allied Governments gave expression to the indignation of the civilised world, announcing that the guilty men would be punished after the war. These declarations showed a marked resemblance to similar pronouncements made on the occasion of Germany's systematic extermination of European Jewry . . .

This almost complete destruction of a whole people was, apart from its moral infamy, an act highly detrimental to a country at war. The cleverest artisans and traders, the most industrious and efficient farmers were eliminated with a suddenness which did not fail to dislocate the internal economy of the country. The Turkish armies stationed in Asia Minor were suddenly deprived of grain, cattle and practically all other foodstuffs with the result that large numbers of Turkish soldiers literally starved. In addition, the dwindling columns of the miserable deportees had been the carriers of infectious diseases, and in consequence an epidemic of typhus broke out in the regions through which they passed. Hundreds of thousands of Turks perished—thus did the victims take revenge on their murderers.

After the war the authors of the Armenian massacre were punished—though not by the Allied Governments who did not prosecute the German war criminals either. Vengeance was exacted by the Armenians themselves, who assassinated Talaat in Berlin, Jemal in Tiflis, and the former Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha in Rome.¹

CHAPTER V.

THE BLITZ THAT FAILED.

MEANWHILE ANTI-GERMAN FEELING WAS MOUNTING in Turkey. The Germans had openly announced their intention of "Egyptianising" Turkey after the war, while the Austrians were almost openly quarrelling with the Germans. They, too, wanted their slice, and Austro-German rivalry assumed grotesque forms in the guise of what was called "cultural propaganda." The Germans formed a "German-Turkish Friendship Association," where German professors bored a public of officers and politicians to extinction with long-winded lectures. The

¹ Armenian attempts after the war to form an Armenian Republic in the territory described as "Greater Armenia" were unsuccessful, the movement being suppressed by Kemal.

Austrians countered by sending to Constantinople a "medical mission" consisting of twenty-five very pretty "nurses" whose job it was to establish friendly relations with Turkish officers. A similar mission was successfully accomplished by a complete musical comedy troupe sent from Vienna.

The Germans retaliated by showering a rain of Iron Crosses (Second Class) on numbers of Turkish officers and dignitaries but with so little success that they complained that captive British officers (who were very well treated and permitted to move about freely on parole) were publicly fêted, and enjoying greater popularity than the Germans.

At that time Austria revived her old ambitions to become the "protector" of the Christians in Turkey. To this end a Catholic Prelate, Aloys Musil, was dispatched on another cultural mission—dressed up in the uniform of an Austrian general. He created even greater hilarity than the musical comedy.

But behind this screen of affability German and Austrian demands grew ever more brutal. A number of Turkish divisions had to be sent to the Galician front to make up for the heavy losses caused by the Russian offensive. It was deeply humiliating that Turkish soldiers had to shed their blood for Austria, the State that had stolen so much Turkish territory and coveted more; and especially at a time when Turkey was facing grave threats on several fronts.

After initial reverses the British had captured Baghdad; they had bought the support of Hussein, the Emir of Mecca, and that of his son Faisal. Arab bands under Col. Lawrence were attacking troop trains and cutting the throats of the stragglers and the wounded. Although their military value was nil—the romantic aureole surrounding the figure of Lawrence has lent much spurious glamour to the whole episode—they exploited to the full their nuisance value in the military field, as later in the political.

Southern Palestine was threatened; from Egypt, the British were building a railway and a water pipeline and advancing steadily. In Persia, a British advance was imminent; on the Caucasus front the year 1916 saw the Russians still immensely strong.

On the Eastern front, however, a change for the better occurred. Enver, jealous of Kemal, had put him in command of a badly-organised and decimated army; it was a command that promised no glory but almost inevitable defeat. Yet the outbreak of the Russian revolution prevented the dreaded Russian attack, and Kemal was able to recapture several important towns.

* * *

Faced with all these threats, Turkey saw her reservoir of man power seriously depleted. Up to the spring of 1916, Turkey had lost over half a million men in casualties; to send troops abroad under such circumstances showed Enver's cynical disregard of public opinion. Travelling on sumptuous journeys of "inspection" through all theatres of war, including Rumania, Enver felt secure. An attempted rising, led by a number of Young Turkish officers, was put down with great severity;

a dozen men were hanged. To Enver's regret, Kemal had wisely refrained from showing his hand, and could not be implicated. Had Enver attacked the Hero of the Dardanelles, a revolution, not a revolt, would have been the result.

The opposition was stifled, but not destroyed, and Enver felt the need for re-establishing his military reputation by means of a spectacular coup. There were actually military circles charging him with incapacity and demanding his replacement by Kemal. If he could succeed in recapturing Baghdad—the loss of which was deeply felt, for it was one of the holy cities of Islam—his opponents would be silenced.

Consequently he evolved another of his grandiose plans. An army of 150,000 men was to be based on Aleppo, from where it should reconquer Mesopotamia. That army group was given the name of *Yildirim* (lightning), descriptive of the *blitzkrieg* it was intended to wage. The German General von Falkenhayn was put in charge, a man whose barely disguised contempt for everything Turkish, combined with his complete ignorance of local conditions and requirements, led various Turkish Commanders to refuse co-operation. Kemal, who had been sent to replace Vehib Pasha, Commander of the 7th Army who had resigned, realised that the ambitious project was doomed to failure. In this he found the support of Jemal Pasha, the former Military Governor of Constantinople who was in charge of the civil administration of Syria. Jemal, one of the leaders of the Young Turkish revolution, had gradually gone over to the opposition provoked by Enver's arbitrary mismanagement. He had also strongly disapproved of the Armenian massacres, and when the pitiful columns were driven through his province he had succeeded in saving numbers of Armenian children whom he had brought up in orphanages. Jemal realised that the German aim was the conquest of Mesopotamia not for the Turks, but for the Germans; it was clear to him, as it was to Kemal, that Turkey might have to defend her independence, not against England, but against Germany.

Kemal, refusing to become a party to a project which, badly organised and insufficient in strength, was bound to fail, resigned his command. For a time he lived in Constantinople, openly criticising Enver, and becoming the focus of an ever-growing opposition group. This opposition, directed both against Enver and German influence, grew alarmingly when the *Yildirim* project collapsed in utter defeat.

Owing to difficulties of transport and equipment, the *blitz* had to be switched from Mesopotamia to the Sinai front. Here von Falkenhayn, who had been an outstanding failure before Verdun, gave another proof of his utter incapacity, completely justifying Kemal's fears. Out-manœuvred and out-generalled by Allenby, he lost, not only Southern Palestine but Jerusalem as well. Jericho fell; von Falkenhayn, who prudently placed his headquarters 130 miles behind the front line, lost touch with events. His arrogance, matched only by his incapacity, made it impossible for the Turkish officers on his staff to collaborate with him. Finally he had to be replaced by Liman von Sanders.

Kemal's growing popularity and political intrigues induced Enver

to remove him from Constantinople where he had returned from the Caucasus front. A visit to the Headquarters of the Kaiser, to be paid by Vaheddin, the Sultan's younger brother and prospective successor,¹ gave Enver a good opportunity of doing this: Kemal was attached to Vaheddin's suite.

Without realising it, Enver thus gave Kemal a long-desired opportunity. The future Sultan gave proof of greater perspicacity than his indolent and almost imbecile behaviour at home used to show. Kemal used all his eloquence in trying to persuade the Prince that he must demand command of an army and must make him, Kemal, his Chief of Staff. "Which army?" was the Prince's shrewd question. Kemal's answer, "The Fifth," did not surprise him: it was based on Constantinople, and therefore likely to be the decisive factor in all future political developments. But despite Kemal's insistence Vaheddin refused to commit himself.

Arrived at the Kaiser's Headquarters at Pless, in Silesia, Kemal missed no opportunity of drawing Vaheddin's attention to the many signs that to the expert foreshadowed the inevitable collapse of Germany's seemingly impressive war machine. He met Germany's demi-gods, Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, and his Chief-of-Staff, General Ludendorff—and he saw with growing apprehension a senile dotard and a brutal Prussian who already displayed the first signs of the dementia that was to overtake him soon afterwards.

Dislike between Kemal and the Germans was mutual. Kemal asked too many questions, considered impertinent yet but all too pertinent; he insisted on personally verifying information he did not trust. When a German general criticised the quality of the Turkish soldier, Kemal created a scene by stating in front of a numerous public: "The only time Turkish soldiers ran away was when they were trying to catch up with their German generals."

Kemal was driven by political ambition, the urge that possessed his restless soul since earliest youth. But this personal ambition was based on the sincere conviction that his country had joined the losing side and was doomed to utter destruction unless he became its leader and saviour. He was willing to serve Vaheddin, provided he did Kemal's will.

Meanwhile he caused Vaheddin to express grave doubts as to the outcome of the war in an interview with the German Kaiser. The Germans were not sorry to see the Turkish mission leave. German-Turkish friendship reached its lowest ebb then; Turkey continued to remain in the war simply because she was too deeply engaged, and because Enver's and Talaat's political and personal survival was bound up with Germany's victory.

Back in Constantinople, Kemal approached Vaheddin time and

¹ Prince Yussuf Izzeddin, the son of Abdul Aziz and next in line of succession, died mysteriously in 1916 on the eve of a trip to Switzerland. The general verdict was, *on l'a suicide*, but the circumstances surrounding this undoubted crime have never been elucidated.

again, only to find that crafty prince temporising. Vaheddin's conception of government had much resemblance to that of Abdul Hamid; the fate of the country was of less importance to him than the safety of his person and of the throne he must ascend in the near future. Enver, to him, seemed more useful as a tool, for Enver had no freedom of choice. The Enver-Talaat *junta* needed the support and the prestige of the Padishah; in Kemal, the prince shrewdly recognised a wild and elemental force, unpredictable and not to be harnessed to the Imperial chariot.

Vaheddin pretended to listen to Kemal's ever more urgent suggestions to eject Enver and his clique. It was clear that the reigning Sultan's days were numbered; let Vaheddin assert himself: he would have behind him not only Kemal, the Victor of the Dardanelles, but also the Army.

But that was just what Vaheddin doubted. The Committee of Union and Progress still stood behind Enver and could not with safety be antagonised. The Germans were still dominant in the country and would undoubtedly intervene on behalf of their protégé, Enver, a step which might cost Vaheddin the throne before he even succeeded to it.

Kemal, on the other hand, was respected, but not liked. Throughout his military career he had been a living refutation of the old saw that you must learn to obey before you can command. Disdaining to accept as well as to use flattery, he did not hesitate to voice his bitter and trenchant criticism; and the fact that he was right more often than not did not tend to make him better liked. For this reason his personal following still remained small as compared with the large number of Enver's adherents.

So Kemal was left in the outer darkness, and it may have been this bitter disappointment, together with the effects of his earlier licentious living, that hastened the outbreak of a grave disease which struck him down early in 1918. It was the illness which was to dog him during the remaining twenty years of his life and finally to fell him. Many biographers have tried to explain the harsher and unlovely side of Kemal's behaviour, his bitter and ferocious moods, with all sorts of pseudo-philosophical speculation; the fact, however, is that the "Grey Wolf of the Steppes," the "Throwback to Gengis Khan" was in almost constant pain for twenty years. The leader who had resuscitated the "Sick Man on the Bosphorus" was himself a sick man.

This fact can but increase our admiration. Like Franklin D. Roosevelt, who licked a disease and became President, Kemal overcame his handicap by sheer energy. The constant realisation that there was not much time left to him drove him on to savage bouts of creative energy. He simply did not have the time for evolving slow and gradual changes; his work, if it was to endure, must be completed while he lived. Here, then, lies an obvious clue to that enigmatic personality.

When Kemal's kidney trouble struck him down in the fateful year of 1918 it was, for once, a blessing in disguise. Forced to take a cure in Karlsbad, he was absent from the scene at home and therefore not involved in the many defeats that were now the lot of Turkey. In July, Mohammed V died—only a few months after his brother, Abdul Hamid,

now a forgotten prisoner—and Vaheddin succeeded him as Mohammed VI. He was to be the last of the Sultans.

In 'Karlsbad, Kemal could observe the ever more rapid crumbling of the Austrian Empire; when, in the late summer of 1918, he returned to Constantinople, he saw that the collapse of Turkey was also imminent.

In the Balkans, where Greece had finally joined the Allies and enabled General Franchet d'Espérey to land an expeditionary corps at Salonika, the Bulgarian front was crumbling under the growing allied assault. In Mesopotamia and Syria, the Turkish divisions were shrinking from illness and desertion, while Allenby was gathering reinforcements and preparing for a decisive blow; in the Hedjas, finally, a Turkish expeditionary corps was surrounded and besieged by insurgents without hope of relief.

CHAPTER VI

THE CURTAIN FALLS

AND NOW, BEFORE THE CURTAIN FALLS, THE SCENE sees an ever quickening *tempo* of events, both tragic and grotesque. The scene was laid in the Caucasus. Greed and jealousy between allies was to lead to a bizarre situation, culminating in actual fighting between Turkish and German troops. This little-known episode deserves mention, for it gives the lie to German assertions of their sincere friendship for Turkey and goes far to explain the distrust and dislike of Germany felt ever since by patriotic Turks.

In December, 1917, three months before the Peace of Brest-Litowsk (which was to show the world the German conception of a dictated peace, vitiating for ever their whining about the "harshness" of the infinitely milder Peace Treaty of Versailles) an armistice was concluded between Russia and the Central Powers. The troops were to remain in their actual positions pending peace negotiations.

But on the Caucasus front this static situation underwent a quick change. The Russian army of the Caucasus melted away; the soldiers left their guns and simply went home, taking with them their rifles and machine guns. Marauding bands of soldiers terrorised the population, particularly Georgians and Tartars. Meanwhile the peoples of the Caucasus rose against Russian domination in a last desperate bid to regain their freedom.

The Caucasus is peopled by numerous tribes of different race and tongue. In the north the Circassians (Cherkess) tribes, though probably of Turanian origin, were Russified to a great extent. Not so the Eastern part, Daghestan, which is inhabited by a number of Moslem tribes, and Transcaucasia.

From the Black Sea to Tiflis, Georgians form the population; most of them orthodox Christians, but some of them Moslems. Turkish Tartars occupy the eastern part of Transcaucasia, while in the South, around Lake Geuktche and concentrated in the town of Eriwan as well

as in other Transcaucasian towns, there was a large and compact Armenian population.

The chief town of the whole region is Baku, one of the richest oil fields of the world, and the reason why so many Powers felt the urge to liberate and protect this area.

These three peoples, Georgians, Tartars and Armenians, wishing to regain their independence and protect their countries from the Russian soldiery, formed a Transcaucasian Federation with Tiflis as its capital. Their aims, however, differed. The Georgians sided with the Germans, hoping to get their support against Russia; the Tartars, of Turkish origin and speaking Turkish, looked towards Turkey as their protector; while the Armenians, knowing what Turkish domination would mean for them, hoped for Anglo-American protection. Their national aim was the re-establishment of the Armenian State, comprising the Armenian districts of Eastern Anatolia. •

Turkey refused to recognise the Transcaucasian Federation. Enver proclaimed his intention of protecting Turkish and Moslem interests, basing his conception of "liberating" the Turco-Tartar tribes of Russia on his "Pan-Turanian" programme. And apart from his desire to "free" those populations, Enver did not forget the riches of Baku which would have meant vast profits for himself and his followers. While Turkey was already trembling on her foundations Enver, living in his realm of illusion, dreamed of conquest and expansion.

The Peace of Brest-Litowsk dashed the hopes of the Caucasians. It provided for a plebiscite in the Ardahan, Kars and Batum districts which Turkey had ceded to Russia in 1878—a decision which Enver interpreted in his own way by occupying these regions despite passionate protest and bitter resistance by the population.

At this stage Germany intervened. German troops were sent from the Crimea and occupied Tiflis; Georgia was declared an independent State under German protection. At the same time British forces were advancing on Baku, but were repulsed.

Germany forbade a further Turkish advance, and threatened to recall all German troops from Turkey and the Syrian and Mesopotamian fronts. Despite this, Enver ordered his troops to advance on German-occupied Tiflis.

Turkish and German troops clashed in a number of engagements, in which the Germans were driven back and lost prisoners to their "allies." These incidents, which occurred in the month of June, 1918, form one of the strangest interludes of the war and throw a significant light on the meaning of an "alliance" with Germany.

Diplomatic negotiations, however, led to the termination of the Turkish advance on Tiflis, and the German prisoners were returned to their units. The Turks now marched against the Armenians. Fighting desperately, the Armenians, supported by Nestorians (a Christian sect of the region) held up the Turkish advance for a while. But when six Turkish divisions were thrown against their small army, the Armenians were overwhelmed. As a last forlorn hope they applied for Austrian

protection, but that ramshackle empire was already in full dissolution. The Turkish troops together with the local Moslems took their revenge in a terrible massacre of the Armenian population.

Further events in this region—British troops occupied Baku shortly afterwards—are outside the scope of this book.

* * *

Rarely can there have been a responsible politician who misread the signs of the times, misjudged the balance of forces, so completely as Enver and his followers.

Three months before the final collapse of Germany and her allies, in the month of July, 1918, the Turkish Press for the first time published Turkey's official war aims. If it is permitted to anticipate, this fantastic rigmarole of Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism should be contrasted with the wise restraint shown five years later by Kemal.

These war aims, as published then in Constantinople, demanded no less than the recapture of Palestine, Arabia and Mesopotamia; the restitution to Turkish sovereignty of Egypt (!), the "independence" of Persia; Turkish control of the Caucasus and the Black Sea shore; the appointment of Turkish princes in the Crimea and Azerbeidjan; Bulgaria to return the valleys of the Mesta and the Struma, Italy, Benghazi, the Dodecanese and Erythrea. In short, it was a programme proving that it is not always wise to have "man's grasp exceed his reach."

The ink of Enver's proclamation was hardly dry when the final collapse came.

* * *

Mustapha Kemal Pasha implored the Sultan to save what was possible by concluding a separate peace. But his urgent entreaties were of no avail. In a new attempt to give Kemal an insoluble task, Enver sent him to Syria, there to assume command of an army that no longer existed as a fighting force and of a front that was hourly caving in more threateningly.

The British under General Allenby attacked. In a retreat lasting two months, Kemal extricated his Army, the Seventh, leading them back to Aleppo. Re-forming broken-up regiments, counter-attacking wherever there was a chance of halting the enemy's advance, Kemal performed a military feat of the first magnitude. What had threatened to turn into a rout became a fairly orderly withdrawal. Kemal read the signs aright. There was no longer any hope of victory; what had to be attempted now was to preserve at least some of Turkey's military strength so as to retain the semblance of a bargaining counter for the coming armistice and peace negotiations.

When the Bulgarian front collapsed and allied armies were streaming towards Budapest and Vienna; when Soviet Russia, denouncing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, declared war on Turkey, the end had come. Constantinople lay open to attack from Bulgaria as well as by way of Eastern Anatolia, and Syria. Both Damascus and Aleppo were about to fall to the British. Within the country, disease and famine were rampant.

Under these circumstances even Enver and Talaat had to recognise that the game was lost. No longer did they have the Committee behind them; it split up into several wings, one anglophile, one pro-French, while others put their trust in American intervention. On the 5th of October, Germany, Austria and Turkey—Bulgaria had already surrendered—asked for President Wilson's mediation on the basis of the same Fourteen Points they had contemptuously rejected a short time before. But the American Government declined to negotiate with a Government whose hands were stained with the blood of the Armenians, demanding at the same time the handing over for punishment of Enver and all others responsible for these atrocities.

Meanwhile unofficial emissaries were sent to the British Ambassador in Athens, declaring Turkey's willingness to make peace at any price and demanding British intervention. When this step remained fruitless, General Townshend, whom the Turks had captured at Kut-el-Amara, was sent to Mudros in order to submit a similar request to Admiral Calthorpe.

While these negotiations were going on, the remainder of Syria was occupied by the British, who also captured Mosul. When the Armistice was finally signed at Mudros on October 30th, the capitulation of the Turkish Army merely confirmed the actual state of affairs.

Apart from units in and around Constantinople, only Kemal's army, which had fallen back on Adana, was capable of organised resistance. The German troops in the Caucasus had mutinied and were sent home; Liman von Sanders was relieved of his command in Syria and Kemal received a telegram which was to have far-reaching consequences for the future of Turkey: he was named Commander-in-Chief.

Enver and Talaat together with their henchmen had fled abroad. A new Cabinet was formed, consisting of personalities not compromised by pro-German activities.

The terms of the armistice were harsh, as was to be expected. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were opened to Allied warships and all forts there as well as strategic points in the interior were occupied. The Turkish navy was surrendered, the army to be demobilised immediately, with the exception of the Turkish forces in Transcaucasia where they formed a welcome wall against Bolshevik penetration. Persia, Cilicia, Syria, Mesopotamia and the whole of Arabia were to be evacuated by the Turkish troops. A rather generous provision of the treaty stipulated that all German and Austrian personnel in Turkey, military and civilian, would not be considered prisoners of war but were to be repatriated within a month.

It is a remarkable fact that despite the demoralising atmosphere of defeat, the prevalence of famine and disease both among the soldiers and the civilian population, there were never the slightest symptoms of Bolshevism, that "disease of a beaten army," as Clémenceau called it. The Sultan was the only monarch on the losing side who retained his throne; and when mutinies broke out among German and Austrian units where "soviets" were formed, these risings were suppressed by Turkish troops. Once again the innate discipline of the Turk triumphed.

It is an astonishing trait, especially in view of the fact that many of these soldiers had been under arms for seven years, waging four wars, losing the great majority of their battles, while being badly equipped, insufficiently fed, and decimated by disease, heat, cold and hunger.

Amid the ruins of defeat, these sterling qualities of the Turkish soldier—who is the Turkish peasant—remained as a shining proof of the unbroken vitality of the Nation. The house had crashed in ruins because it had been badly put together, but its timbers were sound; and the architect to rebuild it, smaller but more durable, was there. Enver had fled, but Kemal had remained.

END OF BOOK TWO.

BOOK THREE

CHAPTER I.

PLANNING AHEAD

ENTHUSIASTIC HISTORIANS TEND TO ASCRIBE TO successful leaders a prescience, a deliberate planning of their future course of action which rarely corresponds to the actual facts. More often than not such leaders were content to follow events and seize favourable opportunities as they presented themselves. If unsuccessful, they went down in history as adventurers who had gambled and lost; if successful, their chroniclers endeavoured to ascribe their every action, however fortuitous, to a deep-laid plan.

Although the historians of totalitarian Turkey have followed this line—one where admiration is hard to keep apart from adulation—we can for once agree. For Mustapha Kemal's every action and utterance in those fateful months and years following the collapse of Turkey furnishes proof that here was a man who was not content to wait on events, but was shaping them according to a definite plan; not an adventurer and gambler, but a statesman and leader of men.

* * *

When Kemal arrived in Constantinople in the winter of 1918, his command having been terminated with the evacuation of Syria, he was without official standing. Neither a deputy nor a minister, he was merely an unemployed general. Yet if that was how the Parliamentarians and the doddering Sultan's Cabinet considered him, the people had not forgotten that he was Turkey's only successful military leader. He was thirty-nine years old—old enough to be seasoned in many fights, military and political; young enough to form a marked contrast to the senility of the Sultan and his Cabinet, headed by a man of eighty-three. Tewfik Pasha, the Grand Vizier, represented the resurgent Old Turkish tendencies, now dominant after the Young Turks were finally discredited. For ten years they had held power and a chance of saving Turkey by the application of their tenets; and they had made a worse mess of things than Abdul Hamid.

Dejection reigned in a country which felt that it had been deserted by its leaders. A dangerous mood, this: it may give rise to anarchy, to unscrupulous demagogues, to civil war.

Kemal described the state of the country in his great address to the Congress of the People's Party in 1927:—

“The Powers on whose side the armies of the Ottoman Empire had been fighting were defeated. The Ottoman army was in a state of dis-

persal; an armistice the terms of which were severe had been signed. The Turkish nation, exhausted by the hardships of many years of war, was plunged in misery. Those who had dragged the country and the nation into the war had fled, thinking only of saving their own hides. The man who held the dignity of Sultan and Caliph was a degenerate who, by the most infamous of means, sought only to save his person and his throne. The Cabinet consisted of cowards and incompetents, devoid of dignity, following blindly the Sultan's will, seeking thereby to save themselves. These men were prepared to accept anything . . ."

Kemal, in this harsh summing-up, does less than justice to men who, in enemy-occupied Constantinople, were trying to save what they could by the age-old oriental device of apparent submission. He forgets that the very Cabinet he so bitterly assails gave him his ardently desired opportunity, by appointing him Commander and Inspector-General in Anatolia; that it was the Sultan's *irade* which lent him his first "legal" authority in preparing the great rising which was to herald the rebirth of Turkey.

Yet Kemal's bitterness is understandable, as he looks back on those days. The Turkish people lay stunned. What political activity there was was not directed against the foreign occupation, but consisted of groups wishing to "collaborate" with this or that power.

There were numerous political parties, but their past was gravely compromised; there were groups entitled "Committee of the Friends of England," of France, of America; there were separatist bodies, calling themselves "Committee for the Liberation of the Kurds," "Thracian Committee," and so on. Not one of all these groups aimed at the restoration of national unity.

These separatist committees, too feeble to proceed to direct action, overwhelmed the foreign powers with memoranda, demands for protection and intervention. In addition there was a wide-spread movement advocating the placing of Turkey under international Mandate. This movement was supported by numerous influential politicians and intellectuals, and fomented by the competing agents of various foreign powers.

To these tendencies Kemal, from the outset, opposed his clear-cut doctrine of national pride and independence. Turkey would have to lose much territory, populations numbering millions; he realised that. But these losses would consist of non-Turkish regions; they would, as he realised with a farsightedness that was borne out by events, leave intact and even strengthen the racial core of Turkey, which was Anatolia. In Anatolia, the first truly national movement had begun spontaneously and even before Kemal's appearance on the local scene, crystallizing in a body called "Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia."

But Kemal still had a long way to go. Constantinople was hopeless. For once in his life Kemal, who hated ante-chambers and the niggling game of petty politics, had tried his hand at lobbying, endeavouring to secure a vote of no confidence against Tewfik's Cabinet. Its overthrow would leave the way open for a "Kemalist" government (that term was

first used about that time) in which he aspired to the all-important post of War Minister.

But the deputies, frightened of this tempestuous spirit, confirmed Tewfik's tenure of office, and Kemal had to humble himself before he was given the supreme command in Anatolia by a Sultan who was content to have the really difficult and dangerous job of organising resistance done by others. There can be no doubt that the Sultan and his advisers were aware of, and not averse to, Kemal's intentions. They did not, however, realise his essentially revolutionary spirit, nor could they know that the abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate, anti-clericalism and secularisation and all those sudden and violent changes that were to come were already extant in Kemal's mind.

But the time had not yet come to divulge these plans even to his closest friends and collaborators. Many of them were devoted to the Sultan—or rather to the imperial idea which he represented; all of them were good Moslems, not at all susceptible to his radical ideas. Kemal himself admitted later that he had to tread warily. In his great speech to which we have referred, he said:—

“The national struggle for independence was directed principally against the invader. But as our fight for independence grew ever more successful, the national will began gradually to reaffirm itself and to tend towards full realisation of all its principles. We did not want to disclose all our ideas and principles right from the outset. Had we issued declarations concerning a future that then seemed fraught with difficulties, our actual fight against the enemy might have appeared as an illusion and a chimera.

“Among the very people threatened by the dangers of foreign invasion there were those who would have been frightened by the prospect of changes that were contrary to their traditions and mentality and beyond their intellectual grasp. The surest and most practicable way to success was to realise each step in our work at the proper moment, and this was how we acted.

“The great processes of evolution which I felt imminent for our Nation I had to keep locked up in my breast as a national secret, and had to realise them gradually in accordance with the will of the people.”

It may be that translation makes Kemal's speeches—we have no writings from his hand—appear more florid and pompous than they were in reality. All observers agree that he was an impressive speaker of apodictic forcefulness. Yet when he invokes “the will of the people” he really alludes to his great and seemingly impossible task of resuscitating and shaping the national will, bending it to his purpose. Sometimes the time is ripe for an outburst, for an act of rebellion: the people is waiting for a leader to put into speech and translate into action its own inarticulate feelings. This was not the case with Kemal. There was nothing spontaneous or popular about the ideas he had to inculcate, slowly and gradually, against the accumulated resistance of tradition and an established way of life. This explains why he was, more than any other contemporary dictator, the doctrinaire and even schoolmaster . . .

But as yet direct action, and speedy action at that, was imperative. For when Kemal landed at Samsun, on the Black Sea, on the memorable date that is now accepted as the starting-point of Turkey's liberation—May 19th, 1919—storm clouds were gathering once more over Anatolia.

CHAPTER II.

“ORDER IN ANATOLIA”

MODERN TURKISH HISTORIANS DO NOT STRESS THE background of Kemal's appointment; yet although it reveals a certain duplicity on his part it was no more than a permissible ruse.

Tewfik had at last been replaced—by Damad Ferid Pasha, the Sultan's brother-in-law. He formed a Cabinet in which Kemal had many influential friends, among them Izmet, then Under-Secretary for War. Kemal seemingly conformed to the prevailing spirit of submission. While secretly establishing contact with the growing resistance against the exactions of the invaders in Anatolia and Syria, he dissembled his real feelings so successfully that Damad Ferid himself had him removed from a list of dangerous “nationalists” to be deported to Malta by the English. His opposition to Enver was remembered, and the Sultan had no objection to difficulties being raised in the way of the English and the French. It would always be possible, the Sultan thought, to disown Kemal, should his activities exceed the bounds constituted by the patience of the victors. It could already be seen that these bounds were not quite so rigid as they had been in the first flush of victory. The war-weary armies and navies wanted to return home; continued wars of intervention, now the main struggle was over, were highly unpopular, as witnessed by the growing opposition to Allied interference in the Russian Civil War. There were disquieting symptoms of unrest both at home and even within the armed forces, and the Sultan's game in creating—unobtrusively—as many delays and obstacles as possible was not without adroitness. After all, peace had not yet been concluded, and every month that passed reduced the probability of the allies resuming hostilities. Who knew but what there might be a repetition of the second Balkan War, allies falling out over the division of the spoils, and an opportunity for Turkey to recoup herself.

But Mohammed VI was not made of the stuff fit for the conduct of such large-scale plans. He was content to wait without actively influencing the course of events—a policy of sheer opportunism not backed by decisive action.

* * *

Kemal at once established contact with the Turkish commanders in Anatolia. There was Refet Bey, Governor of Samsun; there was Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha, an outstanding commander whose army, holding the Eastern frontier of Anatolia, was still intact and in good fighting trim;

there was Ali Fuad Pasha, commanding at Erzerum, a convinced nationalist. And finally there was Rauf Bey, one-time commander of the Turkish cruiser "Hamidieh" which during the Balkan War had executed some daring and brilliant raids throughout the Ægean and even on the Piræus. Rauf's name had become familiar throughout the Moslem world, which had not forgotten the exploits of Chaireddin Barbarossa and his corsairs.

In convincing these men—all good Moslems and loyal to the Sultan and Caliph—that the Padishah, living under the guns of a hostile fleet, was a virtual prisoner and not free in his decisions, Kemal first established the foundations of what was to become the Turkish Republic. It took the shape of a National Assembly, convened at Sivas, in the centre of Anatolia. Kemal, Kiazim Kara Bekir, Refet and Rauf issued their call in a document known as the Amasya protocol. Turkey, the document stated, would not submit to foreign domination; as their beloved Padishah was not free to act, the people were to express their sovereign will in a National Assembly.

Too late, the Sultan realised what this portended for his reign and throne. He cancelled Kemal's appointment and recalled him; but the Congress of Sivas (September 13th, 1919) had already confirmed Kemal as the leader of the people and the expression of its "sovereign will." Kemal was now President of the Congress and its dominant group, the newly-founded People's Party; for the first time he openly defied the Sultan.

It seems hardly justified to criticise Kemal's decisive action in the light of Occidental ideas of leisurely parliamentary methods, slow constitutional procedure, and the whole cumbersome apparatus of perfect proportional representation more suitable to times of peace than a period of desperate upheaval such as Turkey was then undergoing.¹ It was just such a dictatorship which enabled Britain to survive the consequences of the defeat of Dunkirk. Kemal might have attempted to establish a purely personal dictatorship—an enterprise which would have succeeded without much doubt; that he preferred to consult the people, though of necessity in a fragmentary manner and one not in accordance with constitutional niceties, surely redounds to his credit and enhances the purity of his motives.

* * *

Thus fortified by the backing of the people—or at least that proportion of it which could send deputies to the Sivas Congress—Kemal could show his hand more clearly. He began to oppose French and English demands. True, Constantinople lay outside his influence, and there collaboration could be enforced; but in Syria and Anatolia, in

¹ In his *Mustapha Kemal of Turkey* (Holme Press, London, 1930) Mr. H. E. Wortham furnishes a typical example of such criticism when he writes (p. 88):—

"Thus the west had won its first victory in this naive homage to the shades of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau . . . The doctrine of the sovereignty of the majority, which is enshrined in the French and American Revolutions, a theory that makes it divinely just for 51% of the population to tyrannise over the other 49%, reached its crudest manifestation in the Grand National Assembly . . ."

Sivas and Alexandrette it was Kemal who put ever growing difficulties in the way of the allied armistice commissions.

British and French troops were finally sent against him, but were re-embarked before it came to any clashes. These incidents served but to increase Kemal's prestige, and at the same time popular hatred of Damad Ferid, the anglophile Grand Vizier. Everywhere, even in occupied Istanbul (Constantinople), groups of the People's Party (which had now absorbed the East Anatolian Rights Defence Committee) appeared like the proverbial mushrooms. Arms and ammunition disappeared when the allied commissions called for them, and mysteriously found their way to the "Kemalist" forces. This term was now used by the French and British Press to describe "gangs of irresponsible nationalists and even brigands who disturbed public order in Anatolia."

Order in Anatolia . . . Amid bloodshed and rapine, violence and destruction, Greek bayonets were attempting to establish a new order in war-torn Asia Minor.

CHAPTER III.

THE GREAT IDEA

THE GREAT POWERS WERE WAR-WEARY, AND DIS-INCLINED to back their demands with force. But they found a willing helper in Eleuthrios Venizelos, the adroit and ambitious Cretan who for many years was the maker and breaker of the Kings of Greece. Backed by Sir Basil Zaharoff, the international armaments king who yet remained a patriotic Greek throughout his long and adventurous life, Venizelos persuaded France and England to finance, equip and supply a Greek Expeditionary army.

This army landed at Smyrna on May 15th, 1919. It was to be the instrument for the realisation of a great plan—the *Μεγαλη Ιδεια* of the Greeks through the ages. It was the re-conquest of Asia Minor, whose towns had seen the rise of Ionian civilisation a thousand years before Christ; where Homer had sung his immortal epics; where the cradle of Hellenism had stood. It was from Smyrna and Ephesus, Colophon and Halicarnassus that the colonists had gone forth to the isles and the mainland of Greece; Samos, Chios, Mytilene, all the beautiful islands along the Asiatic coast, were by-words in Grecian history.

Byzantium, the daughter of the Greek city of Megara, had been and still was more Greek than Turkish; Greek was the population of the islands, Greek that of the coastal towns of Anatolia. To re-establish a Greater Greece, to assume the heritage of Byzantium after an interlude of 470 years was indeed an ambition worthy of a great past.

Turkey, the hereditary enemy with whom the Greeks had been wrestling for a hundred years, a cruel enemy who had run up a long bill of massacre and persecution, lay prostrate. The moment seemed opportune for crowning the work of Greek liberation.

It is customary for contemporary historians, especially those con-

cerned with Turkish history, to sneer at the Greeks for their ambitious but ill-fated enterprise, and to condemn the great plan that failed as an attempt at robbery with violence. Yet it would be more just to admit that here was the inevitable clash between two equally justifiable conceptions; another link in the long chain of the struggle between East and West, Asia and Europe.

From this point of view it is futile to indulge in abuse at Zaharoff, even though he was a gun merchant, and at Venizelos, because he failed. Whatever the personal motives animating these two men, whatever the political background which made it convenient for the great Powers to support the enterprise in its initial stages, it can not be denied that the Greek campaign in Asia Minor corresponded to a genuine national ideal, carried forward with tremendous enthusiasm. It is equally true to say that the Turks, in defending their homeland, were animated by an ideal no less noble and praiseworthy.

What is not defensible, though perhaps understandable, are the horrible atrocities committed by both sides. Since Mithridates rose against the Romans and had all Roman citizens in his realm killed in one night, Asia Minor had not seen such large-scale massacres as were then committed by Greeks against Turks, by Turks against Greeks. But at the same time this last outburst of age-old hostility, proving that Greeks and Turks must not live jumbled together but can peaceably co-exist, led to the final settlement of this running sore of the Orient. Resulting in the hard but salutary measure of a wholesale exchange of populations, this war proved the last clash between two valiant nations who are now united by a sincere friendship—a friendship which is the guarantor of future peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.

About the campaign itself we may be brief. The Greeks fought bravely, the Turks heroically; the Greek leadership was indifferent, the Turks were led by Kemal.

The war lasted for three years, with interruptions lasting many months when the rains or the unbearable heat of mid-summer forbade operations. The Greeks were held at Inonu¹ but advanced again, taking Eskishehir and approaching dangerously close to Ankara, the last stronghold of the Kemalists. Kemal halted them in the first battle on the Sakaria river, and a period of stalemate ensued in which both sides took up fixed positions.

The campaign was, however, decided in other places than on the blood-drenched soil of Anatolia; the Greeks lost it in the Caucasus, in Athens, and in London.

In the Caucasus, Kiazim Kara Bekir smashed the Armenian Republic, taking Eriwan and with it the last stronghold of Armenian independence. Contact was thereby established with the Bolsheviks who had just defeated Wrangel's White Guards. Munitions and supplies began to stream into Anatolia from Russia, and also from French and Italian sources, so that Kemal's hard-pressed and ill-equipped army gained

¹ Izmet Pasha, then Kemal's Chief of Staff, and his trusted lieutenant in all his battles, derives his name from this victory won by him.

strength while the Greek forces, supplied through long and bad communications and exposed to the noxious miasmata of the swampy Sakaria region, began to dwindle in numbers, efficiency and armaments.

In Athens, the perpetual struggle between Venizelists and Royalists resulted in another domestic upheaval. Pro-Entente Venizelos was expelled, pro-German King Constantine recalled. Political passions, ever the bane of Greek public life for 2,500 years, created obnoxious fermentation within the officers' corps and even the ranks of the army. The volatile Greeks were excellent soldiers in short campaigns, supporting the greatest hardships with fortitude; but they were less fitted for a long war of attrition, far from home and torn by internal factions.

In London, Mr. Lloyd George found that he stood alone in his support of the Greeks, an adventure hardly more popular than British intervention in Russia. Englands former allies were more or less openly siding with Kemal. The French, in 1921, made a secret treaty with him, confirming their possession of Syria which they had taken over from the British in 1919. Italy sent a mission to Ankara, while Russia indicated her recognition of Kemal as the *de facto* ruler of Turkey by a visit to Ankara of Foreign Commissar Tchicherin.

In addition British policy had for once committed that unforgivable political mistake of irritating to the point of despair an adversary one is unable or unwilling to destroy. The Treaty of Sèvres, concluded with the docile Sultan after the occupation of Constantinople and the deportation to Malta of some forty nationalist deputies who, despite Kemal's warning, had attended the session of the Diet, was so harsh that it did much to drive all patriotic elements in Turkey into the Kemalist camp.

Lloyd George claimed the fact that Constantinople was not actually handed over to the Greeks as proof of moderation; but a treaty which internationalised the Capital and the Straits, abolished the Turkish army and navy, established foreign control over all financial and other internal activities, annexed all of European Turkey and a coastal strip of Asia Minor, thus locking the Turks up in the interior of Anatolia; a treaty which re-established the hated capitulations, depriving the Turks of mastery in their own house—such a treaty might have been imposed on an enemy utterly defeated and without a gun or a bayonet; but it was the acme of folly to conclude this treaty with an ineffectual government, which thereby became traitors in the eyes of their countrymen, while Kemal's moral and armed strength was growing daily. When Kemal learned of these events, he is said to have exclaimed triumphantly, "From now on, Istanbul does not rule Ankara, but Ankara Istanbul."

Those deputies who had managed to escape arrest in Constantinople fled to Ankara; even the clergy, as yet unaware of Kemal's dangerous plans with regard to their influence, rallied to his cause. The Sultan lost the last remainder of his popularity, and while Kemal at Ankara was not without opposition which caused many months of irksome internal wrangling, he was in fact the almost undisputed ruler of as much of Turkey as was not occupied by Greek and British troops. In Anatolia, the French and British Controlling Commissions had been

arrested and interned. The Greeks were still enclosing Anatolia in a wide semi-circle, reaching from the Sea of Marmora, Izmid and Mudanya to Smyrna and the South, including the islands. But despite this continued threat Kemal found time to put his house in order, and even to conclude a treaty with Soviet Russia, the first State to recognise him.

It was a treaty that was to have far-reaching and beneficial consequences. It removed for ever the traditional threat hanging over Turkey's north-eastern frontier and terminated an enmity that had lasted for over two hundred years; it equally made Turkey a strong glacis which fortified, instead of threatened, Russia's vulnerable flank. This friendship with Russia remained the cornerstone of Kemal's policy as well as that of his successors, and was not impeded by the severity with which Kemal suppressed all communist propaganda and activity in Turkey.

* * *

In the summer of 1922 Kemal, now Commander-in-Chief and absolute dictator, struck. The Greeks had seen the blow coming, and the British, realising that their Greek allies were doomed, had suggested an armistice; but Kemal rejected what he considered a trap. He attacked at Sakaria. The Greeks offered stubborn resistance, and bitter fighting lasted for twenty-two days.

Then the Greek lines broke. Deserted by their officers, the Greek soldiers retreated, wavered, broke. A disorderly rabble flooded back to Smyrna, hotly pursued by the Turks, hardly less exhausted. On their way back the Greeks burned down Turkish villages, killing, pillaging, destroying; the Turks perpetrated savage reprisals on the Greek stragglers and those Christian villagers who had remained behind.

Most of the Greek soldiery—it was no longer an army—managed to reach their ships and fled across the sea. Their generals were prisoners of war; Kemal, by the way, treated them with every courtesy.

The town of Smyrna was in flames. The Christian population stood crowded on the quays, in deadly terror as the fire and the Turks approached. Impotently, foreign warships were lying in the harbour. They had taken off their nationals, but they could do nothing to save the thousands among whom the Turks now started a terrible massacre.

Kemal rode into the conquered city, like other Asiatic conquerors before him, their horses' fetlocks drenched in blood. His dour face remained unmoved, his morose expression as impassive as ever while men and women showered flowers on him. A girl raised the age-old cry of *Ghazi*, Liberator. It was taken up by thousands of throats in an ever-swelling chorus of jubilant pride. September 9th, 1922, was the day that saw the invader driven out of the heart of Turkey, and the country's liberation achieved.

But amid all this jubilation the Ghazi realised that only the first part of his work was done. It was comparatively easy to unite the nation in the fight against the invader; it would be a much harder job to establish internal unity and push through the reforms that meant, in reality, a revolution. For what the Young Turks had introduced was essentially

not much more than Midhat's liberal Constitution, which was a concession to the West and its incessant demands for reforms. And did the West insist on these reforms in order to make Turkey strong? Was its intention not rather to weaken the country, and facilitate its exploitation by foreign entrepreneurs?

This external westernisation had sat ill on the body politic of Turkey. Under the guise of modernism the old evils of exploitation, superstition, greed and corruption had continued unchecked, just as modern dress remained crowned with the archaic headgear of the Fez. The Constitution had not worked, for the people were not yet ripe for democracy. The Ghazi's work in peace would be no less hard than his wars, he mused as he rode through the drifting smoke of Smyrna's burning streets.

* * *

The Greeks were chased out of Anatolia. Kemal wisely restrained the hotheads in his entourage who wanted to cross the Bosphorus and march on Greece. He realised that this would have led to protracted warfare, perhaps even to a revival of the Balkan Federation, and certainly to a clash with the English. At Mudanya, on the Sea of Marmora, British troops had taken up positions in defence of the approaches to Constantinople. During the month of September, Turk and Britisher faced one another for the last time in the trenches before Tchanak and Mudanya. A single shot would have had disastrous results.

But it was never fired. An armistice was concluded on September 29th, 1922, followed by a peace with Greece—now a republic, as King Constantine's reign did not outlast the lost campaign.

Looking back on this period after over twenty years, it can be said that Anglo-Turkish friendship was resumed then. A Turkish proverb says, *eski dost dushman olmaz*—an old friend shall not become an enemy. England had been Turkey's friend for two hundred years, and for only seven out of them had the two nations been on opposing sides. Since then, British friendship for Turkey has been sincere and disinterested—far more so than Italian, German and even French protestations of friendship.

And the same period also marks the beginning of normal, and later cordial, relations with Greece. Two million people were uprooted from their homesteads and exchanged—half a million Turks from Greece (with the exception of two districts in Eastern Thrace), and a million-and-a-half Greeks from Turkey (with the exception of Constantinople). The exchange, effected with the aid of the League of Nations, proceeded not without hardship, especially as Greece, impoverished and exhausted, saw herself suddenly flooded by indigent masses amounting to almost one-half of her previous population.

But looking back on this necessary surgical operation we can pronounce it an eventual success. It may well be that the very delicate problem of frontier delineation after this war will best be solved by a similar method—with all the safeguards and improvements for which the Turco-Greek exchange provided an object lesson. With a floating population of millions of refugees already uprooted from their homes,

such process—unfortunately—presents fewer difficulties from the sentimental point of view. It would obviate minority problems, and as in the case of Greece and Turkey, would facilitate a lasting settlement of racial and linguistic frictions that are now insoluble.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MAN OF ANKARA

THE NEXT STAGES IN TURKISH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT were no more than the logical result of what had happened before. A stormy session of the Diet abolished the Sultanate (November 1st, 1922), and the Government of the Grand National Assembly was established. The words "Turkish Republic" (*Turkiye Cumhuriyet*, now the official designation) were not used until a year later.

The Sultan fled on board an English cruiser and left the country. Thus was ended the reign of the Sultans of the House of Osman, and Kemal had realised the first of his major aims. In his famous "address"—which lasted four days—he disclosed that the abolition of the Sultanate had been his aim from the first, when he stated:

"The republican form of government has been the basis of the Ankara government ever since its inception on April 23rd, 1920; but to call the thing by its real name before the right moment had come would have imperilled the realisation of our aim."

The Treaty of Sèvres had now become a dead letter. No longer could there be talk of capitulations, of an Armenian republic, of Adana as a French, Adalya as an Italian colony. Izmet Inönü, in Lausanne, temporised, evaded, was struck with that sudden deafness which has prevented him ever since from hearing those to whom he would not listen, until he returned with a treaty that was very different from its predecessor. Kemal's basic demands were fulfilled: Turkish sovereignty remained full and unimpaired within frontiers which corresponded to those delineated by ethnic facts.

The foreign troops evacuated Constantinople and other places still under occupation. The Treaty of Lausanne was the first and only treaty negotiated by and not dictated to, one of the States that had lost the World War. And on October 18th, 1923, a salvo of 101 guns announced the proclamation of the Turkish Republic; its first President was Ghazi Mustafa Kemal.

* * *

At the same time Angora (Ankara) was declared the Turkish capital; Istanbul was reduced to the status of a provincial capital.

The Turkish race sprang from the heart of the earth's greatest expanse of land, the Steppes of Central Asia. Allah, said an old Turkish proverb, had given victory on land to the Turks, but the mastery of the Sea to the Infidels. True, the sea too has seen Turkish valour both in

victory and defeat; but the Turks have sought their destiny mainly on land.

This may have been one of the psychological reasons for Kemal's choice of a capital. Constantinople lies on the sea, Ankara a thousand miles inland in the centre of a vast and arid tableland. Constantinople has always lain under the guns of the foreigner, Ankara was a mountain fortress that was never lost.

Constantinople is beautiful—like a seductive woman she has been much coveted and often conquered, a courtesan, ravishing and ravished in turn. Many flags have waved over her crenellated walls, many conquering keels have furrowed her soft blue waters. She formed the world's picture of Turkey, but she was perhaps the least Turkish of all the Sultan's towns—a polyglot Babel, where all races and all creeds rubbed shoulders, where the Turks sometimes formed a minority.

The city evoked associations of defeat. She stood for all that Kemal abhorred: foreign influence, the tramp of the invader, the corrupt and effeminating splendour of a decayed empire.

Kemal turned his back on Constantinople; the Ghazi resolved to sire his capital on the dry and rocky but virgin ground of Anatolia. Anatolia had been the cradle of the Turks; there, they had not been rich, but strong. Black bread and a hard couch had been the Ataturk's life, and that of his men, when Constantinople and Smyrna were lost to the invader and the Turkish race, back to the wall, was defending its last ramparts. Black bread was Turkey's strength, the enervating luxury of Constantinople her weakness.

This is what Kemal must have felt when he ordered the new Ankara to be born. Like Peter of Russia he wanted his new capital to outshine the old, to stand for the spirit of modern progress, and to become his country's "window on the world."

The location was anything but favourable to the new enterprise. An ancient Seldjuk citadel, crumbling into dust after centuries of oblivion; a few miserable huts nestling under its shadow—such was Angora. The relentless blaze of the sun scorched the treeless plateau in the summer, cold rains and icy winds churned the earth into seas of mud in the winter. It was a far cry from the beautiful shores of the Bosphorus, where the mild and sunny climate of the Mediterranean prevails, to the rigours of Anatolia.

But Kemal spared no pains to build his dream city. Foreign architects for once could let themselves go, unhampered by considerations of economy. Stone by stone the city arose—austere white buildings, squares, boulevards, tree-lined avenues. Not all of it was of equal artistic quality; some of the buildings were in the hyper-modern style of the early twenties that dates more quickly than many other periods; others attempted to combine oriental and western elements; others again testified to their architects' taste for a baroque for which Ankara was not the right place. The same applies to some of the monuments.¹

But these were growing pains. When the city was finished and

¹ See *Turkey at the Crossroads*, by Philip Paneth, London, 1943.

began to house the 120,000 people who gradually came to work and live in the brain of modern Turkey, it was found to be, not only an efficient machine for the administration of the country, but a thing of beauty.

To-day, when the traveller approaches Ankara after a thousand-miles journey through an arid waste, the white of the graceful buildings, the green of the trees and parks confronts him like a mirage. Ankara stands to-day a testimony to the creative genius of man, and in particular to the genius of the one man who conceived and executed the idea. There were many who said that Ankara would not outlive Kemal Atatürk, that after his death Istanbul would again become the capital of Turkey. To-day Kemal is dead, but Ankara endures. It was, not the ephemeral creation of a transient dictator but the living embodiment of the modern Turkey he had created, and is therefore a fitting embodiment of the work begun by Kemal and continued by his friends and followers.

* * *

Again Kemal proceeded step by step. The Sultan was deposed, and therewith the secular power which could not co-exist with an Assembly purporting to represent the sovereign will of the people. But there still remained the spiritual side of the Monarch's power, the Caliphate, with its supposed religious leadership of all the two hundred million Moslems in the world.

Kemal had his well-founded doubts as to the actual power wielded by the Caliph. Not only was his authority by no means universally recognised, but the World War had proved that the Power of the Caliphate had resembled Don Quixote's helmet, in that it looked impressive until put to the test.

But popular sentiment in Turkey was not yet ripe for the abolition of the Caliphate. And here again becomes evident what Kemal's enemies called his duplicity, and his friends, his wisdom. Anti-monarchist, anti-clericalist, a freethinker and perhaps atheist, he had dissembled and pretended an ardent royalism and piety when it suited his ends. On April 21st, 1920, at a date thus when according to his own admission he was already resolved to abolish both the Sultanate and the Caliphate, he had issued the following circular to all Anatolian towns,¹ a document which throws an interesting light on the need for humouring the traditionalist elements of the population, then still the great majority.

In this circular, announcing the inauguration of the Grand National Assembly, Kemal said:—

1. On Friday, April 23rd, after the Friday prayers, the G.N.A. will, with God's help, be opened at Ankara.
2. Since the opening of the G.N.A., charged with the vital task of assuring the independence of our country and liberating the seat of the Caliphate and the Sultanate, will take place on a Friday, the sacred nature of the occasion will be stressed by prayers said in the Mosque at which all Deputies will be present and where the Koran will bathe the Faithful in its

¹ Reproduced in *Le Kemalisme*, by Tekin Alp, Paris, 1937.

light. Afterwards, a procession carrying sacred relics will take place, special prayers will be recited, and a ritual sacrifice of sheep made. . . .

3. To stress the sacred character of the day, a complete reading of the Koran will be begun in all provincial towns immediately, terminating before the Assembly building after Friday's prayers.
4. In all parts of our holy, mutilated, Fatherland, special prayers will henceforth be said in the mosques whenever the name of His Imperial Majesty, our Sultan and Caliph, is mentioned, praying that soon His Exalted Person, his Imperial States and all His humble subjects may regain their liberty and happiness. Special sermons will be delivered stressing the sacred character of our national effort to free the seat of the Sultanate and Caliphate. . . . Then prayers will be said for the delivery, well-being and independence of our Caliph and Sultan, our Faith, our Empire, our Fatherland and our Nation. . . .
5.
6. We implore God to grant us perfect success.

On behalf of the Representative Committee
(signed) *Mustapha Kemal*.

Step by step . . . To retain the Caliphate for another short period was without risk and might, indeed, facilitate Kemal's work in gaining the support of the clergy and the Old Turkish elements who still saw in Kemal the enemy of Enver, and therefore of the Young Turks. Consequently Abdul Medjid was clothed with the empty dignity of Caliph; not that of Caliph of all Islam, but that of "Caliph of Turkey," a meaningless title.

Abdul Medjid was a cultured and amiable gentleman whose learning and simple dignity made him many friends. Yet despite his meticulous observance of Kemal's orders even his limited influence seemed to Kemal incompatible with the secular and totalitarian conception which formed his vision of the New Turkey.

Kemal could have become Sultan and Caliph on the tremendous wave of popularity whose crest he was riding; but his disgust for a theocratic system to which he ascribed much of Turkey's decadence was such that the conception of Cäsaro-Papism never entered his mind. And although Abdul Medjid fulfilled his office with a maximum of tact, the Caliphate, too, was abolished (March 3rd, 1924). Turkey was a secular State.

The complete absence of external repercussions justified Kemal's conviction. In India, the Aga Khan had already during the war been played up as the spiritual head of India's Moslems; the Sultan of Morocco had refused to recognise Abdul Medjid; the Moslems of Albania seceded; many Arabs followed Hadj Amin el Hussein, the murderer and criminal whom Britain had unwittingly appointed Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and who was later to turn against those who had elevated his non-entity to undeserved eminence. Egypt, proud of its famous Islamic Academy,

had never welcomed the Turkish Pontificate. In short, Kemal's act in abolishing the Caliphate was the least revolutionary of all his innovations; it confirmed what he had been the first to realise, namely, that Islam was no longer a political force. Nationalism had taken its place, and the much-vaunted unity of the Islamic world was proved an outmoded illusion.

* * *

If the abolition of the Caliphate had no repercussions in Kemal's foreign policy, it had yet fateful results at home. Some of his most trusted and faithful followers, shocked by this assault on the Faith, opposed Kemal. Among them were Kiazim Kara Bekir, the Conqueror of Armenia, Ali Fuad Pasha, Colonel Arif, Kemal's closest personal friend, and numbers of Deputies, Governors, and prominent people in many walks of life. A rising of the Kurds who proclaimed the Sultanate of Prince Selim, Abdul Hamid's son, gave the pretext for bloody proscriptions which demanded many victims among people whose only crime had been parliamentary opposition against the radical ideas of Kemal and the even more radical notions of some of his followers.

Izmet Pasha was made Prime Minister. He introduced so-called Courts of Independence, courts-martial which stamped out what opposition remained. An Italian author* asserts that these courts executed many thousands, but most sources agree that their presence alone sufficed to deter destructive activities. We must not forget that the country had been more than once on the verge of civil war, and Anatolian politics have always necessitated insistence on drastic methods. Political assassination was, as we have seen, a long tradition in Turkish politics. Kemal, sometimes moody and despondent, sometimes exploding in bursts of vigorous action, lived in the presidential residence of Tchankaya, a modest villa, which was guarded by a bodyguard of Lazz warriors—wild tribesmen and brigands. Their leader, Osman Agha, terrorised Ankara and one day assassinated the Deputy Ali Shukri who had made an opposition speech. In this striking parallel to the Mateotti affair, which about the same time marked Mussolini's first infamy, Kemal behaved with creditable energy. Osman Agha was shot, and the Lazz bodyguard disbanded. Since that time the Ghazi had no need of a bodyguard; he mixed freely with his people from whose love and affection no storm troopers or armoured cars were needed to protect him.

CHAPTER V.

HOUR OF TRIUMPH

NO LONGER NOW NEED KEMAL GUARD THE SECRET of his intentions in his breast. An epoch is closed with the abolition of the Caliphate; it is his great task to shape the future. It is a gigantic task, for it means creating out of the ruins of the past a new type of State, and a new type of Turk.

* Antonio Aniante, *Mustapha Kemal*, 1934—an unreliable work full of vicious anti-British bias.

Taking stock in 1924 and 1925, when his régime was finally established, Kemal found that he had achieved what few men attain in their lives: he had realised his own conception of his future. For forty years fate had forced him to be a soldier; and of necessity he had sought and found "the bubble reputation in the cannon's mouth." Yet his real ambition had been to be a statesman—an ambition frustrated for years through the little tricks of little men, through Enver's jealousy, the Sultan's obtuseness.

Now he had reached the dizzy pinnacle of power and fame. A lesser man might well have given in to the temptation of fresh military ventures and adventures. He could have extended the frontiers of Turkey with more than a fair chance of success, and could have avenged the defeats and humiliations of the past hundred years. This is what other dictators did; that Kemal refrained from a course of action which must have appeared plausible to more than one of his collaborators speaks for the real greatness of his soul and for the purity of the patriotism that was his motive force.

For this was the force that animated this lean, fair-haired man with the piercing grey eyes and the imperious nose. This force alone enabled the outlaw, the "mad brigand" as the papers of Europe and Constantinople called him, to inspire his tired and wavering troops, to demand and endure hardships and dangers—and to keep his head in the hour of success.

Kemal cannot be measured by the standards of our bourgeois age, with its canons of rectitude and morality. His private life cannot be made to fit children's history books, and no amount of propaganda and glorification can make the national hero the usual paragon of domestic virtue.

Yet he was a *virtuoso* in the sense given to the word by the Italian Renaissance. He was the last of the great Condottieri, a leader of men who swept through Asia, akin to the Mongol storm that had shaken the world a thousand years before him. He might have become a force of destruction: cruelty and the lust for power were not alien to his soul. But he possessed the rarest of all qualities: the self-imposed discipline of an iron will able to turn a destructive into a creative force. He became a builder where he might have remained a destroyer; he started out as a conspirator and revolutionary but lived to be a statesman, one of the greatest in a generation not devoid of great men.

* * *

Among Kemal's subsequent reforms one provided for the giving of surnames to all Turks, who had hitherto used the patronymic system. Kemal's new name was conferred on him by a grateful nation. The Romans had named the saviour of their State *pater patriæ*, father of the country; the Turkish people gave Kemal the name "Atatürk"—Father of the Turks. *Ghazi* (=hero, liberator) had been the cry of the people as the victorious general rode into Smyrna; Atatürk became his proud title as he faced the tasks of peace.

* * *

We have noted the manner in which Kemal normalised Turkey's

relations with her neighbours and the great powers. He now proceeded to internal reforms which were in a literal sense to change the face of the country.

These measures needed the support of a political instrument suitable for maintaining a régime whose reforms were bound to antagonise the widest circles. Atatürk created this instrument in the National Party of the People. It was to be the only party in the State; and consequently its programme was identical with the official policy of the State, and its Constitution with that of Turkey. This system is full of interest, though Turkish propagandists and foreign authors go too far when they claim that "Kemalism" constitutes a philosophical system *sui generis* and represents the true essence of Democracy.¹ Government by a single party is not democracy in the accepted sense. But the system presents a number of features that distinguish it from the ordinary run of contemporary dictatorships, and the very fact that it has successfully survived its founder is proof that it harbours the germs of an evolution which may one day lead to the establishment of full democracy. At present (1943) the single-party system is still in force; on the other hand, there is a noticeable freedom of the Press, at least as far as its attitude towards the various belligerents is concerned.

The new Turkish Constitution was evolved in stages at the four-yearly meetings of the People's Party in 1927, 1931 and 1935. A key phrase enounced by the Atatürk at the 1927 Congress defines the Turkish State as "republican, nationalist, populist, étatist, laicist and revolutionary." It is a system not easily subsumed under one of the known forms of government; the best explanation will be found in observation of the reforms effected by Kemal prior to the new Constitution, and in watching the system actually at work.

CHAPTER VI.

THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

"**R**EPUBLICANISM" IS, BY ITSELF, A NEGATIVE DEFINITION. It denotes the absence of a monarch, but tells us nothing about the real nature of the State. For this purpose the additional definitions given for the State of modern Turkey are of the utmost value.

Nationalism is indeed the keynote of Kemal's Turkey. The war had left the country impoverished and exhausted, yet racially homogeneous to a greater extent than any country in the Balkans or the Near East. Turkey can claim to be one of the States least vexed by that eternal element of friction—minorities. One of the *Ghazi's* wisest decisions was the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, and his emphatic repudiation of all claims to territories formerly under Turkish rule. He realised that Turkey, impoverished and ravaged by four years of bitter warfare fought to a great extent on her own soil, would be fully occupied

¹ See *Atatürk et le vrai visage de la Turquie moderne*, by G. Tongas, Paris, 1937; also *Le Kemalisme*, by A. Cohen, with a preface by Edouard Herriot, Paris, 1937.

with the work of reconstruction. More fortunate than Czechoslovakia and Poland, Turkey was not 'blessed' with a German minority within her frontiers. She was therefore spared the discovery that German minorities are eternal troublemakers, spies and Fifth Columnists.

The Turks, as the other Orientals, knew their Germans. They had witnessed the arrogance of their 'allies' during the World War, when monocled Prussians had strutted through the streets of Constantinople acting like conquerors in a subject country. They had also seen the nefarious activities of a small group of German colonists in another Eastern country, Palestine. The German settlers of Saron were spies who, under the cloak of hypocritical piety, incited the Arabs against the British and the Jews, distributed propaganda and arms, and impudently flourished the Swastika in the Land sacred to three great religions.

The Turks realised that 'republican' Germany had by no means relinquished the Kaiser's ambitious plans—plans in which Turkey played the part of a stepping stone to Baghdad and the oil fields coveted by the Reich. Economic and cultural infiltration attempted by Germany in the 'twenties was politely but firmly stopped. When Hitler was put into power by the German people and its real leaders, the Junkers and the Industrialists, he at once made attempts to woo Turkey. Was she not also an authoritarian State?

But the Turks were not to be cajoled. They put a stop to the 'Brown Houses,' the secret conventicles of the 'League for Germanity Abroad,' and the many other devices by which Germany managed to undermine the independence of other Balkan countries.

It was a scarcely-veiled slap in the face when the People's Party declared with frigid politeness that while National Socialism might be the appropriate form of government for Germans, Turkey "was not having any." Relations were correct, as indeed they had to be with one of Turkey's foremost customers and suppliers. But while the Turks in exchange for their 'frozen' balances in Berlin, had to take German industrial products, armaments, aspirins and mouth-organs, they refused to import Nazism. What they really thought of it they demonstrated by granting asylum to a number of German-Jewish refugees. These eminent physicians, professors, architects and others proved a valuable asset to Turkey.

Thus Turkey had no German minority; and other ethnic groups within her borders did not, with rare exceptions, prove troublesome. The exception were the Kurds, a wild tribe who were prone to marauding raids from their mountain fastnesses. There are also some 100,000 Arabs, living in the districts adjacent to Syria and Irak who, as everywhere, form an unreliable element. Not so the Armenians and Greeks (the Greeks of Istanbul were exempted from the exchange of populations), numbering 57,000 and 100,000 respectively, the 100,000 Circassians, and other smaller groups. Turks constitute 96% of the total population—an impressive figure when compared, for instance, with the Polish State of 1939 in which only twenty million out of a total population of thirty-five million were Poles.

This ethnic homogeneity greatly contributes to the essential strength of Turkey. It has permitted them to concentrate on national reconstruction without being distracted by the minority problem which has frustrated similar efforts by many other States.

"The Nation," says the programme of the Republican Party of the People, "is a political unit composed of citizens bound together by the bonds of language, culture and ideals." It follows from this definition—and has been proved in practice—that no discrimination is practiced against any group of citizens on the grounds of race or religion. What is demanded, on the other hand, is the complete cultural and linguistic assimilation of all ethnic groups; no provision is made for any other language than Turkish in public life, though there are still a number of districts in which the mother-tongue of the majority of the population is not Turkish.

Our conception of the People's Party, with its intense nationalism, would, however, be erroneous, were we to believe it a party in the usual meaning of the word, that is, a faction representing special group or class interests. Sprung from the old Anatolian Rights Defence Organisation (*Müdafaayi Hukuk*), it is intended to be a vertical organisation, representing all classes of the Nation.

In other countries, totalitarian parties have used the same slogan, but with less justification. Roughly speaking, the National Socialist Party in Germany represents the interests of Big Business and the Landed Gentry (*Junkers*), in addition to the interests of what would be termed Gangster Bosses elsewhere. The Communist Party in Russia also represents the interests of a single class—nominally those of the Proletariat, but in reality those of the new "aristocracy" formed by intellectuals and bureaucrats. In Italy, Big Business and Landowners supported the Fascist Party.

In Turkey primary conditions were, fortunately, different. We possess a very enlightening speech made by Kemal in 1923 when, after consulting intellectuals all over the country, and summing up the results of his own observations, he embodied his political philosophy in these words:

"Our people has suffered much from its political parties. I must stress that in other countries the political parties are based on economic principles and interests, because there the population is divided into different classes. Against a party which tries to defend the interests of one particular class another party is formed which endeavours to shield the interests of the opposing class. That is quite natural. We know what happened in our country when parties were founded on the assumption that there are separate classes. We, the People's Party, on the other hand, want to stand, not for part but for the whole of the Nation.

"Let us look at our people. You know that our country is essentially agricultural, and therefore the majority of the people consists of peasants. When thinking of a majority of peasants one usually also thinks of great landowners. How many such landowners have we? How large is the extent of their estates? When we look at matters closely we see that in

proportion to the size of our country we have none who might be considered big landowners. Therefore all those who own land need and deserve protection.

"Then there are artisans and small traders operating in small towns. We must, of course, protect this category of citizens now and in the future. Just as there are no great landowners as opposed to the peasants, so there are no big capitalists as opposed to the small traders. How many millionaires are there amongst us? Not one. Therefore we cannot be the enemies of those who have some money. On the contrary, we shall work in order that there shall be millionaires amongst us.

"Then come the workers. To-day the number of our factories and workshops is very limited. There are altogether no more than 20,000 industrial workers, whereas the regeneration of our country necessitates many factories and therefore many industrial workers. We must protect those workers who are in no way different from agricultural labourers.

"Then there are intellectuals and scientists. Could this group of our fellow-citizens form a clique to act against the interests of the people? The duty of these fellow-citizens of ours is to mingle with the masses, to guide them and show them the best way by which to ensure their progress and betterment.

"This is how I look at our country. The interests of the various categories of citizens are perfectly compatible, and they cannot be divided into classes. All our fellow-citizens together form what we call the People.

"The People's Party is therefore going to be a school of civic education for our people."

This has indeed been the function of the People's Party during the twenty years that have elapsed since that significant declaration. There is this important difference from the Marxist conception, aiming at the establishment of a classless society preceded by the dictatorship of one class, the proletariat, that the Turkish nation was indeed, if not entirely devoid of class distinctions, yet sufficiently of the same level to allow Kemal to select a different point of departure.

But if there are no sharply-defined class differences and contrasts, why postulate a one-party system? Kemal gave the answer a year later when he said:

"Those who advance on the clear but long and arduous road of intellectual and social progress will not be able to march completely in step and at the same rate of speed, and therefore there may arise divergent views on method. But we must not deviate. The distance passed so far is not yet sufficiently great to allow of divergence of views. To think of separatist discord before our ideas and principles are sufficiently developed would be vulgar politicising (*politicaillerie vulgaire*). The nation is not yet sufficiently at rest and tranquillity to allow of such discords."

The salient point of this declaration lies in the fact that Kemal himself does not consider his system as fixed and unchangeable "for the next thousand years." This inherent dynamism, the possibility of changes and of further development of the Party's principles characterizes

a system which, although it describes itself as "revolutionary," could claim with better right to be evolutionary.

A perpetual state of revolution is unthinkable; that there are, however, powerful forces of evolution at work within Kemalist Turkey cannot be denied. It was evidenced when a number of years later a second party, under the title "Liberal Party" (*Serbest Firka*) was formed with the concurrence of numbers-of prominent politicians and led by Fethi Bey. As the party line naturally did not allow of any divergency, the leaders of this party claimed that their programme pre-ented a closer approach to the Ataturk's will and real intentions. But Ataturk, who may have permitted the formation of that party so as to discover extent and membership of any potential opposition, clamped down on it when its initial success was less inconsiderable than he had expected. There was, be it said in his honour, no bloodshed or terrorism; the opposition recanted and rejoined the People's Party, in order to propagate their ideas inside it.

If this attempt was unsuccessful while Kemal lived, there is reason to believe that his successors, having inherited a consolidated régime, may be in a position to allow a greater degree of political freedom.

* * *

The Turkish Republic is "étatist." "Authoritarian" would be too severe, "democratic" too mild an interpretation of this term.

All political systems can be graded as between anarchy and the totalitarian State, if we apply their conception of the rights of the individual citizen as the yardstick. There is a variety of concepts between two extreme views: one in which the rights of the individual are of primary importance and may only be rescinded, under a maximum of safeguards, inasmuch as their complete freedom would interfere with the interests of Society; and the other extreme represented by the tyranny of a State which is absolute and does out to its subjects such liberties as are deemed to be compatible with the needs of the State.

On this scale the Kemalist conception may be said to verge towards the latter view, though it should be stated that it stops far short of a theory and practice which has resulted in the all-devouring Moloch represented by the three contemporary dictatorships. The Programme of the People's Party states that it wishes to safeguard "rights of liberty, equality, inviolability and property of the individual and society." But, adds the programme, "these rights are subject to the State's authority"; they must not be in contradiction to the "interests of the public." This is, of course, a truism so elastic that it can cover a multitude of sins or blessings.

M. Necip Ali Kûçûka, a prominent Party member, rather oversimplified the problem when he wrote in *Ulku*, the official Party organ:

"The leaders of the French Revolution, imbued with the philosophical ideas of the XVIIIth century, were guided only by theories on the "Rights of Man." This theory tended to allow the individual unbridled and unlimited freedom (? P.P.). That atmosphere did not permit the establishment of a firm and stable order when the old system had been overthrown by the Revolution; this is what gave birth to dictatorship.

"Our Party, foreseeing the disastrous consequences which might have resulted from the 'Rights of Man' theory, avoided its influence,

"For our Party, the principles of liberty, equality and property are subordinate to the superior interests of society, which determine their limits."

* * *

The "populist" and "secular," or "laïcist," character of the State presents no ideological problems. Titles of nobility as well as most of the disabilities imposed on women have been abolished, so that all citizens can enjoy the same rights and duties. Religion, as the Programme of the People's Party has it, "is a matter of conscience"; *therefore*, it is argued forcibly if not altogether convincingly, religion must be completely separated from "politics, international and State affairs."

To secularise a State the majority of whose citizens were, if not deeply religious, at least used to a way of life in which religious observance played a prominent part, was a difficult task. Kemal considered a theocratic régime as the source of most of the ills that had assailed Turkey. It had perpetuated the virtual slavery of the female sex, it had kept out the technical progress of the West, it had subjected Turkey to a system of law known as *Sheri'a* which was better fitted for the arid minds and deserts of Arabia whence it had sprung, than for a State that wanted to be modern and progressive.

But Kemal had to proceed warily; for he knew that the religious passions of a Moslem population—to which he himself had appealed more than once—were easy to rouse and unpredictable in their intensity. So the changes were gradual.

Abdul Medjid, the ephemeral Caliph, was forced to authorise an important change: Turkish was substituted for Arabic as the language of prayers—a step as revolutionary as the substitution of the vernacular for Latin in the ritual of the Christian Reformation.

The next step was the abolition of the Ministry of the Islamic Cult. This office had been the link between Church and State; its suppression was an act that without attracting undue notice among a population ignorant of constitutional matters, was already decisive. Yet for a number of years Kemal took care not to enounce openly his intention of secularising the State; this, too, was one of the secrets he must keep "locked in his breast." Thus, until 1928 the Constitution continued to proclaim that Islam was the official State religion of Turkey. In one of his speeches, Kemal later admitted that "it would not have been opportune to make this a programmatic issue and thereby enable ignorant reactionaries to poison the whole Nation."

The psychological roots of Kemal's dislike of—we may even say hatred for—the faith of his ancestors and his people are not difficult to trace. In his earliest youth in Salonika he had seen that the schools run by the *hodjas* were conducted by ignorance so as to propagate ignorance, whereas the secular schools of the foreigners were modern and progressive, and even the mission schools were better than traditional Turkish education. In later life he had seen an ignorant and bigoted

clergy consistently on the side of reaction; he had noted the paralysing influence of religious fatalism (*kismet*) on the energies of his people.

It was not that he considered Christianity superior. Its numberless sects had been unable to establish anything resembling unity; and if barely one-third of mankind professed some branch of that creed, the proportion was much smaller still in Asia, cradle, destiny and future of the Turkish race. Out of one thousand million people inhabiting that continent, only 3% professed Christianity, whereas four times as many Asiatics were Moslems.

Yet all religions, Kemal reasoned, were opposed to progress; the dead weight of tradition and prejudice rejected innovation and progress. He was too wise to persecute religion, as other dictators have done, for he realised that persecution is the stimulus that causes religion to thrive and become more potent. What he must do was to attack the evil at its root: he must change the mentality of the people so that they would break with their old ways of life and become receptive to new ideas and that progress in which the Ghazi believed with all the fervour of the eighteenth-century philosophy that he rejected.

CHAPTER VII.

THE VEIL FALLS

THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM WAS "UNIFIED"—WHICH meant the abolition of the religious schools (*medress*) conducted by the clergy. The same fate met the Islamic religious foundations (*vakuf*, pl. *evkaf*), which, incidentally, were almost the only landowners larger scale and whose estates now reverted to the State. And then on Kemal proceeded to an act which raised greater controversy, occasioned more opposition, caused more bloodshed than many another more radical reform: he abolished the *fez*.

All orientals keep their heads covered. To bare your head exposes you to shame—and also to the rays of the sun with which Allah may afflict your reason. The Turk wore the *fez*, that conical headgear without a brim, which permitted the faithful to touch the ground with their foreheads when they said their prayers three times a day.

To dress like the Unbelievers, and particularly to wear a hat, was sacrilege, shunned even by the most enlightened. It happened only once in Constantinople, when a young man, fresh from his European studies, landed in his homeland wearing that detested headgear. He was at once arrested by the police, exposed to public contumely in the Press—and this happened already under the Republic!

And yet, ironically enough, the *fez* was not actually Turkish in origin. It was first worn in Greece, and a Turkish Sultan had to depose a Sheik-ul-Islam who banned it as contrary to religion. But the *fez* had become more genuinely Turkish than any other customs, as foreign importations sometimes do (Tea, not Ale, is now Britain's national

beverage). And one fine day in 1925 the Ataturk decreed that the fez must go. Hats and caps only, with distinct brims, must henceforth be worn.

* * *

Clothes and fashions have often played a great part in political upheavals. The wearing of the Tartan was forbidden for a time after the Jacobite rising in Scotland in 1745; the French revolutionaries adopted the often misunderstood slogan of *sans-culottes* when they opposed the long trousers of the revolution to the knee-breeches that to them denoted a reactionary aristocracy.

The true believers had watched other changes with comparative impassivity. Even the injunction that the Koran must be read in the Mosques in Turkish instead of Arabic had not troubled them so much. But abolishing the fez, they realised, was more than an external change; it was the visible expression of the disestablishment of Islam. Together with the ban on the fez, the wearing of clerical robes had been subjected to very narrow restrictions. Only those who could produce proof of adequate theological studies, be they *imams*, priests or rabbis, could wear clerical vestments. Hitherto it had been comparatively easy for any charlatan who knew some Arabic and could recite a few *suras* of the Koran to set himself up as *hodja* and exploit the credulity of the people.

For long Kemal had insisted on the wearing of European clothes. Not so much because he believed that they possessed any inherent value: he was willing to accept the externals of the West, not to make Turkey an imitation of Europe, but because he believed that the old customs, picturesque as they were, went hand in hand with a reactionary outlook.

So a stroke of the pen abolished the fez; its wearing was proclaimed an act of treason, a demonstration of enmity against the State. Consternation reigned in Turkey. European hats or peaked caps must be worn. But there were not sufficient in all the shops of Turkey to supply the sudden demand. European manufacturers of headgear earned a golden harvest; shiploads of bowler hats, panamas, caps—anything that was available—were rushed to Constantinople. The brothers Borsalino, the famous Italian hat makers, cashed in on a lucky gamble: they had had a ship full of hats lying off the coast, and as soon as the new law was promulgated they were able to rush their cargo through the customs and make a very large profit. Even then the supply did not meet the demand, and for a time Constantinople seemed to live in a perpetual carnival: paper hats—of the kind found in crackers—were worn as well as women's hats.

There was a grim side to the business. Men were hanged "for the wearing o' the red," the forbidden fez. There were riots in the streets; the police beat up the crowds forming around each wearer of the forbidden headgear, and many who fanatically clung to their old tradition found their end on the gallows. In order to avoid international complications Egyptian visitors had to be requested not to wear the fez. Abortive risings occurred, notably in Brussa where the adherents of *antidisestablishmentarianism* (for once the historian may legitimately

employ the longest word in the English language) tried to overthrow the régime—not without support from abroad. They failed, and had to pay the penalty.

* * *

It was to wipe out what is commonly known as the glamour and mystery of the Orient, but what to him stood for reaction and ignorance, that Kemal in one fell swoop abolished, not only the *tarboosh* (fez) worn by the men, but also the *yashmak*, the veil worn by the women of Turkey.

The veiled women of Turkey—what a flood of turgid romanticism, unhealthy mystery and over-heated imagination is evoked by these words. The Oriental code of morals forbade women to show their faces to others than their lords and masters; a woman who bared her face in public thereby demonstrated that she was a prostitute. A remnant of this code is found in St. Paul's injunction, perpetuated by some of our less intelligent magistrates when they wax indignant, should a woman appear in court without a hat.

The opaque veil hid, not only beauty enhanced by mystery, but ignorance, illiteracy and virtual serfdom. A Turkish wife was a rich husband's toy, a poor husband's unpaid beast of burden. Polygamy had already become to all intents and purposes a thing of the past. That institution, the cause of so many lewd jokes, could not withstand the onslaught of economic factors: very few Turks were able to keep more than one wife. It is a debatable question whether polygamy is not more honest and, in some respects, fairer to women than our Western code of behaviour, producing, as it does, both illicit unions and, since there is a surplus of women, large numbers of spinsters who have never been able to live fully and fulfil woman's destiny. Modern Turkish writers—among them the famous sociologist, Zia Gökalp—claim that among the Turks of antiquity woman was not devoid of certain rights. In this Turkish conceptions were different from those of the Arabs. Among the Arabs, as in Japan, the birth of a female child is a calamity, whereas there is extant a special prayer said by Turkish women (*Oğuz Princesses*) asking for female progeny. In ancient Turkish inscriptions King and Queen are mentioned together as co-equals, and laws bearing the King's signature without that of the Queen were deemed invalid. The same writers assert that women and men were employed equally in public service, and seek further confirmation in certain social conditions of the pre-Islamic period of the Turkish people. Thus, the mother shared the parental power with the father; the widow remained the sole guardian of her children and administratrix of her estate; women took part in public business with their faces uncovered.

Asia Minor was, of course, the seat of matriarchal systems and the veneration of female deities from earliest antiquity: the cults of Kybele, Astaroth, the great Diana of the Ephesians. In how far these influences have touched the Turks when they entered Anatolia many hundreds of years later is difficult to establish, and it is possible that in some modern Turkish authors patriotic zeal outruns objectivity.

Some confirmation of their contentions may be found in the writings

of the Arab traveller, Ibn Batuta, who journeyed through Anatolia in the XVIth century, two or three generations after the capture of Constantinople. Describing the Turkish town of Kapçak, Ibn Batuta says:

"I was surprised at the respect shown to women, who are considered almost superior to the men. . . . Women traders are also respected. I saw such a one, riding in a horse-drawn carriage attended by three or four servants. She wore a bonnet decorated with jewels and peacock's feathers. The windows of the carriage were open and the woman's face was clearly visible. Another woman, also escorted by servants, was trading sheep and milk for perfumes. The husbands who accompanied their wives looked rather like their servants; the husband wore a sheepskin coat and a bonnet similar to the woman's. . . ."

Another Oriental traveller, Grenar, describing life in Eastern Turkestan, expresses his surprise at the standing of the women in the following words:

"Contrary to the convention prevailing in other parts of Asia engaged couples see each other before marriage, and are usually from the same village."

This may sound peculiar to Western ears, but it was, and is, a common Oriental usage—or rather abuse—to arrange marriages without the young couple meeting, and often at the tenderest age.

The inferiority of the women does not date from the introduction of Islam; it was a heritage from Byzantium and Persia. *Zerdyst*, the national creed of Persia, saw in woman the embodiment of a lower, and evil, spirit—just as Christianity sees in Eve the instigatrix of original sin. Islam at first even made an attempt at ameliorating woman's position: it limited the formerly arbitrary number of wives a man could have to four, and Mahomet said that woman was no less than man: "a decent Moslem respects the rights of his wife."

But it was not so much Islam that influenced the Arabs as the Arab who altered and debased the essence of Islam; and when the Turks, in the tenth century, adopted Islam they took over with it the worst Arab abuses. Woman, particularly in the towns (in the villages she was somewhat less strictly treated), became a prisoner. Her participation in public life would have been considered sinful. Her education was therefore limited to a minimum; while most girls grew up completely illiterate those of the upper classes might read some innocuous moral treatises, but pursue no other studies. The Harem entombed these women whose life consisted of boredom and obesity.

Yet like so many customs that we consider typically Turkish, the Harem, too, was not of Turkish origin. When the Turks conquered Byzantium they found masses of veiled female slaves and concubines in the so-called *gynaikeia*, the cloistered apartments set aside for women in the houses of the middle and upper classes.

During the ensuing centuries, the heroic epoch of Turkey, the Harem played a not inconsiderable part in protecting Turkish racial strength. Racial strength, be it noted, is not identical with racial "purity": on the contrary: from their campaigns of conquest in Europe, Asia and North

Africa, the Turks carried off to their harems the most beautiful girls, often of the best and soundest stock, and thus prevented inbreeding. Even in the Sultan's harem legitimacy of offspring did not depend on the mother's racial origin. Many of Turkey's best men—sultans, viziers, generals—sprang from non-Turkish stock.

But woman had to pay for the economic security of the harem with the complete loss of her freedom and her elementary human rights. The husband could divorce his wife by a simple unilateral declaration, without the intervention of a court, and so the woman had to study her lord's slightest whim, suffer patiently his moods and exactions, and bear her fate with resignation untinged by any gleam of hope.

From her thirteenth year a girl must veil her face. A wife could not show herself in public even with her husband, nor show her face even to the physician. Special squares, inaccessible to men, were reserved for women bold enough to leave their houses to take the air. And the men seemed to have no greater worry than think up ever new restrictions designed to ensure the subjugation of the women. In earlier times special laws determined the colour and length of women's clothes, their cut and shape; others banned women from the streets on public holidays. Under Suleiman III special officials were appointed to supervise the application of these laws; sempstresses found making clothes of forbidden designs were hanged outside their shops. (If our bespoke tailors, smarting under "utility" regulations and the ban on turn-ups knew of this they would probably appreciate the greater leniency of our Government.)

In 1810 Sultan Mehmed II issued an edict which underlines the miserable position of Turkish women. It said: "Those caught throwing refuse into the streets shall be punished with the same penalties as women found in public."

The Young Turkish revolution of 1909 brought no immediate improvement, but conduced to it. Schools for boys and for girls were established, and of necessity many women became teachers. The most daring of them went abroad to study on Western universities, and although on their return they still had to conform to prejudice, Turkish women in the towns very slowly gained a somewhat better position.

In the villages, restrictions had been less severe all along. The peasant women, working side by side with their men, discarded the veil and moved about freely; they stood by their sides in the Anatolian war of independence, carrying ammunition and food up to the front line and even taking part in actual combat. A monument in Ankara to-day commemorates the heroism of these peasant women.

In restoring equality to Turkish women Atatürk was conscious of doing an act of elementary social justice. On one of his journeys through Anatolia in 1923 he said:

"If a society consisting of men and women is content to apply progress and education to only one half of itself, such society is weakened by half. A nation aiming at progress and civilisation must not overlook this."

He went on to say:

"Motherhood being woman's first social duty, a higher level of civilization can only be attained through educating the mothers of the future. Our nation is determined to be strong; it must therefore look after the higher education of our women."

And a year later Ataturk stressed the same thing, saying:

"Our mothers did their best to give us an education; but we need men of different mentality and upbringing, and this can only be provided by the mothers of the future generations. They will form the foundations for the maintenance and enhancement of the honour and independence of the Turkish nation."

This modest acknowledgment of the limitations of his generation, from which the Ataturk does not exempt himself, is a pleasant trait in a character not devoid of harshness and arrogance; it is in his work and in some of his speeches that we see another side of his nature. This love of his country and his people, this admission of limitations contrasts agreeably with the overbearing self-sufficiency of other dictators.

On August, 1924, the first anniversary of the victory of Sakaria, Kemal spoke these words:

"Speaking of civilization let me stress one point—that the basis of progress and strength is family life. Worries in the life of the family are bound to cause calamities in the economic and political life of the country. It is necessary that Man and Woman who form the family, enjoy the same natural rights and fulfil the same obligations."

Sixteen days after this speech a commission of jurists met and started work on the new civil code which was to replace the outmoded Islamic *sheri'a*; a year later, Kemal proclaimed at Inerbolu that the emancipation of women would form one of the basic principles of the Republic, and in 1926 the Civil Code (based on the Swiss) became law.

Polygamy was abolished, and the equality of women established under civil law. The marriage ceremony was henceforth a civil function at which both parties must be present and give their consent. Divorce was made less easy for the men, while the women, too, could now demand it. Women inherited equally with men, and all branches of commerce and instruction were opened to them.

Their political rights were not at first equal to the (rather limited) rights enjoyed by men, for the vote was still denied them. But the vote is not of great importance under the one-party system. It may be for this reason that the women of Turkey were first given the right to vote for the People's Party at municipal elections (1930) and finally parliamentary suffrage, active and passive (1935). As a result twenty women deputies entered the Assembly at Ankara.

Women were also made subject to conscription, and to-day there is no branch of activity in which women are not represented. Kemal's adopted daughter, Mlle. Sahiba Geuktchen, became a well-known pilot, and other women fliers followed her example.

There are hundreds of women doctors and lawyers, and even some women judges. Madame Affet was a Vice-President of the Historical Academy; Mlle. Beyhan, Chairman of a Parliamentary Commission, etc.

Girl students throng the universities where they study, not only the liberal professions and science but also sociology and hygiene, fields in which women can play a special part. All young girls, from twelve years onward, are instructed in hygiene and infant welfare, and permission to marry is dependent on proficiency in these subjects. There is no doubt that it is owing to these efforts that the birthrate in numerous towns has risen by 30% as compared with 1914.

In industry, too, women are shouldering their part of the burden. In 1915, there were altogether 1806 female workers, mostly in the factories of the Tobacco Monopoly in Istanbul and Izmir (Smyrna). In 1933 the number of female workers and employees had risen to 14,000, and is to-day a multiple of this figure.

In commerce, industry, the professions as well as in art, the women of Turkey are active and proficient, and the observer is impressed by their sturdy health and good looks. Things undreamt of a generation ago have become commonplace sights. Girls and women practise sports and games, play and work, study and toil, side by side with their men. Relations between the sexes have been put on a normal basis. No longer are marriages—often between children—arranged by the parents without the girl's knowledge or consent; no longer does the mystery and restraint surrounding decent girls force the young men into a life of debauchery and vice. A healthier attitude now prevails in matters of sex. In countries where woman is elevated on a pedestal and kept in seclusion she has to pay the price in ignorance, lack of education and civic rights. Kemal realised this and put an end to one of the romantic but unhealthy features of old Turkey.

Surprisingly, this reform of his was to encounter less resistance than many others—or perhaps not surprisingly, because the women themselves were eager to become emancipated. Emancipation of Turkish womanhood had been one of the programmatic demands voiced by the Young Turks for a generation, and Turkish women had come back from abroad where they had absorbed the knowledge denied them at home, and had spread the new spirit among their less advanced sisters.

Old customs die hard, of course. But Kemal always had a flair for a popular gesture. All Turkey chuckled when it heard the story of how the Ghazi on a tour of inspection in Anatolia had seen a pretty girl among the crowd covering her face with a handkerchief. Kemal walked up to the blushing girl, removed the handkerchief with gentle force, kissed her soundly and said:

“Why cover such a pretty face, my dear? We have no reason to hide the fact that our Turkish women are at least as beautiful as any in the world.”

CHAPTER VIII.

THE WRITING ON THE WALL

THERE WAS ANOTHER IMPEDIMENT TO TURKEY'S progress, especially as regards contact with the writings of the West and the production of an autochthonous Turkish literature: the Turkish script.

It was beautiful, intricate, and highly impracticable. While it gave rise to an art undeservedly fallen into desuetude in our age of the type-writer—calligraphy—Turkish script was not a means of communication with the rest of the world, but an element of isolation. It was a script completely alien to the genius of the Turkish language. One of Turkey's leading authors, M. I.-M. Devrin,¹ remarks:

"For many centuries the Turks used the Arabic alphabet, which consisted of thirty-four letters and, like Hebrew, is written from right to left. Since Turkish contains many Arabic and Persian words and since our literature was based on these two languages, the alphabet has to be capable of rendering all the shades of pronunciation of the foreign words. These shades were especially refined in the reading of the Koran. There were, for example, three kinds of "s" and four of "z." But in the current speech of Turkey these triplicated and quadruplicated letters ended by having the same sound and only served to complicate the spelling. Further, as the original form of the words borrowed from Arabic and Persian had been carefully preserved and as the spelling of these two languages has hardly any vowels, the pronunciation of each word has to be specially learned, so that those capable of reading the learned texts without mistakes of pronunciation were very rare."

Arabic writing, despite its manifold variations in the writing of one and the same sound, is incapable of reproducing all vowel values—for instance the same sign has to serve for "u" and "o." It therefore makes difficult the reproduction of foreign names—a difficulty greatly felt by the Turkish General Staff in the last war. The user of Turkish maps could never be certain of the names of foreign places; foreign technical terms could not be reproduced correctly.

Speaking "good" Turkish needed an intimate knowledge of Arabic and Persian, the flowery terms of which had overgrown the original Turkish language just as their script had encroached on it. As a consequence very few people could afford to give their children an education in which a boy needed at least five years before he had mastered the art of reading and writing Arabic. No intellectual intercourse with the rest of the world, no national literature could develop in a country where only 10% of the population could read or write, and even then in a language and in characters too recondite for the rest of the world. Consequently French had become the *lingua franca* of Turkey's intellectual and commercial life (in the latter field sharing honours with Greek). Many of the younger Turkish authors wrote in French; and what they wrote was usually a second-hand edition of currents and tendencies abroad.

Kemal decided that the Turkish alphabet must be reformed and

¹ *La Turquie Nouvelle*, Ankara, 1943.

Latin script introduced. He entrusted this task to a commission of professors and savants.

Many months passed, and Kemal waxed impatient. He kept pressing the commission, and finally the learned men presented the result of their researches. Their proposals were scientifically correct, but their system had one drawback: it needed more than fifty letters in lieu of the twenty-six of the Latin alphabet, and was so complicated that it would have taken longer to learn than Arabic.

Kemal dismissed the commission with a short address singularly devoid of cordiality, tore up their report and threw it out of the window. Then he sat down and passed a whole night, fortified by gallons of *raki* and innumerable cigarettes, working out a system that was at once practicable and sound. When the morning came it was ready; Kemal had done in twelve hours what had taken the professors many months. Based on the material available to the European printer—with slight modifications—Turkish now had a phonetic, simple alphabet.

The new alphabet, with its Roman characters, consists of twenty-seven letters and is essentially phonetic. It has no “q” and no “x,” but contains a “j” which is the Latin “c,” a “ch” which is written “ç,” a “sh” written “s,” and a “gh” which is simply a “g.” Besides facilitating the teaching of Turkish, the reform has done away with a kind of Chinese Wall which separated the Turkish mode of writing from that of most civilized nations.

The general now turned schoolmaster. He taught the new alphabet wherever he went, often taking up a piece of chalk and writing it out on the blackboard of some village school. Greybeards and children sat side by side, learning their own language once more. To-day the study of Turkish has become much easier for both Turks and foreigners. Kemal's system stood the acid test of all theories: it worked.

* * *

The introduction of the Latin alphabet and figures was but the corollary of an even more radical reform of the language itself, a reform which presents one of the most remarkable aspects of extreme nationalism.

Imagine that one day a law, accompanied by heavy penalties, forbade the use of all foreign words which have grown into the English language since the Norman conquest. All French roots must be extirpated, for they are an alien encroachment; only the pure Saxon of the “Beowulf” must be used.

The papers appear one morning, printed in runes, or in a language completely unintelligible to the man of the street. Professors of Germanic Languages, particularly of early Anglo-Saxon, are in great demand: they are given the task of discovering in a rude and undeveloped language the roots and forms suitable for modern needs. In the *thing* (formerly the House of Commons) Anglo-Saxon is *de rigueur* and consequently there is almost complete silence—except for the few University dons who understand the strange new speech. Public announcements and the newspapers must have an English commentary and translation in every other column . . .

It may sound fanciful, but this is almost precisely what happened in Turkey. Arabic and Persian words had flooded the language and indeed almost superseded it as a means of literary expression. Unadulterated Turkish was spoken only by the rude peasants of remote villages, while the papers, official proclamations, the whole of literature, were couched in elegant and flowery Turco-Arabic.

This was incompatible with national pride—decreed Atatürk. So musty old manuscripts were searched for archaic Turkish words that had fallen into obsolescence; the tongue of Turkish tribes who had not undergone Arab influence, such as the Tartars and the natives of Turkestan, was diligently explored for suitable material. All foreign words—including many French terms—were replaced by venerable antiquities which nobody understood. The papers, printed in the new vernacular, had to carry glossaries and footnotes “translating” their strange language. It was a sublime, if slightly ludicrous, gesture, endeavouring to wipe out the results of a thousand years’ history. Not only were foreign words replaced by the home-grown product, but innovations were also introduced into the grammar of the Turkish language, so that a whole people had to learn its own language all over again.

All this went hand in hand with a revival of folkloristic and archaeological interest and research. The old Hittites¹ were unearthed and discovered to have been the forefathers of the Turkish race, as well as the Sumerians, Scythians, Huns, Avars. A modern writer on Turkey² states that it was only under Kemal that the Turks began to delve into their racial past, and adds, rather naïvely, that “only then did it come to light, to everyone’s astonishment, that the best part of the cultural achievements of mankind had its origin in the spirit of the Turkish peoples.” This is the kind of claim made by resurgent nationalism everywhere and depends, of course, on the interpretation of the term “Turkish.” To accept such extravagant statements with a certain amount of reserve implies no lack of admiration for the achievements of modern Turkey, nor for the healthy pride in its past which a virile nation is justified in feeling.

Another innovation was the introduction of the metric system. Hand in hand with these seemingly external changes went a thorough reform of the legal system. Law and justice in old Turkey had been a cesspool of corruption and bribery; it had also been without system. A tangle of antiquated laws and customs, the whole was based on the Koran—or rather on the interpretation given to it by many schools of thought, often sharply contradicting each other.

Kemal introduced, in addition to the civil code based on the Swiss, commercial and penal codes modelled on the German and Italian systems. The prison system—both lax and inhuman under the old régime—was also reformed in the light of modern principles.

¹ Their name survives in Hatay, the Turkish name for the much-contested Sandjak of Alexandrette which was finally returned to Turkey by the French, following considerable agitation and tension.

² Stephen Ronart, *Turkey To-Day*, London, 1938.

CHAPTER IX.

DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESS?

ALL THESE REFORMS DID NOT, AS HAS BEEN SAID, aim at making Turkey a European State—or rather a Levantine copy of one. Kemal's intention, as far as we can discern, was to create a new type of Asiatic State, combining the technical achievements of the West with reliance on the national characteristics of the Turkish race. To understand the full import of Kemal's plans and dreams—and he was the kind of man whose dreams often came true—the man's complex and deeply interesting personality must furnish the clue.

Kemal's forceful personality also dominated the political system of the new Turkey. A system which recognises only one party, which has a Parliament but no legal opposition, is not a democracy in the accepted sense. So much is admitted.

Yet without going into constitutional niceties it will be agreed that real democracy is something that must grow. It must evolve by the same natural process as established parliamentary democracy in England after periods of feudalism and absolutism. One of the greatest dangers, one of the gravest disservices to democracy is imposing it from outside on a people not yet ripe for it. So much was proved by the example of Germany. Used to centuries of despotism and militarism, the Germans in 1919 found themselves suddenly the citizens of an extremely "democratic" state. The constitution of the Weimar Republic, drafted by Hugo Preuss, a Jewish professor of International Law, was, and still is a masterpiece. It represents something very close to the ideal constitution of a truly democratic state.

But unfortunately an enlightened and liberal constitution presupposes a nation ripe for it—a people of political adults. The Germans, however, were still politically immature. Their progressive constitution fared no better than a piece of beautiful precision machinery in the hands of savages. Democracy sat on their limbs like a Saville Row tailcoat on an African witch-doctor.

The German looked at his constitution like a criminal at the law: searching for loopholes. Consequently Germany experienced the abuses, instead of the blessings, of parliamentary democracy. Over thirty parties competed at the elections—many of them led by and consisting of demagogues and cranks. And, as we all learned to our cost, the most vicious of cranks came to power. He came to power *legally*—that is the salient fact. Hitler was *voted* into power by a nation not ripe for unlimited democracy; nothing could have shown a clearer reduction to absurdity of the good intentions of Germany's democrats.

In view of this crushing example the democratic onlooker may be permitted to indulge in a moment's speculation, asking himself what might have happened if the Turkey of 1924 had adopted a constitution similar to that of the Germany of 1920.

Is it unlikely that among an illiterate population some demagogue

might have arisen who could have nourished a spirit of hate and *revanche*? Turkey had lost the war—or had she lost it? Had she not been “stabbed in the back” by the Greeks, the Jews, the Armenians? And our imaginary dictator would have got votes, he would have got the support of fascist dictators abroad and the powerful aid of clerical reaction and injured national pride at home.

Soon our dictator would “legally” have a majority. He would stage pogroms and massacres—atrocities that would be pooh-poohed by foreign investors whose concentration on dividends blinded them to the existence of concentration camps. European chancelleries would refuse to interfere in “domestic concerns”; they would be content to tighten their frontier control and bar their doors against refugees from Turkey. . . .

Then our dictator would proclaim his final territorial demands. He would occupy Rhodes, or Cyprus, or Syria—and Europe would not go to war over “far-away countries of which we know little.” Every concession would whet his appetite. And finally he would proclaim his real aim: to re-establish the Turkish Empire of 1520—the whole of the Balkans, all Greece, Egypt and North Africa . . . and the world would have the choice it had in 1939.

Does it sound fanciful? It has happened; and it is conceivable that it might have happened even in Turkey, had she been given unlimited democracy before the people were ready for it, and had her leaders shown less good sense. The Turks have been the “good Europeans” of the period between the wars.

Turkey’s present constitution cannot be subsumed under one of our usual systems of government. The nearest approach to an explanation will be found in contemplation of the system actually at work. It shows features of socialism—banks and railways as well as other public utilities are State-owned—but it retains private enterprise and the peasant’s ownership of his land. It has abolished the titles of nobility, *pasha* and *bey*, and given an equal chance to men and women of all classes; yet the common man has no say in political matters. The church is disestablished, yet both Moslems and non-Moslems are free to worship according to their rites. Nationalist feeling is intense, yet racial origin is no obstacle to full citizenship provided the citizen identifies himself fully with Turkish language and culture. The same nationalist feeling does not extend to territorial claims; similarly there is a strong, well-drilled and well-equipped army whose rôle has never been envisaged as other than defensive.

In a word, the programme of Turkey is a combination of nationalism and modernism—a unique combination, seeing that usually intense nationalism tends to be retrograde and reactionary. It is not Democracy—not yet; but it seems to be about the best method yet devised to make a nation politically conscious and ready for political maturity. Education for literacy, citizenship, and the eventual attainment of full democracy—this is the keynote of modern Turkey.

* * *

This is the story of Turkey's progress. And recording it, the observer wishes he could be as certain of his scale of values, as assured of the certainty that "progress" marches in an upward direction as were our Victorian forbears.

He is in a dilemma when asked to judge whether a complete reversal of a people's way of living, working and thinking is good and desirable, or whether it might not be the mere imitation of an industrial civilisation two generations out of date. The observer remembers the charm of an easy-going life that created things of beauty; he remembers the graceful minarets, white and shimmering; the simple and dignified houses, soaked full of light, encumbered only with the barest minimum of furniture far removed from the clutter of bric-à-brac that constitutes our idea of "Oriental" interior decoration; the impassive, contemplative repose that we call laziness but which arises from another conception of life—perhaps more dignified than ours.

And the onlooker shudders at the thought that soulless mechanical perfection is to turn the whole world, "from Edinburgh to Chungking," into one and the same combination of factories and suburbs, a sort of Manchester-cum-Golders Green, with men and women working at the same robot belts in the same factories, and afterwards enjoying the same synthetic emotions of the Hollywood celluloid.

But then the beholder pulls himself up. Is he not the incurable romantic who sees the world with the eyes of a tourist? The "old-world" cottage of the agricultural labourer as it used to be: behind a charming exterior a cramped darkness, a lack of the most primitive sanitation that bred disease and stunted physical and mental growth. Thus, did not the Oriental "cachet" hide squalor and ignorance, fanaticism and bigotry, suffering and oppression. Should man remain content with poverty and inefficiency?

Once more the observer recognises another of our modern fetishes—Efficiency. The straight road, the "autobahn" accommodating six lanes of rushing evil-smelling internal-combustion vehicles; the trains running to time with the inexorability of fate—why do we venerate these signs of "order" and were prepared to forgive much to fascist dictators because they achieved this? Is it the destiny of Turkey to replace the slow, beautiful handicrafts of her women with efficient, machine-made, hideous fashions of the West; her houses, congenial to her landscape, with the cubist atrocities of the German *Bauhaus*, unrelated to any scenery but that of the moon and described as dwelling-machines?

Turkish women are "emancipated." They now share with their Western sisters the privilege of working in offices and factories; they are freed from the slavery of the harem—possibly this means the "freedom" of evolving a class of soufed, frustrated virgins whose malignant spinsterhood makes them a burden to themselves and others because they have never known woman's supreme fulfilment.

We apply our scale of values—the values of a civilisation that has failed so signally, that has produced so little besides sweat and blood

and tears, that we should be more modest in rejecting and classifying as "uncivilised" ways of life that differ from ours. . . .

Turkey has created a strong and virile new nationalism: so much is true. Whether the addition of another nationalism to the sum of existing national prides, jealousies and conflicts will conduce to what should be the goal of true progress remains to be seen. This goal, it appears to us, is the greatest good, for the bodies and souls, of the greatest numbers, with the minimum of State interference in matters of organisation, and none whatsoever in matters of conscience and the exercise of the rational mind.

If we admit of the existence of progress, humanity has striven towards this goal. It has never completely reached it; for the delicate balance of compulsion and liberty, order and anarchy, content and discontent which that programme implies has been achieved for fleeting instants only during the brief history of mankind.

In the preceding pages the observer has striven to record historical facts. He does not claim to have been completely "objective"; for the very fact that the history of a people attracts him sufficiently to devote time and energy to writing about it testifies to the presence of some bias in their favour. But he has endeavoured to balance predilection by the admission of evidence coming from others, and he has tried to avoid propaganda of the pejorative character which this word has acquired nowadays.

Modern Turkey by putting her own house in order has achieved much—so much is admitted without doubt. If she puts her energies into the even greater task of helping to turn the bomb-scarred ruin of a slum that was Europe into a habitation fit for Moslem and Christian, Turk and Jew and Infidel, to live in side by side in peace and amity, then the rebirth of Turkey will have been a blessing for Humanity.

CHAPTER X.

TOTAL EDUCATION

RE-SHAPING A COUNTRY OF SEVENTEEN MILLION souls presented a problem of immense difficulty. Force cannot solve such a problem with any degree of permanence; Atatürk rightly recognised that education on the largest scale was needed.

This question was therefore tackled with all the élan of a campaign, and characteristically enough numbers of propaganda writers use military similes when describing it. Tekin Alp¹ relates how "a new general mobilisation was ordered. . . . The victor of Sakaria is now commander-in-chief of archæological and historical research." With a tiresome wealth of simile Tekin Alp goes on to describe how shock troops of professors and research workers descend on libraries, etc. The first and subsequent objectives in this campaign were duly occupied; they consisted in "proof" that the Ionian, Mediterranean and, in general, European

¹ *Le Kèmalisme*, p. 115 et seq.

civilization is of Turkish origin. Mlle. Affet proves that the Turks are "Aryans"; a French ethnologist is found who asserts that "the Turks are among the most beautiful specimens of mankind"—in short, during the revolutionary period which ended with Ataturk's death, the Universities of Istanbul and Ankara worked on the dangerous principle of endeavouring to provide with scientific foundations what the unerring instinct of the leader is convinced is right. Tekin Alp, with engaging candour, puts it into these naïve words:

"After a period of preparation during which the spirits are well impregnated with the aims and objectives of Kemal Ataturk, an Institute for Historical Research is founded."

But this patriotic exuberance—a period during which professors would refer to Ataturk as "our immortal Saviour"—did not prevent valuable work being done by the universities. To-day, the greatness of Turkey's national hero is established so securely that it no longer needs the slavish adulation which formed one of the least pleasant traits of modern Turkey. His régime has proved its intrinsic merit by outliving its founder. When, on November 10th, 1938, Mustapha Kemal Ataturk at last succumbed to the illness that had dogged his life, he closed his eyes in the certainty that his tenure of power had not been an ephemeral dictatorship. And one of his lasting merits will remain the fact that enlightenment and not obscurantism, instruction and not ignorance, were what he chose as the basis of his reign.

To the universities at one end of the educational scale correspond the village schools at the other. A minimum of instruction is now compulsory for all children; in the villages schooling is simple but progressive, teaching not only the "three R's" but also the rudiments of hygiene, physical training and agriculture.

But a country in which up to less than twenty years ago a very large part of the population was completely illiterate, faces yet another problem, not known to the same extent in other countries—that of adult education.

This adult education is by no means limited to the task of imparting the arts of reading and writing. There is the need of spreading social and cultural enlightenment, of interpreting to the people the many innovations introduced by the reformers of Turkey, to encourage completely new branches of cultural activity, and altogether to promote good citizenship.

This task has been recognised and accepted by Turkey's only party, the People's Party, and the instruments for the completion of this gigantic but fruitful task are the People's Houses (*Halk Evi*).

The project is one of the most interesting plans ever devised for adult education. It has now been in function for over ten years and has proved an unqualified success.

The creation of the People's Houses was resolved at the third Party Congress in 1931, and one year later fourteen of these establishments were inaugurated in provincial capitals. They are under the auspices of the Party—the director of a *Halk Evi* must be a Party member—but

every Turkish citizen, irrespective of Party membership, is admitted.

The activities of the People's House fall under nine branches:— (1) Languages, history and literature; (2) The fine arts; (3) Dramatic Art; (4) Physical culture; (5) Social Assistance; (6) Popular lessons and courses; (7) Libraries and publications; (8) Rural life; (9) Museums and exhibitions.

Not every House is fully equipped for all of these activities; but each possesses a library and cultivates at least three of the above branches. In addition, *Halk Odalari* have been opened in many villages. These are "People's Rooms," operating where the full programme cannot yet be attained.

Turkey now possesses over 400 People's Houses, and new ones are opened regularly (among them one in London in 1942). Their libraries possess an aggregate of nearly 500,000 books; according to statistics, up to 1942 25,000 lectures, 15,000 theatrical performances, 8,000 concerts were given, 4,000 courses held and 13,000 exhibitions organised.

The importance of these combined community centres, "polytechnics" and social welfare units cannot be exaggerated. A brief glance at the nine principal fields of work shows this.

The work of the Section of *Languages, History and Literature* is inspired by the Historical Society and the Linguistic Society. It spreads a knowledge of the Turkish language in its reformed state, makes selected native and foreign literature accessible to the masses, and encourages the study of history and literature. In addition, legends, folklore, idioms, popular customs and costumes, are collected and compiled by this section.

In the field of *Fine Arts* the Turks had been hampered in the full exercise of their artistic talents by the ban on the pictorial and sculptural rendering of human beings and animals imposed by the Koran. Turkish artists were therefore limited to the one field of ornamentation; and although some of the finest specimens of the *arabesque* were produced by Turkish artists, the medium is too limited to allow of free artistic expression. A few Turkish artists who studied abroad were deprived of the fertile soil of a native and original tradition, and their work therefore merely reflected contemporary trends in art without being specifically Turkish.

The People's Houses further the developments of Turkish art which since the "disestablishment" of Islam, is no longer hampered by the ancient ban. Painting, sculpture and music, as well as photography are the subjects of courses, and an especially interesting field, cultivated with much attention, is popular art as expressed in peasant costumes and dances.

Art is, of course, the one field in which the power of the State cannot enforce the production of masterpieces. If a nation's art is not to be a slavish copy of other models it must be given time to develop freely and find its own line of development.

Kemal, for instance, conceived a violent dislike for that melancholy and seemingly monotonous, yet so immensely impressive and, as it would seem, typically Turkish type of music embodied in the *amané*.

It is the plaintive chant sung by the fisherman or *hamal* (porter) all around the Mediterranean shore. Kemal insisted on "modern" music of the European type—chiefly jazz. "Proof" was consequently discovered of the non-Turkish origin of the *amané*, it was banned, and the strident clamour of jazz filled the towns. To-day, however, a more tolerant conception prevails, and the Cultural Section of the People's Party rightly tries to promote music by applying the externals of Western musical technique to music which is essentially Turkish in character.

Dramatic Art is an old tradition in Turkey, though its forms were different from those of the Western theatre. The traditional *Kara Gheuz* puppet shows are revived and adapted to modern conditions. They are characteristic expressions of one of the most pleasant traits of the Turk: his sense of humour. Living actors appear in the open air shows called *Orta Oyunu*, dramatic improvisations and topical farces.

The Turkish language, euphonious and rich in sonorous vowels, is a good vehicle of dramatic art. A Turkish national theatre is being built up, based on the Ankara School of Dramatic and Lyrical Art; and the People's Houses make performances accessible to their members.

Physical Culture is one of the foremost activities of the *Halk Evl*. The enormous spread of physical culture throughout Turkey gives the lie to the legend of Turkish laziness and indolence; and at the same time the fundamental change in Turkish conceptions could find no more striking expression than to see boys and girls, young men and women practice gymnastics and all forms of sport together.

Physical fitness, the Turks realise, has always been an important factor of national strength. The physical endurance of the Turkish soldier under conditions of extreme hardship has always impressed foreign observers, and has been one of the reasons for victory in the Anatolian Campaign of 1922. To-day the Sports Association of Turkey controls all sporting and athletic activities; the People's Houses are members of the Association and continue the good work begun in the schools, where education for physical fitness conducted according to modern systems plays a prominent part.

All modern and a number of traditional sports are practised in Turkey—even mountaineering and winter sports, for which the neighbourhood of Brussa and other mountain districts provide ample opportunities. The People's Houses arrange yearly contests, including football matches which are extremely popular.

Social Assistance is an important activity, particularly in rural districts. The spreading of modern ideas on hygiene, the provision of crèches goes hand in hand with support for local charitable activities.

The department for *Rural Life* is of particular importance. In a country where peasants constitute 85 per cent. of the population it endeavours to raise the material and intellectual level of the farmers—no easy task in a land where entire districts have lived in almost complete isolation from the rest of the country. Hygienic and educational conditions left much to be desired.

It is here that the members of the People's Houses do their work.

Assistance is given to the local teachers, modern methods of farming and housekeeping are propagated, care is taken of the sick.

These efforts are greatly helped by the improvements made in rail and road communications, while the radio has proved another important factor.

Libraries and Publications are no longer the reserved field of the few who could master the intricacies of Arabic writing. The language reform has created a vast public eager to assimilate knowledge. The library attached to every People's House therefore meets an urgent need. Apart from books of a general cultural character there are works on technical subjects, dealing with the various parts of the country, their climatic and geographical conditions, their productive and general economic capacities. Similarly, every People's House—and every People's Room—displays a large selection of illustrated periodicals dealing with all the aspects of national reconstruction, giving practical hints and also acquainting a public that has been little used to travelling, with the manifold beauties of their own country.

This valuable instruction finds its practical complement in the department of *Popular Lessons and Courses*. Not only are adult illiterates given elementary instruction, but there are free courses in chemistry, applied physics, electricity, and in many handicrafts and trades. The teaching of foreign languages is another activity of this department. People with the highest qualifications consider it a privilege to give lectures and courses free of charge; they realise that here is a national mission of primary importance.

Finally there is the department of *Museums and Exhibitions*. The country that has played so great a part in history is rich in archæological discoveries. Through the People's Houses the results of research are made accessible to the people and a healthy pride in their great past is inculcated in the nation. The origins of Turkish history form, of course, the object of special studies. In addition to the Imperial Archæological Museum in Istanbul there are now musea in many provincial centres, and historical monuments are preserved with care and understanding. The People's Houses foster an intelligent appreciation of the great relics of the past. No longer will the peasant destroy the remains of ancient temples in order to use the stones for his house.

It has been said that not all People's Houses are in a position to cultivate the full curriculum. Their beneficial effect has nevertheless been immense. One result of their activities is the complete emancipation of Turkish womanhood. From the seclusion of the harem and the virtual serfdom that was the lot of the peasant woman, they have risen to a position where they receive the same education as the men. Here lies one starting point of development towards that full democracy which Turkey will one day obtain. In the spacious and comfortable rooms of the People's Houses the foundations are being laid for the complete democracy which it would have been a mistake to foist on a people not yet ripe for it.

With Kemal Atatürk ended a revolutionary period, radical and

sometimes rough in its methods, but necessary in order to abolish the accumulated abuses of three centuries.

Under the milder régime of his successor the people is preparing for the best form of real democracy—that based on knowledge and enlightenment. The People's Party rightly conceives its virtual dictatorship as a task of tutelage: the leaders of Turkey realise that the maximum of popular enlightenment is the best barrier against reaction and despotism. Fascism is not interested in the spread of culture; therefore the fact that modern Turkey has created the People's Houses proves that she is well on the way towards progress and democracy.

CHAPTER XI.

TURKEY AT THE CROSSROADS

TURKEY LIES AT THE CROSSROADS¹ OF EUROPE AND ASIA—that focal point where the West ends and the East begins.

A barrier between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, she keeps the gates of Asia. To-day only a fraction of her territory lies on European soil—9,200 square miles out of her total area of 294,000.

The area covered by Turkey even after the loss of most of her Empire in Europe, Africa and Asia is still vast—larger than France, Belgium and Holland together, over three times the size of Great Britain. Yet the country is so mountainous and rugged that the population it houses numbers only eighteen million—in other words, the density of population is only one-ninth that of Great Britain.

There are only three towns with more than 100,000 inhabitants—Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara.

Turkey's frontiers form strong natural defences. Even in our days when mountains and streams, natural and artificial fortifications are no longer the insuperable obstacles they were in the past, they are important, particularly where they mark the boundaries of an economic and racial entity.

This homogeneity facilitated Kemal's task of political reconstruction. But reconstruction was no less urgent in the economic field. Turkey presents the paradox of a country still poor despite the fact that it possesses some of the richest mineral deposits in the Near East, that it lies on one of the world's main trade routes, and that its coastline, several thousand miles long, favours seaborne trade.

Here as in many other fields, modern Turkey is struggling valiantly against a heritage of sloth, decay, and the loss of substance caused by centuries of foreign exploitation. For a long time foreign investors drew riches out of the country, whilst the peasant lived in abject poverty. Trade, banking, communications were largely foreign-owned, a state of affairs completely reversed by the Turkish Republic.

The Peace Treaty of Lausanne left the new Turkey with only 2,500

¹ See "Turkey at the Cross Roads, by Philip Paneth. Alliance Press, 1943.

miles of railway. The network has since been almost doubled but is still only one-fifth of that of Great Britain in mileage—one-fifteenth in proportion to the size of both countries.

The state of road communications is even worse. The total length of metalled roads is now some 10,000 miles, compared with 180,000 miles in Great Britain. Nearly half the Turkish roads are scheduled as "in need of repair"; anyone who has ever travelled these roads, full of potholes and turning into mudbanks when it rains, knows what this means.

Modern Turkey has done much to disprove the old story told in Anatolia in the days of the sultans. After an absence of many thousands of years, it was said, Allah once more visited the earth. So much had changed everywhere that he asked for guides to conduct him on his tour of inspection. But when he came to Anatolia he declined the services of a guide. "Here the roads are still as I made them," Allah said.—

Since this story was told Turkey has added nearly one-fifth to the road mileage inherited from the old régime; but much remains to be done. The lack of road and rail communications is but another consequence of the same fact that has so far prevented the full industrialisation of Turkey: lack of capital. Learning from past experience, Turkey prefers relying on her own efforts to opening the door once more to foreign capital and thereby perhaps to economic domination by the foreigner.

For this reason Turkey has still remained essentially agricultural, though her industrial progress during the past ten years is considerable.

More than half of Turkey is pasture land, another 15 per cent. is arable or suitable for intensive cultivation such as orchards and vegetable gardening. An eighth of the country is covered by forests, while one-seventh consists of unproductive ground. The soil is fertile, although erosion has damaged much of it; but methods are still primitive.

The Government has done much for agriculture. It has instructed the peasant in modern farming methods, supplied him with better seed, subsidised him in bad years and improved his marketing and supply facilities through the creation of co-operatives. Silos were built, and schemes of drainage and irrigation were financed by the Government.

Cereals, tobacco and fruit are Turkey's most important crops. She grew sufficient wheat for her own needs; in 1941 and 1942, however, bad harvests, combined with lack of manpower and the strain on transport caused by the mobilisation, produced a shortage. The food situation deteriorated, and a system of rationing had to be introduced.

Turkish tobacco is world-famous. It has given its name to the tobaccos grown in the former Turkish regions of Macedonia and Bulgaria, and the generic name of "Turkish" tobacco distinguishes Oriental tobacco from the American, or Virginia, type. Let us note in passing that there is no such thing as "Egyptian" tobacco. Tobacco is not grown in Egypt: the term applies to a blend preferred by Egyptian manufacturers of cigarettes.

The best Turkish tobacco, as regards Turkey proper, is grown in the Smyrna (Izmir) district. The smallest leaves (*dubek*), sweet and

aromatic, command very high prices; they were generally bought by the great American tobacco trusts and give the characteristic sweet taste to well-known brands of American cigarettes.

Very good tobacco also grows in the Samsun district, on the Black Sea coast. It is highly aromatic and in its best qualities also fetches a high price. Tobacco grown near the Sea of Marmora is of inferior quality and used chiefly for home consumption.

The Turkish tobacco export accounts for 30 per cent. of the total value of exports, and Germany and Austria were Turkey's chief customers in Europe. The same, incidentally, applied to the tobacco exports of Greece and Bulgaria, and here we see the curious political repercussions produced by something so seemingly unimportant as the cigarette smoker's preference. The British public, true to its innate conservatism, stuck to Virginia cigarettes, whilst the market for "Turkish" cigarettes, containing Turkish, Greek and Bulgarian tobacco was insignificant. When these countries were suffocating under tobacco, their warehouses full of bales awaiting a buyer, their peasants in distress, Germany stepped in. She bought the tobacco; but by means of clearing agreements she forced the Balkan countries into her economic net. They were compelled to accept German goods—and with the German goods came German technicians, German instructors, German "tourists," and all that this implies.

At the cost of a slight change in her smokers' taste and a few million pounds—as much in ten years as is now spent on a few days of war—Britain might have secured a preponderant influence in those countries—countries where the German was disliked and feared while British sympathies were an established tradition. But this is after all only one of the many might-have-beens of the period between the wars. . . .

Tobacco is the most valuable industrial crop of Turkey. In recent years successful experiments have been made with another: cotton. The production of cotton in Turkey has already risen to 1 per cent. of world production; it illustrates the astonishing contrasts to be found in a climate ranging from the sub-tropical to the extremes of heat and cold prevailing on the Anatolian plateau.

Figs, grapes, nuts and olives are—and always have been—characteristic products of Turkey. Dried fruits and olive oil are among the most valuable exports.

Crops are grown along the sunny shores of the *Ægean* and Black Seas; but the bare, arid landscape of the interior is still peopled only by flocks of hardy goats and sheep. They form the principal livelihood of the East Anatolian peasant; the long, silky fleece of the *Angora* goats is famous. Buffaloes, mules and even camels are characteristic features of village life; they are often the only means of traction and locomotion. The pastoral industry furnishes valuable exports, notably wool, mohair and hides.

But Turkey's chief wealth, little of which is as yet exploited, are her deposits of coal and other minerals. It is not generally realised that Turkey possesses the most important coal basin in the Balkans and the

whole of the Near East: the coal fields of Zonguldak-Eregli, on the Black Sea coast. With about three million metric tons their yearly production amounts to over 1 per cent. of output in the United Kingdom.

The fields are now under Government control, and British credits and supplies have modernised them. A British firm has also constructed there an electric power station. From these coal fields will come the energy that will eventually enable Turkey to develop her vast industrial potentialities. At present the Turkish Railways, shipping companies and iron and steel industries are the chief consumers. When the Turkish coal fields will be in full exploitation—new deposits have been discovered recently—and hydro-electric power will be developed, Turkey will achieve the industrial progress for which she already possesses the natural prerequisites.

Turkey is rich in chrome ore; she exports practically her total output of this valuable mineral, which is the largest in the world, amounting to one-fifth of the world's chrome production (excluding Russia). A large proportion of Turkey's chrome was and is exported to Germany; in exchange Germany delivers war material to Turkey.

This arrangement was made with Britain's knowledge and approval. While Turkey remains neutral she must have a certain amount of commercial intercourse with Germany, who would otherwise seek a pretext of violating Turkey's neutrality.

"Inonu's desire to keep his country out of the war is well understood by the British," writes Ahmet Izzet Feridum.¹ "For example, when a Turkish agreement with Germany about chromium meant that the British monopoly would not be renewed, no dissatisfaction was publicly expressed in England, unlike America where there was sharp criticism. Britain understood the armament problem of her Turkish ally. In spite of British help and American Lease-Lend deliveries Turkey, exposed to acute danger, was short of tanks and had only two hundred first-line aircraft, although her up-to-date airfields could have accommodated six times that number. . . . For about 50 per cent. of her exported chromium Hitler offered Turkey Messerschmitts and Heinkels, vitally important for Turkey's armament. More than thirty aircraft of the latest types have already been delivered to Turkey. London carefully studied the Ankara-Berlin agreement. Germany has to deliver her goods first; only then do Turkish deliveries follow."

A large number of other mineral deposits exist in Turkey and are being exploited to a greater or lesser extent. Iron, copper, zinc and lead are mined and also exported, while traces of many other metals have been found including gold, silver, mercury and antimony, mined already in classical times. Oil has recently been discovered near the Irak border.

All this wealth will one day play an important part in the development of Turkish industry, long the step-child of the State.

In 1913 Turkish industry employed only 17,000 workers, most of them in milling, textile manufacture and the factories of the *Régie*, the State tobacco monopoly; and even that small industry suffered greatly during the war.

¹ *Free Europe*, January, 1943.

The Republic since its earliest days paid attention to industrial development, but it was not until 1933 that the Government began to plan for establishing and consolidating the country's industrial structure. Two great Industrialisation Plans, in 1934 and 1937, aimed at the development of numerous industries. Some of the finance came from abroad, notably from Russia and from Britain, but to a great extent the State-owned banks of Turkey mobilised the small savings of the small people. A third plan, put into operation in 1938, had to be suspended, owing to the needs of the defence industries.

The remarkable *tempo* of industrialisation cannot be better illustrated than by comparing the value of Turkish industrial production in 1927, when it came to thirty-two million £T, to that of 1940, which amounted to nearly ten times that amount—three hundred million Turkish pounds. Even then Turkey has still a long way to go, and meanwhile the peasant and not the industrial worker remains the backbone of her economic structure.

A promising beginning has been made with the aid of British firms and supplies, of iron and steel production, although it falls far short of industrial requirements.

Turkey must still import her arms and much of her food. She has come near to clothing herself. Four-fifths of her textile requirements are already home-produced, and complete self-sufficiency is aimed at. Cotton, wool, hemp, jute and silk are all produced in large quantities.

It goes without saying that the war has much impeded the development of Turkish industry and trade. The army had to be kept in a constant state of readiness, and tension increased as the German hordes drew nearer to the Turkish frontier. Even now that the Axis has been smashed out of Africa, and the threat to the Middle East by way of Egypt and Palestine is removed, Turkish frontier guards face German troops on the Greek and Bulgarian borders. And Turkey realises what it means to have Germany as a neighbour: the price is constant vigilance.

Another catastrophe visited Turkey during this war. Towards the end of December, 1939, heavy earthquakes shook North-Eastern Turkey, Towns and villages collapsed or were swallowed by fissures in the ground while icy blizzards fanned the smouldering ruins into flame. Four days later, as hundreds of thousands shivered homeless in the terrible cold, floods inundated dozens of towns and villages.

It was one of the major disasters of nature. The death roll mounted to forty thousand, countless people were homeless, thousands of wounded, sick and orphans had to be cared for. But this national calamity provided the opportunity for demonstrating two facts: the efficiency of new Turkey, and the strength of Anglo-Turkish friendship.

The Red Crescent, the Turkish Red Cross, organised the rescue and after-care work with coolness and efficiency. Medical arrangements were described as "admirable" by foreign observers; preventive measures were taken with such promptness that the spread of infectious diseases, so usual after disasters of this kind, was checked.

The public, too, behaved with great discipline. Public security was

maintained without effort; there was no looting, no disorder. Convicts whose prison had been damaged volunteered for rescue work; gangs of other prisoners were put to work without supervision and returned to prison of their own accord.

In the work of relief and after-care, valuable assistance was given by the Anglo-Turkish Relief Committee that came spontaneously into being as soon as news of the catastrophe reached England. Britain, though at war, not only collected large sums at home but also sent a mission with supplies, medical relief and other essentials, while Indian moslems also sent large contributions.

Britain's spontaneous gesture evoked sincere gratitude in Turkey, where feelings of sympathy with Britain were freely expressed by public and press, much to the displeasure of Germany and her representative, arch-intriguer von Papen. While the Government had of necessity to maintain correctly neutral relations with Germany, public opinion was undisguisedly pro-British.

Both German and Japanese propaganda—the latter applied assiduously, based on the slogan “Asia for the Asiatics”—failed to make much impression in Turkey, at least inasmuch as it was directed against Britain. While the question of India, for instance, has consistently exercised Turkish opinion, it is recognised that the Japanese threat to India is immeasurably more grave than the importance of the political issues now being ventilated.

Following developments in Africa and Sicily, a number of papers that were formerly, if not pro-German, yet sceptical as to the chances of British victory, have changed their stance. The visit to Britain by a number of Turkish journalists early in 1943 has gone far in impressing them with Britain's strength and resolution. Others, like the well-known Deputy and journalist, Hussein Yaltchin, editor of “Vatan,” have been sincere friends and supporters of Britain all along.

America, too, enjoys a “good Press” in Turkey. There, as throughout the Middle East, American interest in European affairs is being welcomed, because it is considered untinged by imperialist motives.

German propaganda has not been completely without results in regard to Russia; it has succeeded in awakening ancient distrust concerning Russian expansion in the Black Sea area. The very severe sentences imposed on Russian subjects following an alleged attempt on the life of von Papen have done as little to promote cordial feelings as has the passage through the Straits of Italian warships permitted by the Turkish military authorities. The example of the Baltic States, Finland and even Poland has created a certain amount of apprehension. Once again there looms the spectre of Peter the Great and his famous “testament,” a policy which some Turkish circles believe is reflected in Stalin's dynamic methods. It may be this distrust of Russia which has so far prevented Turkey from becoming a belligerent—a course of action which appeared indicated by the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Alliance.

Anglo-Turkish friendship dates back to the eighteenth century. When Turkey has largely lost its power and became more and more

likely to become a Russian dependency, far-seeing English statesmanship recognised Turkey's potential importance in European affairs despite her waning strength and peripheral position. In 1791 Pitt proposed assisting Turkey in her fight against Russia—a situation that was to recur more than once. Burke rejected the idea of considering Turkey a factor in the European balance of power. The Turks, said Burke, were chiefly an Asiatic people, completely isolated from European affairs; a policy which would admit them to a say in the European scene "would earn the curses of posterity."

Despite this ominous prediction Britain more than once directly and indirectly came to the assistance of Turkey. In 1833 England's intervention saved Turkey from becoming Russia's vassal; in 1844, a joint Anglo-Austrian step saved Turkey from an Arab-Egyptian invasion led by Mohammed Ali. In the Crimean war the British and the French fought side by side with Turkey against Russia; in 1878, as we have seen, it was again Britain who saved Turkey from complete dismemberment.

If this consistent British policy was not dictated by the kind of romantic enthusiasm for the independence of a small nation such as inspired Byron and his Philhellenes, its results were nevertheless beneficial both to Turkey and Europe; and the 1914-1918 interlude has done no lasting damage to Anglo-Turkish relations.

Anglo-Turkish friendship did not always find commensurate expression in trade relations between the two countries. Up to the end of 1939 Germany occupied the leading position in Turkish trade both as the largest buyer of exports and the foremost supplier of imports. The Trade and "Clearing" Agreements which did so much to upset European economy and make it subservient to Germany had gradually placed Turkey in a position where she was obliged to buy German goods in order to liquidate the vast book credits that had accumulated. Here, as always, Germany showed how well she had learned the trick of squeezing her—creditors.

Since the outbreak of war, however, Turkish trade with Germany—and also with Italy which for a time replaced Germany as a prominent customer—has dropped considerably, while trade with Britain has rapidly increased. Since 1940 Britain has bought large quantities of Turkish exports, and has delivered much-needed industrial goods, notably railway rolling stock. Yet the fact remains that the war has proved a severe setback to Turkish trade and the development of industry. Maintaining an army of 900,000 in a constant state of alert is bound to throw national economy out of gear.

Yet it can be predicted with confidence that after the war, when a world liberated from the German nightmare will again see the free exchange of goods unhampered by economic nationalism, Turkey will reap the rewards of vast natural resources, an industrious, frugal and capable population, and a wise and statesmanlike leadership.

CHAPTER XII.

IZMET INÖNÜ

KEMAL HAD BEEN A CATAclysmic force. HE HAD been the earthquake that had changed the face of Turkey.

Such elemental manifestations are beyond our normal standards; our judgment, in the last instance, depends on the eventual good or havoc wrought by their passing. In retrospect, even an earthquake may be found to have achieved beneficial results: it may have shifted the course of streams and thereby made life easier for subsequent generations; or its violence may have caused water to spring from hitherto arid ground.

But an earthquake is not easy to live with; it is feared, respected, even revered—but never liked. Thus it was with Kemal. The nation that followed, obeyed and revered him found it hard to live in an atmosphere of perpetual heroism and change. It found it equally hard to accept a form of politics which had in its early days borne too great a resemblance to political gangsterism and had in later years hardened to what was in effect a personal dictatorship.

For these reasons the accession to the Presidency of Izmet İnönü was welcomed with universal acclaim, based equally on admiration of President İnönü's brilliant record and estimable character and on a feeling of relief.

Izmet had been in many respects Kemal's complete antithesis. Kemal was an atheist, Izmet a devout Moslem; Kemal was addicted to orgies of drink and sexual licentiousness, Izmet an exemplary husband and father whose private life has always been immaculate; Kemal—a wild, savage and unpredictable genius, Izmet—a precise and correct staff officer, of equable temper and complete reliability.

Yet it was indeed lucky for Turkey that these two men fought and worked side by side for twenty years despite their contrasting characters and not infrequent divergences of opinion. For both had two things in common: they were great soldiers, and they loved their country with an ardour which transcended personal considerations.

Izmet was born on October 25th, 1884, as the son of Reshid Bey, a prominent lawyer of Smyrna who later became chief of the legal department in the Ministry of War.

The young Izmet received a good education at Sivas, where he went to the Military High School. From there he passed through the Artillery School and finally the Army Staff College, from which he graduated in 1906 with the rank of Captain.

Stationed in Macedonia, then the hotbed of Young Turkish activities, he joined the movement at about the same time as did Kemal.

Two years after the Revolution of 1909 he distinguished himself on active service in the Yemen and was promoted to the rank of Major. At the end of the First Balkan War he became military adviser to the Turkish Peace Delegation. It may have been there that he learned the old oriental

art of slow and temporising negotiation which was to stand him in such good stead when Turkey had lost another war and he had to head her Peace Delegation.

At the outbreak of the World War he was, at the age of 30, one of the youngest Lieutenant-Colonels in the Army. Colonel Izmet served with great distinction, fighting against the Russians in the Caucasus, against the British in Palestine, and acquiring a reputation for coolness and bravery in the face of danger.

During the armistice period in 1918 he was appointed Under-Secretary for War. Izmet was then aware of Kemal's plans as he set out on his historic journey to Samsun in May, 1919; it was Izmet who had thrown his weight into the scales to obtain the appointment for Kemal. And when he saw where Turkey was heading under the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres while ruled by a weak and vacillating Government that was devoid of national pride and dignity, he resigned his position and joined forces with Kemal. Arriving at Ankara on March 20th, 1920, he became a member of the Grand National Assembly.

Devrim, the revolutionary epoch, was a time of violent dissension, even among the leaders of the revolution. Against Rauf, who wanted to maintain the Caliphate and even a constitutional Sultanate, Izmet, though a cautious politician and rather inclined towards traditionalism, sided with the radical proposals of Kemal.

Apart from politics, Izmet now took a prominent part in the long and bitter War of Liberation. As Kemal's Chief of Staff, Izmet was in command of the forces which defeated the Greeks in two battles fought near the village of İnönü; it is from this place that Izmet, at Kemal's suggestion, later chose his name, in accordance with the Napoleonic tradition. The first battle (January 9th to 11th, 1921) halted the Greek advance north of Kutahya; it was a clash in which Izmet, as Kemal declared, "defeated, not only the enemy, but Destiny as well." The second battle of İnönü (April 1st, 1921) thwarted the second thrust of the invaders. Izmet was then placed in command of the whole of the western part of the front and took part in the memorable and decisive battle of Sakaria which settled the issue. Izmet was with Kemal when the victorious army entered his home town, Smyrna, and it was Izmet who negotiated the Mudanya armistice which ended the war.

In November, 1922, Izmet was unanimously chosen by the National Assembly to represent Turkey at the Lausanne Peace Conference. Dealing for the first time with the victorious and severe statesmen of the West, Izmet refused to be overawed. Lord Curzon, aware that Izmet was slightly deaf, read out a long memorandum in which it was declared that in view of her past misdeeds Turkey could not expect considerate treatment from the victors. Izmet listened quietly to the reading of the document, which occupied a full hour. When it was over, Izmet turned to Lord Curzon and remarked:

"I am sorry, Sir, but I am a little hard of hearing. Would you be good enough to read it again?"

Lord Curzon stamped out of the room in high dudgeon, and the



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(With acknowledgement to "Toronto Star.")

conference remained suspended for several months. Meanwhile Izmet returned to Ankara where his conduct of the negotiations was bitterly assailed in Parliament and Press, and only Kemal's influence enabled him to return to Lausanne.

When he went there in the end, negotiations were resumed in a more conciliatory atmosphere, especially as the former show of severity had been mere bluff: none of the victor States was willing to resume the war against a Turkey which had so impressively shown her teeth at İnönü and Sakaria. Izmet succeeded in winning a negotiated, not a dictated, peace, proving his qualities as a statesman as well as a soldier in this first diplomatic victory for centuries carried off by Turkey.

When the Republic was proclaimed Izmet became its first Prime Minister, a post which he held with one short interruption for fifteen years. He proved an able administrator and wise counsellor in the difficult days of the early republic, and a trusted supporter of Kemal whose radical reforms he backed—even to the extent of surprising the Assembly one day by a speech which nobody could understand: it was the first couched in Kemal's new and purified Turkish. His frequent addresses—logical, dispassionate and concise—served to acquaint the people with the new plans and reforms.

Izmet's special care were the railways, then much neglected. As a soldier he realised their strategic importance for the defence of the vast spaces of the country. At his instigation the State repurchased the railway concessions from the foreign companies that held them (on terms which, let it be admitted, were considered less than fair by investors) and expanded the railway system despite the obvious difficulties.

Izmet made it his job as Prime Minister to promote peace and concord in the Balkans—a Herculean task which still awaits achievement. Hardly a stranger spectacle can be imagined than that of the Turks, the hereditary oppressors and tyrants of the Balkans, appearing in the rôle of peace makers; but Izmet acquitted himself with credit and a large measure of success. He sponsored the Balkan Entente, and when he visited Athens in 1937 to inaugurate what promised to be a new era of peace and understanding in the strife-torn Peninsula, the Greek people greeted him with a spontaneous ovation—the very man who had fought and decisively defeated them half a generation before.

As Prime Minister Izmet was the brains of the Government, and much of the work of reconstruction must be attributed to his efforts, although his modest and retiring disposition caused him willingly to leave the limelight to his flamboyant Chief. In 1937, a disagreement between Kemal and Izmet led to the latter's resignation and retirement; yet Izmet, loyal to the last, never referred to the cause of the trouble and bided his time with dignity.

It came when on the day after Kemal Atatürk's death (November 11th, 1938) the Grand National Assembly elected Izmet İnönü President of the Republic. He brought to his new task his great capabilities and a long and rich experience in public affairs. While he continued the general policy of his great predecessor, he began to humanise the dictatorial

system of Kemal, paving the way for the eventual establishment of democracy.

The war intervened and delayed the development of one of the greatest political and sociological experiments of our time, less publicized but not less interesting than that of Russia.

President İnönü's policy aimed at keeping Turkey out of the war, especially since the entry of Russia confronted Turkey with the same problem as in 1914. An uneasy vigilance has been Turkey's attitude ever since the war. Although Germany concluded a Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression with Turkey, Hitler has not yet attacked the country.

In May, 1939, Britain gave Turkey a guarantee against aggression; on October 19th of the same year was signed the treaty, valid for 15 years, which established an alliance and pact of mutual assistance. By virtue of the pact Britain is bound to assist Turkey in the event of aggression by a third power, while Turkey will aid Britain if aggression in the Mediterranean involves Turkey as well.

This rather elastic formulation has allowed Turkey to remain a non-belligerent so far, especially as the Germans and Italians have avoided provoking Turkey whose military potential makes them think twice, while her raw materials are necessary to the Axis.

But while a cordial friendship unites Turkey and Britain, relations with the Axis are cool and formal. The pro-Axis non-belligerent at the Western gates of the Mediterranean is balanced by a non-belligerent at its Eastern portals who is wholeheartedly on the side of the United Nations.

The day may yet come when the Axis in a last desperate fling may attack Turkey; President İsmet İnönü and with him the whole Turkish people realise this. They also know that Britain will once more stand at Turkey's side, helping her to defend the crossroads that she now guards alone.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

ON THE SPELLING OF TURKISH NAMES

THE vowel-values of Turkish and Arabic being variable, it appears impossible to follow any hard-and-fast rule in the rendering of Turkish names. The modern Turkish spelling is not a safe guide, as many names would appear completely unfamiliar to the European reader.

One and the same name may be spelled Mohammed, Mahomet, Mehmed, Mahmud; Suleiman, Suleyman, Soliman; Murad, Amurat; Djemal, Jemal, Jamal; Kemal, Kamal, Kiamil; Hassan, Hussein; and so on.

The same applies to place names. Here, too, the author has endeavoured to use the forms most familiar to the British reader, and assures all parties concerned that the use of Uskub, Salonika, Dédé-Agatch in lieu of Skoplye, Thessaloniki, Alexandroupolis; that of Constantinople and Adrianople instead of Istanbul and Edirne, or Smyrna for Izmir, denotes no *parti pris*, political or otherwise.

THE SULTANS OF TURKEY

Osman	1281-1326	Suleiman II ..	1687-1691
Orkhan	1326-1360	Achmed II ..	1691-1695
Amurat I	1360-1389	Mustapha II ..	1695-1703
Bajazid I	1389-1402	Achmed III ..	1703-1730
Mahomed I	1402-1419	Mahmud I ..	1730-1754
Amurat II	1420-1451	Osman III ..	1754-1754
Mahomed II ..	1451-1481	Mustapha III ..	1757-1774
Bajazid II	1481-1512	Abdul Hamid I ..	1774-1787
Selim I	1512-1520	Selim III ..	1787-1808
Suleiman I ..	1520-1566	Mahmud II ..	1808-1839
Selim II	1566-1574	Abdul Mejid ..	1839-1861
Amurat III ..	1574-1597	Abdul Aziz ..	1861-1876
Mahomed III ..	1597-1603	(Amurat/Murad V) ..	1876
Achmed I ..	1604-1623	Abdul Hamid II ..	1876-1909
Mustapha I ..		Mehmed Reshad V ..	1909-1918
Osman II ..		Mahomed VI ..	1918-1922
Amurat IV ..	1623-1640		
Ibrahim I ..	1640-1648	Caliphate:	
Mahomed IV ..	1648-1687	Abdul Mejid ..	1922-1924

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